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Abstract

THE NEXUS BETWEEN THE BALLOT AND BULLET: POPULAR SUPPORT
FOR THE PKK AND POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE IN TURKEY

By Nadir Gergin, Ph.D.
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
degree Doctor of Philosophy at Virginia Commonwealth University.
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2010.
Major Director: William W.Newmann,PhD,Professor,L.Douglas Wilder School of
Government and Public Affairs

This study examines the relationship between popular support for the
Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), which is an ethnic insurgent and terrorist
organization mainly operating in Turkey, and its terrorist activities during the preand post-election periods in Turkey . Popular support has been measured
through popular votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK in 1999
general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Two leading theories of social
movements, Resource Mobilization Theory (RMT) and Relative Deprivation
Theory (RD), were used as theoretical approach.
The study uses secondary data and constructs a longitudinal design. An
advanced statistical analysis technique, a generalized hierarchical linear model:

xiv

time nested within subjects (or GHLM repeated measures) was employed in this
study.
Findings indicate that popular support is positively related to terrorist
attacks of the PKK in Turkey. More popular support for the insurgent leads to
more terrorist attacks. Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the
pre-election period of general elections. However, terrorist attacks abruptly
increased upon the election but then subsequent terrorist attacks decline over
the post-election periods.

CHAPTER I.INTRODUCTION

Introduction
For over 30 years, Turkey has suffered from the effects of terrorism that has
resulted in over 30,000 casualties attributed to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party’s
(hereafter the PKK). Founded in 1978, the PKK is an ethnic insurgent and
terrorist organization that originated in the Diyarbakir province of Turkey with the
main goal of establishing an independent Kurdish state in the Middle East
covering parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. The terrorist organization has
adopted the “protracted war strategy” of Mao and Marxist-Leninist ideology.
One of the most significant reasons why the PKK remains in existence is
due to the popular support for both sides (government and insurgent) that is
acknowledged and viewed by both scholars and practitioners alike as being the
determining factor in defeating counterinsurgency warfare. Among other reasons,
popular support is credited primarily to logistical concerns, the nature of guerrilla
warfare strategy, and legitimacy (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). First, in terms
of logistics, supporters provide insurgents with safe havens, freedom of
movement, logistical and financial support, intelligence, and new recruits (U.S.
Army, 2006). Second, the existence of insurgency indicates at least some degree

1

2

of popular support for the insurgent; otherwise, there would be no insurgency.
Finally, popular support generates a feeling of legitimacy that may attract foreign
help and thus afford the insurgent an opportunity to major safe heavens abroad
and receive support from Diaspora.
In brief, popular support relates to resources that increase the insurgent’s
capabilities. For these reasons, the insurgent must make every effort to obtain
popular support in order to win the population over to its side. Insurgency and
social movement literature indicate that if popular support is nonexistent or is not
voluntarily given, it will be acquired through the use of political violence (Galula,
2006; Jordan, 1962; Sarma, 2007; Trinquier, 2006).
In this study, the primary hypothesis assumes that the insurgent’s need for
popular support may lead to committing political violence. In addition, it is
hypothesized that political violence varies depending on the degree of popular
support. Similar to other studies that have measured popular support for
insurgent groups through electoral or polling data (Berrebi & Klor, 2008;
Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Guelke & Smyth, 1992), this study measures the
support for PKK through popular voting for its political party and examines the
influence that this support has had on PKK terrorism over pre- and post election
periods.
The findings of this study could help get insights in to the PKK terrorism in
Turkey and how it is related to the elections. In 1990, the PKK established its first
legal political party known as the People’s Labor Party (HEP) and has continued
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to engage in electoral politics ever since. Until the local elections the general
elections of 2007, votes for PKK’s legal Democratic Society Party (DTP) steadily
increased; however, the vote share dramatically shifted in favor of the
government’s party. For example, the vote share of PKK’s political party declined
across the country from 6.2% in the general elections of 2002 to 3% in the
general elections of 2007. In other words, PKK’s political party lost its popular
support by almost 50% in the general elections. Similarly, vote shares of the
insurgent’s affiliated DTP party declined from 26% to 21% in the Kurdish
dominated regions. If popular support is actually of crucial importance for
insurgent groups, this relative decline should affect PKK’s political violence.
Thus, it would be of interest for the Turkish government to understand how the
relative decline in votes affects the violence characterized by the PKK.
Two leading sociological theories, relative deprivation theory (RDT) and
resource mobilization theory (RMT) were used to address how changes in vote
share of the PKK’s political party are related to the PKK terrorism. Although their
theoretical backgrounds differ and lead in different directions, they can still shed
light on the various aspects of political violence.
The relative deprivation theory (RDT) is based on grievances and views the
differences between an organization’s achieved and expected results as a
source of relative deprivation that leads to political violence. Derived from this
approach, in this study the relative decline in popular votes for the insurgent’s
political party is considered as the source of relative deprivation that is expected
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to increase political violence. On the other hand, resource mobilization theory
(RMT) views an organization’s resources rather than grievances as being the
most important determinant factor associated with an insurgency in reaching its
goals. From the perspective of RMT, a positive relationship between popular
support and insurgent violence is expected; therefore, it is hypothesized that as
the PKK achieves more popular support, the group will acquire more resources
and will consequently be able to carry out more terrorist attacks. Similarly, when
the PKK loses popular support, its ability to carry out more terrorist attacks are
expected to decrease due to lack of resources. Similarly, when the PKK loses
popular support, its ability to carry out more terrorist attacks are expected to
decrease due to lack of resources. Although the assumptions of both theories
differ, they still offer insight that can assist in understanding where the insurgent
will direct its violence in an effort to mobilize the population.
The dependent variable of the study is the “number of PKK’s terrorist
incidents” that have occurred within individual provinces of Turkey, and the main
independent variable is the vote share of the political party affiliated with the
insurgent (PKK), which is assumed to represent the degree of popular support
from the province. In addition to the vote share variable, there are three time
variables to determine whether the elections have any impact on the terrorist
attacks.
This dissertation has a longitudinal study design, and employs a
“discontinuous growth model” using a random coefficient model (RCM) with a
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repeated measures design. Within a longitudinal design, RCM is an intuitive and
efficient way to estimate individual change curves as well as capable of
separating changes over time within individual provinces and differences inbetween provinces at initial status (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). According to Lang
and Bliese (2009), discontinuous growth models represent a specific form of
multilevel mixed-effects models with multiple time variables to model transition
processes over time and individual differences in transition processes. Thus, by
employing this model, the researcher will first be able to analyze terrorism
patterns in each pre- and post election period and across provinces by testing
whether terrorism significantly increases or decreases as a function of time
during these election periods. Second, the researcher will be able to examine
whether there are identifiable differences in patterns of terrorism over time during
the pre- and post election periods (e.g., some provinces may worsen whereas
others may remain the same).
Briefly, the insurgent’s political violence is expected effected by the election
and vary depending upon the level of popular votes in a constituency (province).
If evidence is found suggesting that a relationship exists between popular votes
and political violence, this may help to better understand the insurgent group’s
internal dynamics in terms of political violence as well as identify vulnerable
provinces that may be prone to terrorist attacks during election periods. If
findings suggest that the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is correct, then the
researcher will conclude that insurgent violence varies according to the degree of
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popular votes in support of the PKK political party. In this case, the government
should then focus on “winning hearts and minds” policies to win the population
over to its side and thus erode popular support for the PKK. Furthermore, the
government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces where the
PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular votes.
On the other hand, if findings suggest that the relative deprivation (RD)
theory is correct, the researcher will assume that a decline in popular votes
generates relative deprivation that leads to political violence. If this is the case,
then the government should position its counterinsurgent forces in provinces
where voting for the PKK’s political party have declined, because this would
indicate that failure in elections generates relative deprivation. In this way, not
only can the government use its forces effectively, but it can also predict where
the most vulnerable provinces would be located. Finally, the findings of the study
could be applied to other countries that suffer from ethnic insurgent violence,
namely the IRA in the United Kingdom, the ETA in Spain, and others that engage
in electoral politics.
Problem Statement
Existing literature related to insurgencies suggest that popular support is the
key factor in counterinsurgency warfare. The majority of researchers in this field
have focused on the terrorist’s choice of target and type of attack plan (Galula,
2006; Sarma, 2007; Trinquer, 2006), whereas others have focused on whether
the population supports or disapproves of insurgent violence (Hayes & McAllister;
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2001; 2005). Basically, scholars argue that selective terrorism against selected
targets, namely, soldiers, police officers, and informants, increases the popular
support of insurgency amongst the population while indiscriminate terrorism
erodes its popularity. Although difficult to quantify, various researchers have
measured popular support for the insurgent through electoral data or polling data
on its particular political party and examined the influence of political violence on
electoral outcomes (Bali, 2007; Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008).
However, there remains only scant literature regarding the opposite direction that
examines the impact of the electoral outcomes on terrorism during the postelection period (Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Guelke & Smyth, 1992). Furthermore, most
research concerning the link between popular votes and terrorism is crosssectional that does not take heterogeneousity among the subjects and changes
over time into consideration. Therefore, this study is an attempt to thoroughly
examine this linkage between election outcomes and political violence through
longitudinal data by using a discontinuous model with random effects, or the
random coefficient model (RCM) repeated measures.
Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study is to examine whether there is a
relationship between popular support for the insurgent (PKK) and terrorist
incidents carried by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. And a secondary purpose is
whether elections have any impact on those terrorist incidents. In order to do so,
the researcher tests whether terrorist attacks significantly increases or decreases
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as a function of time during pre- and post election periods, and whether popular
votes for the political party affiliated with the PKK is related to these terrorist
attacks.
Research Questions
In order to reach its goals, this dissertation seeks answers to two main
questions:
1) Is popular support associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks in
Turkey?”
2) Are the elections associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks in Turkey?
Hypotheses of the Study
Two main hypotheses and several sub-hypotheses are proposed to answer
these questions:
H1: “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.
With regards to impact of electoral support, the RMT and RD theoretical
approaches have different expectation, so we have two sub hypotheses:
H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.
H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.
The second main hypothesis of the study is that:
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.
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The PKK could intentionally increase its terrorist attacks over the pre-election
period to discredit the government, to discourage electorates to cast their votes,
and increase its popular support among the Kurdish population.
As some scholars pointed out post election violent events as quick and
short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and
ends in a short period of time (Amerasinghe , 1989). Therefore we expect an
increase soon after the election and a decline in a short period of time and
propose the following hypotheses:
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.
H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period.
Significance of the Study
From theoretical approach, if the study finds evidence to support that
popular votes and elections influence terrorism, this may help to better
understand the insurgent group’s internal dynamics in terms of political violence
and identify possible vulnerable provinces during election periods. If findings
support the resource mobilization theory (RMT) is correct, indicating insurgent
violence varies according to the degree of popular votes in support of the PKK
political party, and it will be suggested then the government should then focus on
“winning hearts and minds” policies to win the population over to its side to erode
popular support for the PKK. In addition, the government should position its
counterinsurgent forces in provinces where the PKK’s political party has retained
or increased its popular votes.
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On the other hand, if findings support the relative deprivation (RD) theory,
indicating a decline in popular votes generates relative deprivation that leads to
political violence, thus the government should position its counterinsurgent forces
in provinces where voting for the PKK’s political party have declined. In this way,
not only can the government use its forces effectively, but it can also predict
where the most vulnerable provinces would be located.
Finally, although this study focuses on the PKK in Turkey, due to the fact
that ethnic insurgencies share some features and all need for popular support,
the findings of the study could be provide some insights into other countries that
suffer from ethnic insurgent violence, namely the IRA in the United Kingdom, the
ETA in Spain, and other insurgent organizations that engage in electoral politics.
Definitions of the Terms in the Study
Insurgency:
‘Insurgency’ is defined as the attempt an attempt to overthrow or oppose a
state or regime by force of arms (Joes, 2004). U.S 2006 Counterinsurgency
doctrine defines an insurgency as an organized movement aimed at the
overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed
conflict (p:13). Since the PKK is an armed organized movement that aims to
create an independent Kurdish homeland in the Middle East, the PKK is viewed
as an insurgent organization; and because of using terrorism strategy that targets
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both civilians and security forces to achieve its goal, the PKK is identified as an
insurgent terrorist organization.
Dominantly Kurdish Populated Region (here after the DKPR):
The PKK considers certain provinces as a part of “Kurdistan” that its claims
to fight for its independence. These provinces are located in the Southeastern
and Eastern regions of Turkey. However, not all provinces in those regions are
considered as a province of Kurdistan by the PKK. In this study, these provinces
are named as “dominantly Kurdish populated region” (here after the DKPR).
Province:
Currently there are 81 provinces in Turkey. They are governed by appointed
provincial governors. Each province has certain number of districts, which are
governed by district governors, governmental employees appointed by the
Ministry of Interior. Districts have certain number of villages and might have
certain number of towns.
The PKK Terrorism in Turkey
Good counterinsurgency policies erode popular support for the insurgent
where poor ones contribute to popular support (Parker, 2007). Thus, it is in the
interest of this study to determine whether Turkey’s current or past
counterinsurgency policies helped the PKK inadvertently gain popularity amongst
the Kurdish population or eroded a considerable proportion of it. The main
purpose of this section is to review what the government did and did not to

12

acquire support from the population. Having chronologically explored the history
of the PKK, this section investigates on the past and current counterinsurgency
policies of Turkey against the PKK in terms of their ability to acquire popular
support from Kurdish population. Finally, its experience on electoral politics will
be chronologically surveyed.
History, Strategy, and Structure of the PKK
The PKK was founded during a meeting of Abdullah Ocalan and his
associates in the city of Diyarbakir on 27 November 1978. This meeting is more
commonly known as the First Congress of the PKK, and in its Foundation
Statement the PKK made reference to the liberation of Kurds scattered in Turkey,
Syria, Iran, and Iraq, and the formation of a “Greater Kurdistan” (see Map 1) in
this region as its long-term objective (Roth & Sever, 2007).

Map 1: the allegedly Kurdistan that the PKK aims to establish.
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Note: Taken from the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Web page:
http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/pkk.htm
The statement also suggested that in order to reach its goals, the PKK
adopted Mao’s “Protracted War Strategy” and Marxist-Leninist Ideology. Mao’s
formula of the people’s war consisted of seven components of which three are
directly derived from Lenin’s strategy of revolutionary insurrection (Joes, 2004):
(1) the people’s war must be led by a Communist Party, 2) must have a military
force strictly controlled by the Party, 3) must have a united front to broaden the
people’s war base of support, 4) must champion the mass line to gain the
people’s support, 5) should set up base areas for support, regrouping and pilot
demonstrations of the revolutionary future, 6) must, to every extent possible, be
self-reliant lest it lose touch with the people−its ultimate source of strength and
support, and 7) the people must rely on three-staged

military strategies of

protracted war: defensive, stalemate, and offensive stages. During each phase, a
particular form of warfare drives the dynamic (Marks & Palmer, 2005). During the
strategic defensive, terror and guerrilla actions lead. During the strategic
stalemate, mobile warfare is dominant and sees insurgent main force units,
equivalents of government formations, take the field, but not seek to hold
territory. At the strategic offensive or ‘war of position’, seeks to hold what is
gained. Mao’s protracted war strategy insist that guerrilla is only an interim phase
of the struggle, intended to enable the insurgents to build a regular army which
will, eventually, win through conventional warfare (Merari, 1993). Mao’s strategy
attaches great importance to popular support from the population and guerrilla
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warfare strategy. The foundation statement explicitly declared that as the
protracted war strategy requires it has adopted a party-front-army approach as
his organizational structure and has chosen ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy as his
main activity.
The PKK publicized itself eight months after his foundation, on July 31 st of
1979 through an armed attack on a Parliamentary Member, Mehmet Celal
Bucak. It declared its foundation and his goals across Turkey to attract the
Kurdish population to join and support the PKK. In order to reach his goals, the
PKK sent its selected members into the Palestinian training camps to get military
training. First terrorists to have arrive in Palestine and started their training under
the supervision of Palestinian instructors in September 1979 (Kalkan, 2007).
Sending its militants to be trained in Palestinian camps has continued until the
PKK establish its own camps in Beka Valley in Syria.
Turkey’s unstable situation, which the PKK and various Turkish left wing
terrorist organizations were a part of it, resulted in a military coup in September
12th 1980.After the military coup, Chief of General Staff of Military, Kenan Evren
took over the presidency; the National Security Council ruled the country until the
parliamentary elections held on November 6th of 1983. Right after the military
coup, under the military command, the Turkish army launched an offensive
counter terrorism campaign against all type terrorist organizations which resulted
in arrest of thousands of people. Under these strict military conditions, the PKK
organized its Second Congress in Damascus, Syria from 20–25 August 1982. It
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was during this meeting that the group decided to initiate a violent armed
campaign in order to establish a Kurdish state (Roth & Sever, 2007); and the
following month, September of 1982, the PKK began sending its trained militants
to Turkey (Kalkan, 2006).
Having completed its military cadre, the PKK also declared the foundation
of its first guerrilla army named People’s Liberation Army of Kurdistan (ARGK)
through very sensational simultaneous attacks on two gendarmerie stations on
August 15th of 1984 in Semdinli and Eruh districts of Turkey. Kalkan (2006) stated
that those stations were intentionally selected because they were small enough
to succeed and would represent the PKK’s war zone. The impact of the terrorist
attacks was huge on the public, the government and other countries. The PKK
still argues that these attacks have determinant impact on aware of Kurdish
problem at the international level (Bayik, 2007).
Early Counterinsurgency Policies: The Coercive Period (1985-2000)
According to Duran Kalkan (2006) at the beginning, government had
considered it as a military problem and expected to suppress the PKK within a
couple days, therefore preferred to respond to these attacks with a three-day
military operation in 1984 and then with a comprehensive military operation in
1985. Furthermore, it was after the 1987 third congress of the PKK that the
Turkish government realized that it would take longer than expected to defeat
PKK

terrorism.

Then

the

government

implemented

a

comprehensive

counterterrorism campaign which is derived from the British counterinsurgency
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experience in its colonial countries during the 1950s and 1960s, especially in
Malaya and Kenya: 1) single leadership; 2) turned insurgents; 3) resettlement; 4)
village guards; and 5) winning hearts and mind policies (Hoffman & Taw, 1991).
These counterinsurgency policies lasted until the early 2000s.
Turkey gave little attention to the winning hearts and minds policies, which
refer to social, economic, health, education and other policies to acquire popular
support from the population trough promoting living conditions of the population
that the PKK relies on. And unfortunately some counter terrorism policies, in
particular a resettlement policy backfired and alienated a considerable proportion
of the Kurdish population from the government and contributed the cause of the
PKK. These poor counterproductive policies could be the main underlying
reasons behind the relative increase in popular votes for the PKK’s political party
in the elections between 1995 and 2002. In his reply to a legislative inquiry
submitted by parliamentary member M. Riza Yalcinkaya, on July 14, 2008
Ministery of Interior Besir Atalay reported that resettlement policy was
implemented in 14 provinces. As a consequence of the resettlement policy,
386,360 individuals left from a total of 62,448 households due to PKK terrorism.
However, it seems that these are numbers are much more than the government’s
claims. According to a recent survey published by Hacettepe University Institute
of Population Studies (2006) found that the number of individuals, who
immigrated from those 14 provinces, is estimated at between 953,680 and
1,201,000. The number is at best three times higher than the official numbers
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stated by the Government. The study also provides the estimated numbers of
immigrants according to years. The study reports that 300,000-380,000 (31.6%)
during 1986-1990, 585,000-735,000 (61.3%) during 1991-1995, 47,000-60,000
(5%) during 1996-2000, and 20,000-25,000 (2.1%) individuals voluntarily or
involuntarily left their homes due to security reasons during 2001-2005 years.
Figure 1 indicates these numbers and percentages during those periods. As
seen, 93% of individuals left their homes between 1986 and 1995.
Figure 1: Number and percentages of individuals who left their homes
Individuals Left Their Homes Due to PKK Terrorism /
Resettlement Program
1996--2000, 5%
47.000-60.000

2001--2005, 2.1%
20.000-25.000

1986--1990, 31.6%
300.000-380,000

1986--1990
1991--1995
1991--1995, 61.3%
585.000-735.000

1996--2000
2001--2005

Winning hearts and minds policies: Cohesive period (2000-present)

The leader of the PKK, Abdullah Ocalan, was captured by Turkish Security
Forces in Kenya in 1999 and the PKK declared a cease fire which lasted till
2004. During this period, a new government led by the Justice and Development
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Party (here after the AKP), came to the power in Parliamentary elections of 2002.
New government opened a new era in counter terrorism. The government did not
favor early coercive counter terrorism and implemented a series of cohesive
counter terrorism policies. When the government stopped implementing them
and has implemented new policies in 2000s, the popular support shifted from the
PKK to the government. Although these new policies are not direct counter
terrorism policies in their nature, they helped to generate a considerable amount
of popular support for the government and eroded a considerable proportion of
the popular support for the PKK. These types of policies are referred as “winning
hearts and minds policies” in the literature. The most distinguished feature of the
new government’s policies is that they targeted the population rather than
terrorists themselves, and sought non military solutions such as health, social
welfare, education and others while securing the local population from the
terrorism.
With regards to new counterterrorism policies, the first effort of the new
government was to repeal the state of emergency and regional governorship
policy, which was being implemented in two provinces. This action removed the
strict rules being implemented in those cities and pressuring on the population
living within eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey, which the PKK
considers them as parts of “Greater Kurdistan.” The government also repealed
the resettlement policy. After 2002, not a single a village has been evacuated
due to security reasons. In 2002, and 2008, the government took further steps to
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promote cultural diversity and made several legal adjustments and removed the
barriers in front of broadcasting in other languages (Dundar, 2006). Furthermore,
in December of 2004, legislatures passed a law which permits the teaching of
local languages; after January 19th of 2004, many courses started to teach
Kurdish language, however, most of them were closed in a short time due to lack
of demand.
The new government’s comprehensive counter terrorism policies have been
identified and described in the “Counter terrorism Action Plan” and approved by
Counter Terrorism High Council (Terorle Mucadele Yuksek Kurulu) on December
29th of 2005. The consequences of the plan have been evaluated after two-year
implementation period in December, 2007. Although the document is classified
and the entire document is not published, some parts of the report have been
leaked out. The plan is consisted of 61 clauses to be implemented in 23 cities
located in the eastern and southeastern regions of Turkey. According to the plan,
the government adopted a long term, unarmed counter terrorism policy alongside
the armed one; however, the armed counter measures are subordinate to long
term and unarmed policies. The action plan identifies the counter measures in
education, health, sports, employment, immigration, religion, and other fields.
The results of the action plan are pleasing and give hope for the future. Şen
(2007) reported the consequences of the plan as follows: To promote the living
conditions of the Kurdish populated regions, the government has spent one
billion dollars for KOY-DES project (Support Villages-Project) to establish a
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drinking water system in 8,000 villages, and built 8,500 kilometers of stabilized
roads, and asphalted 13,500 village roads in the regions.
In the education field, only in 2007, 24,500 of new teachers have been
assigned to and 292 schools built in the designated provinces. Furthermore,
quota of successful students without any costs in private teaching institutions
offering university preparation courses was increased from 2% to 3%. As a
consequence 5,500 students attended these courses with no cost.
In the health field, the number of doctors and other health professionals were
redoubled compared to 2002-2007 period. Only in 2007, more than 1,200
medical doctors and 8,100 health professionals have been assigned to those
provinces. Recep Akdag, the ministry of health, reported that only in Sirnak,
which is a poor city located at the border both with Iraq and Syria, the number of
specialist doctors increased by three times compared to 2002.
Regarding economic measures, the Government has implemented a law to
encourage economic investments such as tax reduction, appropriation of land
with no cost, exemption from worker’s insurance premiums and others. Only in
2007, approximately 3 billion US$ (3 Billion 217 million 105 thousand 696 YTL)
and 11,103 new employment were projected in those regions trough this law.
Within the last four months of 2007, 950 cattle and 2,600 small cattle have been
donated to individuals in need. The government also has implemented a program
to compensate those individuals who have suffered from terrorist acts or
activities undertaken during the fight against terror through passing the Law No.
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5233 on the “Compensation of Damages that Occurred due to Terror and the
Fight against Terrorism” in July 2004 (Brookings, 2009). According to ministry of
interior records, between 2004 and July 30th of 2008, 341,429 individuals applied
to the government to benefit from the law. Commissions have revived the
applications and decided to pay 89,695 of the applicants (EkoNews,
2008).Furthermore, a total of 280 million US$ (390 million YTL) was paid as of
2007 and was decided to pay extra 270 million US$ (374 million YTL).
In addition to these winning hearts and mind efforts, the government made
some adjustments in the criminal justice and diplomacy field. For instance, the
government abolished the state security courts, which trials suspected terrorists
under more restrict criminal procedures. The government also increased the
cooperation between the EU and U.S. The U.S is supporting Turkish security
forces through providing timely intelligence against the PKK targets. This study
argues that it was these cohesive, good counterinsurgency/counterterrorism
policies since 2000s that eroded the popular support for the PKK and generated
the

popular

support for

the

government.

On

the

other

hand,

early

counterinsurgency/counterterrorism policies between 1985 and 2000 have
eroded the support for the government and alienated the Kurdistan population
from the government. The electoral data reflects the impact of these poor policies
on

Kurdish

population.

During

early

counterinsurgency

policies,

which

corresponds the elections of 1991 to 2002, the votes for political party of the PKK
were on the rise whereas it has declined in the general elections of 2007 after the
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new

government

redesigned

its

policies.

In

conclusion,

the

new

counterinsurgency/counterterrorism approached shifted popular support from the
PKK to the government.
Electoral Politics and the PKK
The PKK acknowledges the importance of popular support since the
beginning, in 1970s, but in early 1990s, did become aware of potential of a legal
political party in generating popular support and control over the population.
Therefore it began to engage in electoral politics as soon as it formed its political
cadre and obtained sufficient popular support. It formed his first legal party
named HEP (People’s Labor Party) on June the 7th of 1990. The main purpose of
the PKK in engaging electoral politics is to acquire popular support for its cause,
to gain legitimacy and to control over the population. However, this was neither
the ultimate goal of the PKK nor super ordinate to the PKK. Instead, it is only a
tool to help reach its goals. As declared in the foundation manifesto of the PKK,
the ultimate goal was to create ‘Greater Kurdistan” and this could be achieved
through only armed struggle.
Due to the fact that the government has intentionally rearranged the date
of general elections to be held a week earlier than the actual date the HEP was
caught unready for the elections, therefore made a coalition with the SHP (Social
Democratic Populist Party). The HEP candidates ran for elections under the SHP
within the Eastern and Southeastern regions of Turkey, which dominantly
Kurdish populated provinces and considered as the “Kurdistan” by the PKK.
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However, the PKK’s candidates won the elections and 22 HEP candidates
became parliamentary members in the parliamentary elections of 1991.HEP’s
candidates almost obtained 50% of vote proportion of each province that they ran
for the election. This was a political victory for the PKK as well as the SHP. The
SHP became the third party in general elections and came to the power through
a coalition government with the DYP (True Path Party). In other words, with the
help of SHP, the PKK became an invisible partner of the government. However,
the Supreme Court of Appeals opened a banning case against the HEP party
claiming having links to the PKK. Then another party was founded named DEP
(Democracy Party) in 1993 and all parliamentary members of the HEP joined into
the DEP. However, this electoral victory was ended by the Constitutional Court’s
decision those parliamentary members were convicted and incarcerated due to
the party’s affiliation with the PKK.
Upon the Constitutional Court banning decision, again another new party,
the HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) was founded in 1994 and ran in the
general elections of 1995 and 1999 and local elections of 1999. As seen in the
Figure 2, at the national level, HADEP obtained 4.2% in 1995 and 4.7% of all
votes (Turkish Statistical Institute, General Election of Representatives). Not
surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Appeals opened a case against the HADEP
on January 29th of 1999 then the Constitutional Court decided to shut down The
HADEP Party in March 2003 (Bal, 2003). The PKK again formed a new political
party which was named as the DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party). The DEHAP
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party ran for the parliamentary elections of 2002 in which he increased its vote
rates from 4.7% to even 6.2% across the country (see Figure 2). This was the
highest vote rate that the PKK’s political party has ever had; however due to a
10% proportional barrier in front of political parties in general elections, unlike the
general elections of 1991, which its coalition party the SHP got 20.8% and
passed the barrier, none of the his candidates became parliament members and
took seat in the General Assembly of Turkey (TBMM). However in the 2007
general elections, the PKK has lost some proportion of electoral support both in
the dominantly Kurdish and non-Kurdish populated regions (see figure 1).

Figure 2: Vote rates for the Political Party of the PKK at corresponding election.
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In April 2003, the Supreme Court of Appeals prepared another report and
submitted it to the Constitutional Court to shut down the DEHAP. However this
time, the DEHAP dissolved itself before the Court’s decision and immediately
transferred all of its resources to the DTP (Democratic Society Party), which was
established in October 2005 on an order from Abdullah Ocalan (Gundem, 2008).
It was argued that the actual reason of the new party was not the fear of banning
by the Constitutional Court, but it was because of the fact that DEHAP did not
compete enough with the AKP, the ruling party, and did not receive sufficient
votes from the Kurdish population in municipality elections in 2004 (Gundem,
2008). In the parliamentary election of 2007 only 3.4% of the electorate voted for
the DTP, which indicates a clear defeat of the PKK in terms of popular support; it
was 6.2% in the previous general elections in 2002.

Both the municipality

elections of 2004 and parliamentary elections of 2007 signaled that the PKK has
lost a considerable proportion of his popular support. However expectations in
elections were higher than the achieved results.In an interview with his lawyers in
May 2007, two months before the 2007 parliamentary elections, the leader of the
PKK, Abdullah Ocalan stated that their votes for the DTP were 6% across Turkey
in the 2002 parliamentary elections therefore expecting at least 6.5% of popular
votes in 2007 elections. Due to the fact that the popular votes for its political
party, DTP has declined from 6.2% to 3.4% across the country and 22.86% to
16.17% in the Kurdish populated regions in the general elections of 2007.
Election results of this election were shocking; it was the first time that the vote
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share of the PKK’s political party has moved backward in a general election.
Electoral preferences of the Kurdish population definitely disappointed the PKK.
This dissatisfaction was declared soon by top leaders of the PKK. After the
general elections of 2007, both the Kurdish population and incumbent
government (the AKP) were blamed for the election results. For instance
Abdullah Ocalan, the founder and current leader of the PKK, stated that “the
incumbent government bought votes of the Kurdish electorate” (ANF news
agency, August 11th of 2007). Likewise, A. Haydar Kaytan, another top leader
and one of the founders of the PKK, called newly elected Kurdish parliamentary
members of the ruling party (AKP) as “betrayers”; furthermore stated that “for
those who voted for the incumbent party, it means that leaving their rights to live
and dishonoring themselves” (ozgur gundem newspaper, August 6th of 2007).

Thus this study argues that both the election outcomes of general elections
of 2007 and intimidating statements to the public by PKK leaders indicates that a
significant gap must have occurred between PKK’s expectations and achieved
results of the elections. Since a gap occurred between the previous and current
parliamentary election results this decline may cause a relative deprivation and
thereby lead to an increase in the level of the PKK violence in the post-election
period. However from the resource mobilization theory (RMT) perspective, the
election outcomes indicate support of the Kurdish population for the government
rather than the insurgent PKK. According to the RMT approach success of the
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insurgent depends upon ability to mobilize resources of the population to sustain
a social conflict (Zald & Berger, 1978). Since popular support is essential for
insurgent groups in terms of logistics, nature of the insurgency and legitimacy,
from the RMT perspective it would mean a decline in resources of the insurgent
thereby lead to decline in terrorist attacks across the country but to more surgical
use of violence in certain provinces. Thus this study considers both situations
and examines the PKK terrorism over the time.

CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The main focus of the literature review addressed popular support, use of
political violence for obtaining popular support, and debates concerning the
resource mobilization theory (RMT) and relative deprivation theory (RDT) as well
as political violence related to elections. The researcher reviewed three main
sources of literature consisting of insurgency, social movement and political
science for the following reasons: first, the PKK of Turkey is viewed as an ethnic
insurgency using terrorist tactics, second, insurgencies are categorized in the
literature as revolutionary social movements (Locher, 2002); and finally there are
valuable literature on elections in the political science field.
The literature review consists of four sections. In the first section, literature
that addresses the importance of popular support in an insurgency situation is
discussed. In the second section, use of political violence to acquire popular
support from the population is surveyed. The third section establishes the study’s
theoretical framework by analyzing RDT and RMT, two leading theories related
to the social movement literature. The final section investigates why insurgent
organizations engage in electoral politics and examines the literature regarding
elections and political violence as well.

28

29

The main purpose of the literature review is to examine the importance of
popular support for the insurgent organizations, and what they do to acquire
popular support and how they react to a relative decline in their popular support.
The existing literature argue that due to especially needs for logistics, intelligence
and other organizational resources, popular support is vital important for the
insurgent organizations, without sufficient popular support from the local
population, the insurgent would not achieve its main goals , therefore if they do
not have sufficient support from the population, they often resort violence to
acquire it
Popular Support
Importance of popular support of the insurgency has been pointed out by
both scholars (Galula, 2006; Taber, 2002) and practitioners (Guevara, 1962; Mao
Zedong, 2000). Popular support is vitally important for three main reasons: (a)
Logistical concerns (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). (b) Nature of the
insurgency (Jordan, 1962), and (c) Legitimacy (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006).
Logistical concerns
In order to reach political goals, the insurgent must have logistical support
that is typically provided by the population, namely, safe heavens, freedom of
movement, financial support, logistics, information, recruits, supplies, food, and
funds (Jordan, 1962; U.S. Army, 2006). For example, intelligence regarding the
movement of counterinsurgent forces is a necessary element for successful
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guerrilla operations given that the element of surprise and raids against the
counterinsurgent are achieved through a sympathetic population (Jordan, 1962).
However, when the local population withdraws its support from the insurgent, this
new situation is most likely to result in not only lack of logistics for the insurgent,
but also providing aid in government’s counterinsurgency/counterterrorism
efforts, thus it would increase the efficiency of the government and diminish of
the insurgent’s control over the population (Mesquita, 2005). Furthermore, it may
lead to abandon the struggle and end the insurgent violence (Weinberg,
1991).For instance, when the Maoist insurgents, the Communist Party of NepalMaoist (CPN-M) launched a bloody campaign against the Nepal government to
achieve communist revolution, due to lack of popular support, especially from
urban middle-class— which the insurgent identified them as the main source to
tap their resources in to insurgent organization— it ended its violent strategy and
joined the mainstream political parties upon an agreement between the insurgent
and government on November 21st of 2006 (Gobyn, 2009). In other words, if the
insurgent lacks logistical support, successful guerrilla warfare against the
government cannot be carried out effectively.
Nature of the insurgency
Since the guerrilla fighter is a civilian who has taken up arms and alienates
himself from the people, the insurgent must have popular support (Jordan, 1962).
Without the consent and active aide of supporters, the guerrilla would be merely
a bandit who could not survive; therefore, if the government could claim this
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same popular support, the guerrilla would not exist, because there would be no
war, and thus no insurgency (Taber, 2002). In other words, if there is an
insurgency, there must be some degree of popular support for the insurgent
Legitimacy
Popular support can provide the insurgent movement a feeling of legitimacy
(Gerrits, 1992, as cited in Gassebner, Jong-A-Pin, & Mierau, 2008), and such
legitimacy for the insurgent can be generated by political goals (Hayes &
McAllister, 2005; 2001). For instance, when the IRA’s political party Sinn Fein
won the British Parliamentary elections of 1918 on a separatist forum in Ireland it
represented the popular mandate that justified the Irish War of independence
(1919- 1921), establishment of an independent of Republic

and other IRA’s

campaign against the British rule (Neumann, 2005).
As a consequence, an insurgency that has broad and popular support with
legitimate political goals can attract international public attention to the issue and
thus obtain support from abroad, especially from the Diaspora living overseas.
For instance, The PKK has received reliable support from the Kurdish
communities in Western Europe, especially from German and a lesser degree
from Sweden (Cornell, 2001). In addition to the Kurdish Diaspora, the PKK was
also supported or tolerated by several foreign countries due to various reasons.
During the 1980s, the Soviet Union supported the PKK due to its Marxist-Leninist
ideology; the Syria supported it and provided safe havens due to border dispute
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over the Hatay province of Turkey; and Greece, Iran and Greek Cyprus are
among other countries that supported or tolerated the PKK (Cornell, 2001).
In his book, Beating the Goliath, Records (2007) viewed external support as
one of the determinant factors in defeating powerful, strong governments. For
example, the Kosovar Albanian insurgency led by the UCK guerrillas in
Yugoslavia during the 1990s was able to attract great popular support from both
Albanian natives as well as the international community because the insurgents
were clever enough to convince their internal and international audience that
their goals were legitimate. As a consequence, with help from the international
community and broad popular support, within a few years the UCK won the
insurgency warfare in the political field, even though not on the battlefield.
Muller (1970, 1972) pointed out the perception of ‘legitimacy’ in government
and examined how it relates to political violence. Muller views it as one of the
main and dominant factor in explaining political violence. In his study titled “A
Test of Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence”, Muller (1972) measured
legitimacy with trust political authorities and found an inverse correlation with
political violence. Furthermore, he suggests that belief in the illegitimacy of the
regime and belief in the utility of violence by the “dissidents” (insurgent) in the
past have a substantial impact on individual’s readiness for mobilization to
engage political violence against the government. In his earlier study, Muller
(1970) examined the support linkage between citizens (represented) and political
authorities. His findings suggested that although the performance of political
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authorities certainly has influence on support, the much of this effect depends on
legitimacy sentiment. In other words, if people think the ruling government is
illegitimate, no matter how good the political authorities work, they will not
support the government and its political authorities. By the same token, if the
insurgent’s political party, which won the national and/or municipal elections, is
perceived as legitimate, then its performance would not be important in terms of
popular support. If this is the case, the population would vote for the political
party associated with the insurgent unless it changes its opinion about the
legitimacy.
Types of Popular Support
The importance of popular support is not only a scholarly discussion but
also an operational and political goal for the insurgent. For example, Che
Guevara (1962), an insurgent leader, viewed popular support as an
indispensable condition of guerrilla warfare, and Mao Zedong (2000), another
insurgent leader, famously noted that due to the fact that guerrilla warfare derives
basically from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist nor
flourish if it separates itself from their sympathies and cooperation. Similarly,
Galula (2006), a counterinsurgency practitioner and analyst, viewed support of
the population as the “first law” of the counterinsurgency warfare, and Ney (1962)
also concurred that the insurgent cannot survive or function without popular
support. Although both scholars and practitioners of insurgencies have pointed
out the importance of popular support, few have explicitly mentioned the type that
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is vitally important for the insurgent or the key determining factor in insurgency
warfare.
Current literature divides popular support into “active” and “passive.” Active
support includes people or groups who join the insurgency and provide critical
assets

to

the

insurgent

including,

for

example,

logistics,

intelligence,

transportation, and safe havens, and carry out actions on the behalf of the
insurgent (U.S. Army, 2006).
Passive support refers to tolerance or acquiescence and includes those
individuals who quietly sympathize with the insurgent but are unwilling to provide
material assistance; however, they do allow insurgents to operate, but do not
provide information to counterinsurgents (O'Neill, 1990). Passive support often
has a great effect on the insurgency’s long-term effectiveness (U.S. Army, 2006).
As Taber (2002) pointed out, without the sympathy, cooperation, and support of
the people, the insurgent would be merely a bandit and inevitably fail. Lawrence
(1929) underlined passive support and argued that the insurgent must have a
friendly population−not actively friendly−yet sympathetic to the point of not
betraying rebel movements to the enemy. Galula (2006) divided the population
into three groups: an active minority against the insurgent; a neutral majority, and
the active minority supporting the insurgent. Resource mobilization theory (RMT)
better describes the groups in a population. For example, in their resource
mobilization theory, McCarthy and Zald (1977) added one more group and
divided the population into four major groups and subgroups: (a) constituents
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(active supporters), (b) adherents (passive supporters), (c) public bystander
(neutral majority), and (d) opponents. The RMT approach also distinguishes
these active (constituents) and passive supporter (adherents) groups by whether
or not they will directly benefit from the insurgent’s accomplishments. The term
“beneficiary” refers to those who would benefit directly from the insurgent’s
accomplishment of goals, whereas “conscience” refers to those who are direct
supporters of the insurgent but do not stand to benefit directly from its success in
accomplishing goals (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).
Dividing popular support and the population into groups could have
important practical implications in an insurgency. In order to defeat the opposing
party, each side (government and insurgent) must carefully analyze these
portions among the population and develop an effective strategy to win these
groups over to their own sides. However, there is no consensus relating to this
matter in the literature; rather, there are different suggestions pertaining to the
groups that should be addressed. For example, according to Galula (2006) the
insurgent focuses on the “neutral majority” and aims to mobilize it against the
government with assistance from the supportive minor population. However,
Sluka (1989) stressed the “opponent” group by arguing that the insurgent can
survive even without active support from its population but cannot survive in a
hostile population against support. Both Galula (2005) and Sluka (1989)
suggested that the government should focus on the insurgent’s “opponents” and
mobilize them against the insurgent.

36

From the insurgent’s side, RMT theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977)
suggested that the insurgent focuses on passive supporters (adherents) as well
as active supporters (constituents) rather than the public bystander (neutral
majority). The reason derives from RMT’s concerns regarding the mobilization of
potential resources into the insurgent organization. Since the main concern of the
RMT is how to acquire support from the people and mobilize their resources into
the organization, depending exclusively on mass beneficiary active supporters
(constituents) would reduce the potential size of the resource pool that could be
used for goal achievement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Similarly, depending upon
beneficiary passive supporters (beneficiary adherents) would severely restrict the
amount of resources the organization could raise (McCarthy & Zald, 1977).
Therefore, the RMT approach suggests focusing especially on non-beneficiary
passive supporters and both active and passive supporters who are “isolated”
from the insurgent. The term “isolated” refers to individuals who do not meet face
to face with the insurgent and are not bound to the insurgent through solidary
selective incentives (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). In order to do so, McCarthy and
Zald (1977) suggested that effective media campaigns would be the best means
to obtain resources from isolated constituents, and attractive “political goals”
would work best for the isolated passive supporters (adherents).
Similar to RMT theorists, Funes (1998) divides their audience into four
major sectors and describe the theoretical framework. First is “operative base” of
ETA (active supporters). They effectively support the violence. Second is “area of
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influence” of ETA (passive supporters).They may not directly support violence,
but they tolerate it and offer a kind of emotional support that may be transformed
into active support at any moment. Third are “indifferents” (neutral population).
They do not support ETA violence; they do not share their goals. Finally, “passive
opponents” of the ETA. They reject ETA violence under any conditions and do
not agree with the ETA. However, due to fear, they keep their opinions to
themselves. According to Funes (1998), although these citizen groups target all
of those sectors of the society, their first priority, is the ‘passive opponents”
against the insurgent. Second, is “neutral population”. Third is ‘passive
supporters” of the insurgent. Because it is very difficult to influence the active
supporters; citizen groups strive to influence the people who are close to the
violent group. In contrast to the traditional insurgency theorists, such as Galula
(2006), Trinquer (2006)— who suggests mobilization of the mass against the
insurgent—, Gesto por Paz and Elkarri of Spain is a good model of civilian-led
mobilization against the insurgent.
Although most scholars points out the importance of eroding popular
support for the insurgent, they do not clearly describes how to practice it. In her
study titled Social Responses to Political Violence in the Basque Country:Peace
Movements and Their Audience, Funes (1998) describes how citizen groups,
Gesto por Paz (“gesture toward peace”) and Elkarri (“among all of us”), that have
been formed in mid1980s against the ETA violence in Spain was able to create a
social pressure against ETA’s active and passive supporters, thus eroded
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popular support for the insurgent. These two groups have more than a hundred
subgroups that are consisted of thousands of supporters spread throughout the
Basque country and autonomous community of Navarra. The main of these
citizen groups is to end the violent conflict. Their members organize meetings;
bring together people with different viewpoints to convince one part of society,
which supports ETA violence, to give up violence and the government to help
end the violence. If any person becomes a victim of terrorism due to ethnic
conflict, regardless of whether a policeman, civilian, or terrorist, the following day,
these citizen groups organize periods of silence for 15 minutes. Each local group
chooses one specific venue, a very central place where these silent periods are
observed. Supporters of these citizens groups know where and when, they need
not be summoned to attend. Or if someone is kidnapped by the ETA, they come
together at the same time, on the same day, every week until the terrorist
organization release the victim.
With regards to theoretical framework, according to Funes (1998, p.507)
these citizen groups adopted the McAdam (1983) process of cognitive liberation
process. The first step is loss of legitimacy. In this step, use of violence as a
means to reach political goals is delegitimized and a people are aimed to be
isolated from the violence. When this isolation succeeded, it increases the costs
of remaining a member of ETA supporter. The second is “the abandonment of
fatalism”. This step helps to culminate it and gives a new sense of efficacy. In the
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final step, a new consensus is formed based on enhanced feeling of group
political efficacy.
Political Violence for Popular Support
Although the literature points out the importance of popular support for both
sides, it neither explicitly explains the possible actions that the insurgent would
take when it senses losing a considerable amount of popular support nor the
relationship between political violence and popular support. Furthermore, there is
no consensus regarding whether violence against civilians increases or erodes
popular support for the insurgent. In this dissertation, we argue that the need to
secure survival forces the insurgent to use political violence even against its own
native population.
Rationale of Political Violence against Civilians
Under what conditions do insurgent groups either gain or lose popular
support is a complex issue that remains inadequate. The question of when
political violence generates or erodes popular support for the insurgent is
typically explained by two similar categorizations: (a) combatants and
noncombatants (civilians) and (b) “selective or discriminate terrorism” and
“indiscriminate or blind terrorism.” Indiscriminate force refers to the application of
force against a target without limiting the force, whereas discriminate force refers
to the limited use of force (Martin, 2009). Martin developed a political matrix
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depicting the relationship between the “quality of force” used by terrorists and
“characteristics of the victim” of the attack (see Figure 3).

Figure 3: Political violence matrix

Martin (2009) suggested that when force is used against combatants, it
characterizes a warfare environment. However, when force is used against
noncombatants or passive combatants, it occurs in a terrorist environment.
Although Martin’s model indicates the type of conflict involving the terrorist and
the victim, it can also be used to understand when a terrorist attack can either
generate popular support or backfire. As shown in Figure 3, the insurgent has the
best chance of obtaining support from its own population if it discriminately
attacks only combatants.
Although terrorist attacks can appear random, some scholars argue that
they are usually highly selective in target selection and serve a distinct goal
(Boyle, 2009). Because the insurgent is rational in its terrorist attacks, most
terrorist violence is not indiscriminate or irrational; instead, it plays a quite
strategic role in insurgent’s overall direction, and can be surprisingly effective in
achieving its political aims (Kydd &Walter, 2002; 2006; Enders&Sandler, 1993;
Barros, Passos&Gil-Alana, 2006; Lake, (2002). Thus, if the insurgent is rational,
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then it should follow a specific pattern (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006;
Hewitt, 2000).
Despite these categorizations, whether indiscriminate violence against the
population can generate popular support remains a controversial issue. Some
researchers argue that indiscriminate violence erodes popular support for the
insurgent (Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Guevara, 1962; Abrahams, 2006), whereas
others claim that the insurgent still obtains passive support due to discouraging
the population to cooperate with the government through intimidation (Jordan,
1962; Kalyvas, 1999; Trinquier, 2006). Taking the former approach, Guevara
(1962), an insurgent theorist and practitioner, was opposed to attacking civilians
and stated that “terrorism is a negative weapon and in no way produces the
desired effects. It can turn people against a revolutionary movement, and brings
with it a loss of lives among those taking part which is much greater than the
return” (p. 35).
Thornton (1980) distinguished selective terrorism from indiscriminate
terrorism by arguing that if the insurgent carefully selects its targets and
discriminately commits terrorism against only those selected targets, the
population does not feel anxiety; however, totally indiscriminate attacks are not
desirable for the insurgent. Stated differently, these attacks are not desirable
because the insurgent has a political goal, and attacks must be directed toward
fulfilling that goal. Abrahams (2006) approaches target selection from terrorist
success perspective—which is defined as success as achiving the groups’s
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declared political goals—rather than from a popular support perspective. He
focuses on foreign terrorist organizations only and their terrorists attakcs on
target government’s civilian population only. He concludes that the key variable
for terrorist success in achieving political goals is the ‘target selection’; groups
who attacks mostly civilians rather than combotants systemactically fails to
achive their political objectives (p.52), because the government’s population
interpret the consequences of a terrorist attacks targeting civilians as an attack to
destroy the society, its core values or both rather than the group’s limited political
objectives such as control over a piece fo territory or national self-determination.
His analysis is based on the social pyschologist Edward Jones (1976 )’s study
which found that observers tend to interpret an actor’s objective in terms of the
consequence of the action.
Similar to Thornton (1980), Douglass and Zulaika (1990) acknowledged the
difference between selective and indiscriminate violence as exemplified by two
ETA bombings in 1987 at a shopping center in Barcelona and military barracks in
Zaragoza that indiscriminately killed many bystanders. These attacks prompted
enormous public demonstrations that involved hundreds of thousands of
participants against the violence. As a consequence, the ETA then stated that it
had not intended to produce civilian casualties in the Barcelona case and
claimed that the authorities had worsened the situation by giving advanced
warning (Douglass & Zulaika, 1990). Likewise, Funes (1998), Bueno (2005), and
Mesquita (2005) argue that despite the advent of political freedom and
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constitutional guarantees, during transition from dictatorship to democracy and in
its first years of democratic stability, the ETA increased its violence and carried
out bloodier and indiscriminate terrorism against civilians. The ETA also
attempted but failed to kill Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Aznar in April 1995,
and King Juan Carlos in August 1996 (Barros, 2003).As a consequence of its
sustained bloodier, indiscriminate terrorism campaign, its idealist image as
freedom fighters fighting against the dictator began to erode and the ETA began
to lose the popular support it had been enjoying (Funes, 1998; Barros, 2003),
and as a negative consequence of these attacks, Aznar’s Popular Party, which
adapts a hard-liner approach, was elected in the elections of May 1996 (Barros,
Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006).
Similarly, when a landmine targeting the military exploded near a passenger
bus and killed six children and 32 other civilians, and wounded 72 others on June
6th of 2006 (the U.S Counterterrorism Center, 2006 report), the leader of the
insurgent group issued an order to the military wing, the PLA, to stop all ‘physical
actions’ against unarmed people (Gobyn, 2009).
Thompson (1966) likewise argued that after a certain point, indiscriminate
terrorism will shift the support in favor of the government. For instance, when the
Chechen insurgents bombed three apartments that killed 229 Russian civilians in
1999, it eroded a considerable amount of popular support from Russian
population for the Chechen insurgency. Russian sympathizers who used to favor
Chechen’s war for the independence shifted their view and became opponents.
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According to Abrahams (2006), from the onset of military operations until the
ceasefire in August 1996, some 70% of Russian opposed the war between the
military and the Chechen insurgents; according the Public Opinion Foundation,
71% of Russians were willing to trade the land for peace. However, the following
terrorist acts, these numbers were reversed; 73% of Russians supported Russian
Army to advance into Chechnya whereas only 19% of Russians wanted peaceful
negations with the insurgents.
Researchers of the latter approach adopt more rational and convincing
arguments. For example, since popular support is vitally important for insurgents,
by terrorizing the population, the insurgent will still be able to obtain passive
support because of their ability to discourage supporters from cooperating with
the government (Jordan, 1962; Kalyvas, 1999; Trinquier, 2006).
Although these categorizations are certainly useful, they are still insufficient
in capturing the dynamics of political violence against civilians. In order to clarify
this vague explanation of violence against the population, this dissertation offers
an additional dimension in categorizing the population. The researcher divides
the population into two categories and then integrates a new concept into
“selective” and “discriminate” terrorism. Thus, this study suggests that violence
against civilians should be analyzed under two categories: (a) the insurgent’s
native (own or local) population and (b) the government’s population. Without
distinguishing between them, one cannot reach an accurate conclusion regarding
the relationship between political violence against the population and popular
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support, because violence against each group has different dynamics and
pursues different goals. Few researchers (Boyle, 2009; Goodwin, 2006; Hewitt,
1990; Ney, 1962) have analyzed the distinction between the government’s
population and the insurgent’s native population.
Violence against insurgent’s own population
As a main principle, Mao Zedong (2000) disapproved of violence against
the insurgent’s own population by stating that “… in a war of counterrevolutionary
nature, there is no place for guerrilla hostilities. Because guerrilla warfare
basically derives from the masses and is supported by them, it can neither exist
nor flourish if it separates itself from the population” (p. 44). However, the
literature indicates that on many occasions, the insurgent breaks Mao’s rule and
uses political violence against its own population.
In contrast to Mao Zedong (2000), O’Neill (1990) suggested that in order to
gain popular support, insurgent organizations will use coercion against their own
people when other non-coercive methods do not work. Likewise, Ney (1962)
suggested that terror is the insurgent’s most potent weapon used to extort the
support of its “own” people. Alonso (2007) further argued that the insurgent often
attempts to acquire such support through fear, because this method stresses that
any opposition to its objectives will come at a price, and Sarma (2007)
considered the use of terrorism as a tool to ensure that necessary conditions will
prevail in which such support can thrive. Trinquier (2006) argued that
unconditional support of the population is a necessary factor of victory in guerrilla
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warfare; if it does not exist, it must be secured by every possible means, of which
the most effective is terrorism. Similarly, Jordan (1962) suggested that when
popular support is not always given voluntarily, it is acquired through terrorizing
the population. Similarly, Ney (1962) argued that when voluntary support cannot
be sustained at the desired level, the insurgent will almost inevitably resort to
terrorism in an effort to compel this support, and when used against an
insurgent’s own people, political violence establishes the needed popular
support.
Although the use of political violence against an insurgent’s own population
for the purpose of obtaining popular support has been pointed out, little
information is provided regarding the logic, dynamics, or how it works or
generates popular support. This constitutes one of the weaknesses of the
insurgency literature that should be strengthened. We argue that if the insurgent
lacks the desired level of popular support, it will apply political violence against its
own people to ensure that secure survival of the insurgency as well as the
organization is secured. As mentioned previously, it is believed that success in
counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves greater popular support (U.S.
Army Stability Operations and Support Operations Manual of 2003), and as the
insurgent group gains support, its capabilities grow (U.S. Counterinsurgency
Manual of 2006). On the other hand, when the population strongly supports and
believes in its government, then chances for the insurgent are remote (Jordan,
1962). Therefore, popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare.
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Due to this determining feature, popular support is viewed as a zero-sum
commodity given that a gain for the insurgency is a loss for the government, and
a loss for the government is a gain for the insurgency. This is the reason why the
insurgent resorts to political violence when it does not have sufficient popular
support.
As RMT theorists McCarthy and Zald (1977) pointed out, once insurgent
organizations are formed, organizational survival becomes their primary goal.
Consequently, they pursue their goals only if they secure organizational survival.
Since popular support is crucial for survival, if the insurgent senses that support
is being threatened, any means to protect its survival will be used, even violence
against its own native population. According to McCarthy and Zald (1977), this is
because without securing survival, the insurgent cannot pursue its goals at any
rate. Stated differently, if the insurgent cannot obtain the population’s support
and resources (e.g., intelligence, recruits, and logistics) and does not use
violence to obtain them, it will not survive and not reach its goals anyway.
However, even if the population does not willingly choose to provide any support,
the insurgent will still secure its organizational survival by using violence against
the civil population to acquire the necessary resources. Although the insurgent
will not obtain “active support,” by terrorizing the population it can still convert the
people who do not cooperate with the government into “passive supporters” with
“blind eyes.” As a consequence of this violence strategy, regardless of whether
the people have sympathy or not, if they wish to live, they have no other choice
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than to provide all kinds of requested materials and resources to the insurgency.
If this is the case, the first important mission for the insurgent becomes survival,
not one of being liked by the population. Without a doubt, however, this is the
insurgent’s worst scenario and its least desired situation.
On the other hand, after securing survival, the insurgent still has the chance
to gain the population’s hearts and thereby reach its goals. Popular support is not
continuously given to one political side (Galula, 2006) but rather is conditional
and can change with time (Janos, 1980: Galula, 2006). This is because the
population weighs the level of threat and its party’s chance to win before
choosing a side and is thus more likely to be on the side of the party whose
popularity and effectiveness are combined. In the initial stages, even if the
people view the government as being more powerful, as the insurgent increases
its threat against the population, and/or wins some battlefield victories against the
government, the insurgent acquires more support from the people. For example,
Kalyvas (1999) found that the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) of Algeria
killed many Algerian civilians who supported the country’s secular government or
simply refused to support the organization. According to Ney (1962), this
intimidation technique usually works. Ney argued that when the Algerian
insurgency commenced on November 1, 1954, the number of insurgents was
estimated to be a few hundred to 3,000 but sharply increased to 20,000 full-time
guerrilla troops by the beginning of the 1960s. This growth in strength was
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attributed primarily to the widespread use by the FLN’s leadership of political
violence against the Moslem population (Ney, 1962).
The rationale to resort to violence requires secure survival of the insurgent
and insurgency. Although without support the insurgent cannot not achieve its
goals anyway, by frightening and forcing the people to support the organization
through new recruits, information, logistics, and other means may appear to be
the most rational and effective choice. As a result, for a population that is
involved in insurgency warfare against a foreign power, the insurgent’s threat
may possibly be envisioned greater and closer than the counterinsurgent
government’s threat of imprisoning anyone who supports the insurgency.
Violence against the government’s population

Hayes and McAllister (2005; 2001) stressed the importance of the
insurgent’s political goals to generate popular support by suggesting that political
ends justify the violence. Furthermore, if violence is perceived as having the
greatest chance of achieving the required political goals, then it will be used.
Thus, by employing violence against the government’s population in order to
achieve political goals can be viewed as legitimate by the insurgent’s own
population and even generate support. According to Boyle (2009) carefully
planned selective terrorism against the government’s population indicates the
capability of inflicting pain on the government and protecting the insurgent’s own
population. Furthermore, such violence is a way to boost the insurgent’s
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reputation for toughness and indicate its nationalist, ethnic or sectarian
credentials as well as its willingness to fight in local power contests (p.218).
Likewise, Hoffman (2004) argues that terrorism against enemy population is a
message directed towards the insurgent’s own constituents and can be used
stimulate popular activitism, bolster the insurgent’s base of support, help mobilize
the population and achieve a self sustaining rate of organizational growth (as
cited in Boyle, 2009). For instance, during so-called second Palestinian Intifada
public support for terrorist suicide bombings stood at 70% of Palestinians (BBC
News, 28, June,2002, as cited in Neumann,2005, p.947). According to Neumann
(2005) support for terrorist attacks not only depend on nature of targets but also
time and circumstances of the attacks. In his cross national study, Hewitt (1990)
found that popular support for insurgent violence does not decrease due to
terrorist violence against the government’s population (“ethnic enemy”)(p.166).
Goodwin (2006) distinguished the insurgent’s own population from the
government’s population and proposed three key contextual factors that strongly
influence groups to adopt indiscriminate terrorism as a political strategy: (a) a
perception that large numbers of civilians benefit from, support, or at the very
least tolerate the use of repressive measures by the state against militant groups
and their constituents; (b) a large and relatively unprotected population of
‘‘complicitous’’ civilians; and (c) ‘‘social distance’’ between the terrorists, their
constituents, and the target population. Likewise, Hewitt (1990) divides the
population into two main categories: insurgent’s constituency (“fellow ethnics”)

51

and its enemies (p.147). Similar to the RMT approach, he argues that insurgent’s
constituency consists of both potential and actual supporters. Hewitt concludes
that “nationalist ideology” legitimates terrorist violence and generates a positive
image of the insurgent as long as terrorism campaign uses proper tactics and
does not kill “fellow ethnics”. Using a similar analogy, from an ethnic conflict
perspective, Bruce (2001) suggest that when the society is divided into ‘us’ and
‘them’, they become ready to deploy violence against the other. From this
perspective, we argue that when the insurgent used violence against the
government’s perspective, it would be tolerated or even generate support.
Similarly, Mack (as cited in Record, 2007) focused on the government’s
population and argued that success of the insurgent arises from the “progressive
attrition” of the government’s political capability to wage war, not a military
victory. In Mack’s view, attacking the government’s population would erode the
government’s “political will” to continue to wage insurgency warfare and thus lead
the insurgent to victory. Enders and Sandler (1993) argue that the main logic of
massacring innocent civilians is to bring pressure on the government to accept
their demands. From a similar perspective, by considering Palestinian terrorism
that gains since the early 1970s, Dershowitz (2002) argues that terrorism works
and is an entirely rational choice to achieve to achieve political goals (as cited in
Abrahams, 2006, p.44). Although targeting government’s civilians generate more
concerns among the government’s population and erode the political will of the
government, targeting governmental targets may also erode its political will under
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certain conditions. For instance, the Lebanese-based Shiite terrorist group,
Hezbollah’s terrorism campaign successfully compelled the United States and
France to withdraw their military forces from Lebanon in 1984 (Atran, 2004, as
cited in Abrahams, 2006, p.45), because they successfully eroded the
government’s political will to continue the wage against the insurgent. Similarly
when the violent attacks by the insurgent LTTE against the Indian Peace
Keeping Force, or the IPKF — Indian army troops that were deployed in Sri
Lanka to disarm the insurgent LTTE and enforce the Accord that was signed
between the India and Sri Lanka government on July 30 th of 1987— increased
and caused over 1,500 casualties, it eroded popular support among the Indian
population for Gandhi government’s Sri Lanka policy and political will of the new
government. From the autumn of 1988 there was little public support for the
government’s Sri Lanka policy. Due to lack of political will of the new National
Front government, as soon as it got elected in the elections of December 1989, it
agreed to the prompt withdrawal of the IPKF by March 1990 (Crenshaw,
2000,p.151).
Comparable to Record and Mack, Enders and Sandler (1993), and Galula
(2006) believed that despite FLN’s military defeat on the battlefield, due to the
lack of political will in Paris, the French withdrew all troops from Algeria and
granted independence to Algeria in 1962. Therefore, we argue that unlike
violence against the insurgent’s own population, insurgency violence against the
government’s population might be more tolerated and even have a more positive
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effect on the native population and generate popular support among the
insurgent’s population, especially if the insurgent’s population believes it would
erode the political will of the government or bring the government to its knees.
Conclusion
To sum up, the insurgent must depend on the population due to its logistics,
intelligence, new recruits, financial support, food, and other requirements needed
to wage guerrilla warfare and reach its political goals. Therefore, the level of
popular support among the population should always be assessed by the
insurgent. As Galula (2006) pointed out, popular support is not continually given
to one political party but rather is conditional and can change with time. Because
popular support is conditional and can shift from one side to the other, the
insurgent cannot risk losing this important support and therefore must take
necessary steps to retain or regain popularity. Insurgency leader Che Guevara
(1962) acknowledged the possibility of changes in conditions and the importance
of a popular support level in insurgency warfare and further suggested that the
guerrilla must analyze the popular support. Likewise, Mao Zedong (2000) pointed
out the changes in local conditions and suggested making modifications if
necessary. In short, both insurgency leaders warned other insurgency leaders for
possible changes in the environment. Taking this approach in this study, the
researcher examines the insurgent’s responses to relative changes in its popular
support level.
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Debate on Relative Deprivation Theory (RD) and Resource Mobilization Theory
(RMT)

Two leading theories of sociology, relative deprivation theory (here after,
RDT) and resource mobilization theory (here after, RMT), have been widely used
in the literature to explain political violence and the occurrence of social
movements. These theories constitute the principal theoretical framework of this
dissertation for two main reasons. First, we view the PKK as an insurgent
organization that uses terrorism as a tool to reach its goals; and insurgencies are
categorized as “revolutionary social movements” in the social movement
literature. Second, each theory is based on different assumptions and
emphasizes various aspects of insurgencies that could shed light on the PKK’s
use of political violence.
Relative deprivation theory assumes that the difference between achieved
and expected results generate relative deprivation that frequently leads to
collective action (political violence) in order to achieve goals of the social
movement (insurgency). This theory views discontent or grievances as the
source of political violence. Although RDT’s main focus is on individuals, in this
study its concept is applied to (insurgent) organizations.
As a reaction to RDT, resource mobilization theory does not view
grievances and inequalities as sufficient factors for the occurrence of social
movements but rather considers them as a precondition for the occurrence of
social movements. Furthermore, the RMT approach suggests that without
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forming a social movement organization and resources available to the
organization, social movement conditions cannot lead to collective action. The
resource mobilization theory assumes that social organizations compete for
resources to be flowed into the organization, and sometimes this competition or
lack of resources available to the movement leads the social movement
organization to use violence to obtain them. Resources may consist of financial
assistance, equipment, land, information, and intelligence, among others. Since
almost all of these resources are usually provided by the population to the
insurgent, taking the RMT approach, in this study, popular support is viewed as
the potential resources available that could be transferred to the insurgent.
Although the theoretical grounds of each theory differ, both shed light on different
issues that could influence post-election terrorism.
Relative Deprivation Theory
The relative deprivation theory became a dominant theory in the social
movement literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The term “relative
deprivation” was initially introduced in 1949 by Stouffer and Merton (1949) (as
cited in Locher, 2002). In social science literature, the term refers to a situation in
which individuals have less than they believe they deserve (Locher, 2002; Muller,
1972). Gurr (1970) expanded its meaning to the discrepancy between
achievement optimum and achievement. Using the notion of reference groups,
Geschwender (1964) defined relative deprivation as the perception that a
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person’s membership group is in an advantageous position relative to other
group or groups (as cited in Muller, 1972) (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: RDT Model 1: Comparison to reference group
Outcome
Government (reference group)

Gap

Relative
Deprivation

Political
Violence

Insurgent

Time
Opposed to Geschwender’s (1964) notion of reference groups, Wilson
(1973) and Runciman (1966) argued that there need not be an objective referent
corresponding to the perception (as cited in Muller, 1972). Similarly, Gurr (1970)
conceptualized relative deprivation and argued that the position of one’s own
group (or one’s own standing) in the past, present, and/or future can be used as
a reference point (see Figure 5).
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Figure 5: Comparison to one’s own group

Outcome
Expected Results

Gap

Relative
Deprivation

Political
Violence

Achieved
Results

Time

The main assumption of RDT is that relative deprivation is caused by a
gap between expectations and achievements (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Goodwin,
2006) that can and often do lead to anger (Zimmerman, 1983). According to
Morrison (1978), there are two different kinds of relative deprivation that can lead
to anger. The first is decremental deprivation, or when people believe that their
opportunities have been suddenly reduced, it leads to decremental deprivation.
The second is aspirational deprivation, or when people’s expectations and
ambitions increase but their opportunities do not increase, it leads to aspirational
deprivation. Both types of relative deprivation create similar feelings: something
that is desired, expected, and demanded by a large number of people does not
appear to be available to them.
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Gurr (1970) developed a “theory of collective violence” based on the
concept of relative deprivation theory. He argued that the potential for violence
depends upon the discontent held by members of a society, and discontent is
caused by a perceived gap between what they have and what they think they
should have. Gurr referred to this gap as “relative deprivation” and argued that
this gap frequently leads to violence. His causal mechanism that underlies the
deprivation-violence relationship was derived from frustration-aggression theory
(Muller, 1972). In this explanation, frustration produced by one’s perception of
discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities is considered as
the source of potential for political violence, and the magnitude of political
violence will vary strongly and directly with the degree, or intensity, of relative
deprivation (Muller, 1972). In this study, by taking the RDT approach, the
researcher assumes that a proportional decline in popular votes that presumably
reflects popular support for the insurgent should generate relative deprivation in
the insurgent group. As Ross and Gurr (1989) suggested violence may increase
when the insurgent perceives an existential threat to itself. Thus, it is reasonable
to expect such relative deprivation because of at least two reasons: First, popular
support is vitally important for the insurgent and a determining factor in defeating
the adversary. Losing such support threats the insurgent’s survival due to
logistics and other previously mentioned concerns. Second, the insurgent would
lose its chance to achieve its goals. Due to the fact that the insurgent is weak
against the government in terms of both materials and tactics, it employs guerrilla
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warfare strategies and aims to mobilize the population against the government.
However, failure in 2007 general elections indicates that the population supports
the government rather than the insurgent; therefore, the insurgent’s opportunity
to defeat the government by mobilizing the population would be remote anymore.
Resource Mobilization Theory
The resource mobilization perspective was introduced with the publication
of Social Conflict and Social Movements by Oberschall (1973) and later improved
by McCarthy and Zald (1977). Oberschall (1973) stressed the importance of
organizations and leadership in social movements. Similarly, McCarthy and Zald
(1977) acknowledged the importance of organizations in social movements but
pointed out the necessity of organizational resources for the movement.
Furthermore, according to the manner in which an organization uses and
allocates resources as well as the amount of activity directed toward goal
achievement is a function of the organization and influences the success of a
social movement (MacCarthy & Zald, 1977). A movement’s organizations are
important because they serve as sites to bring people together and as resources
that sustain the movement (Reger & Dugan, 2001). Although theorists of the
RMT approach exclusively consider resources as time and money, they also
include knowledge, meeting space, communication networks, media, labor,
solidarity, legitimacy, and internal/external support from the power elite (Reger &
Dugan, 2001).
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Unlike the RDT approach, the resource mobilization theory (RMT)
challenges theories that are based on a person’s dissatisfaction and suggests
that movements (insurgency) cannot be effective without proper resources
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). The RMT approach views strain or discontent, key
aspects of insurgency and social movement theories, as an insufficient cause for
a movement and emphasizes the importance of resources in a movement
organization. Organizations are viewed as key components in the emergence of
movement (McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Zald & Berger, 1978). Similarly, Galula
(2006) suggested that in the insurgent’s cause, popularity alone is insufficient to
transform sympathy to the population’s participation. This, however, can be
achieved by an insurgent living among the population and being backed by
guerrilla forces that will eliminate the open enemies, intimidate the potential ones,
and rely on those among the population who actively support the insurgency.
Correspondingly, the RMT approach argues that continuous availability of
resources and the ability to mobilize these resources have an impact on the
capability to maintain a conflict. Additionally, immediate outcomes depend upon
this ability to mobilize resources in order to sustain a conflict (Zald & Berger,
1978). Because the resources of movement are vitally important for success,
social organizations compete with one another in an effort to acquire them
(McCarthy & Zald, 1977). According to Boyle (2009) terrorist violence against the
government’s population tend to be concentrated in high-value, resource rich, or
contested territories, where multiple parties have conflicting stakes on territory
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and stakes. Likewise, Höglund (2009) suggests that parties with ‘close races’
have strong incentive to use violence. From the RMT persective, this competition
to obtain resources as well as a lack of resources may sometimes lead the
movement to use coercive measures (Zald & Berger, 1978).
Similar to the traditional insurgency approach, the RMT approach assumes
that individuals are rational. In other words, they weigh the costs and benefits of
participating in a movement and then decide to join only if the benefits outweigh
the costs. Galula (2006) suggested that the population weighs the level of threat
and the chances of a party’s victory before making a decision. The population is
more likely to be on the side of the party whose popularity and effectiveness are
combined. Therefore, by taking the resource mobilization theory, in this study we
argue that as an insurgent group gains support from the people, its capabilities
and resources to generate violence will expand, or, as McCarthy and Zald (1977)
suggested, as the flow of resources increases, the movement organization will be
able to hire more full-time professional personnel (e.g., full-time guerrillas,
political officers, et cetera) and increase the potential size of the resource pool
(e.g., new recruits, intelligence, logistics, financial support, et cetera).According
to Mesquita (2005) increasing the level of resources invested in terror would
increase the probability of defeating the government .As a consequence, the
movement will be more likely to accomplish its goals. From the insurgent’s
perspective, the more resources available not only mean more tangible
materials, namely full-time guerrillas, weapons, and ammunition but also
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intangible materials, for example, intelligence relating to the counterinsurgent and
sheltering insurgents among the population.
By the same token, as the insurgent group loses support, its capabilities
and resources to generate violence will diminish. When the insurgent becomes
unable to recruit new members and some segments of the population express its
hostility against the insurgent, the insurgent may end its struggle and violent
activities (Weinberg, 1991). The insurgent are subject to resource constraints
that limit the insurgent’s expenditures on activities not to exceed its income or
resources (Enders & Sandler, 1993). In his study using a game theoretic
approach, Mesquita (2005) clearly explains the underlying logic why the
insurgent violence decreases its political violence and supports his argument by
the describing the violence in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday
accords. To him, since the insurgent is endowed with resources, withdrawing
support the insurgent some percentage of the resources available to the
insurgent will be lost and remaining resources will accrue to terrorist activities As
a consequence, there will be a decline in violence despite increased militancy,
because the insurgent will lack the resources to engage in the amount of
violence they would like. According to Mesquita (2005) decline in resources of
the insurgent describes the situation in Northern Ireland following the Good
Friday accords. After the Good Friday accords, the splinter groups such as “Real
IRA” increased its militancy and engaged in terrorist attacks such as bombing of
Omagh, a missile attack on the UK’s Secret Intelligence, M6, the assault on
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Ebrington Barracks in Derry, and the bombing of the BBC . Despite these
terrorist attacks were qualitatively more violent than anything which the
Provisional IRA had engaged the splinter groups had small size and lacked
resources to actually the overall death toll from the IRA violence. Similarly, by the
late 1990s, the ETA lost most of its popular support and as a result it changed its
violence strategy. Since then ETA activity and number of killings substantially
decreased; however, the type of killings has become more specialized such as
politicians, journalists and etc (Barros, Passos, & Gil-Alana, 2006).
Ease of access to the resources and perception of risk also do matter for
the insurgent. Berrebi and Lakdawalla (2007) found that the proximity of a
terrorist base or an international border both substantially increase the frequency
of attacks because of lowering the costs of a terrorist attack and risk of supplying
resources and material for the attacks.
In conclusion, by taking the RMT approach, the researcher hypothesizes
that the insurgent will be more likely to increase its level of violence when there is
more popular support and decrease its level of violence when there is less
popular support from the population.
Conclusion
In sum, the literature and RMT approach were found to reach similar
conclusions regarding the insurgent’s dependence on resources that are
expected to be provided by the population. However, if the population does not
willingly provide resources, as a last resort the insurgency may use political
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violence against its own native population in an effort to acquire them (Zald &
Berger, 1978). Thus, the primary stimulus for violence is the need and capability
to gain resources. Because the insurgent considers popular support as a zerosum game, its primary rival is the government that strives to obtain support of the
people as well. Although the insurgent might possibly attack its own native
population due to a lack of popular support in obtaining resources, by attacking
selective targets (e.g., military soldiers, police officers, and other governmental
agents), insurgents will typically generate more popularity among the population.
As a result, most terrorist attacks should be expected to occur within areas that
are supportive of the insurgent due to the availability of resources supplied.
Taking the RMT and insurgency approach, through popular support the
insurgent will usually be assumed to have more freedom of movement, recruits,
financial resources, logistics, places to hide, and intelligence to successfully carry
out a selective terrorist attack. In contrast to the RMT approach, the relative
deprivation (RD) approach assumes that a considerable amount relative decline
in an insurgent’s support level will create a gap between its expected results
versus achieved results. This gap is considered to be a relative deprivation that
usually leads to political violence, the major issue in the proposed study. By
taking the RDT approach, in this study, we expect that as a vote share of the
insurgent’s political party declines between two elections, political violence also
increases.
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Elections and Insurgency
Introduction
This section reviews the political science literature to understand why
insurgent organizations engage in electoral politics and examines the literature
regarding elections and political violence as well. The underlying reason is that
there is some literature on the ‘election violence’ which is considered as a special
type of political violence in the political science literature, therefore literature on
election is reviewed to understand the dynamics and the linkage between
election and violence. Briefly, existing literature points out that in democracies
elections are tools for transferring the political power; therefore sometimes they
can be viewed as an opportunity to increase their popularity among the
population by insurgent organizations or discredit the incumbent government. In
order to do so, the insurgent may resort violence over the pre-election period.
Most of the literature on election violence focused on the pre-election violence
and examined its effect on election results, however still there is scant literature
on post-election violence and why the insurgent use violence over the postelection period. Furthermore existing studies attempt to explain post-election
violence from a relative deprivation approach; they argue that the insurgent
launch a violence campaign because of poor election results; although an RD
approach provides a logical and reasonable explanation, still they ignore the
alternative approach, resource mobilization approach.
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Functions and Importance of Political Parties in Democracies
Elections and political parties play an important role in democratic states.
Political parties are considered as indispensable components of a democratic
political order and institutions serve as means to solve economic and social
differences peacefully (Weinberg, 1991). Geddes (1996) referred to political
institutions as “weapons” in the struggle for political power (as cited in Finn,
2000)

because political institutions are vehicles to make trade-off among

competing values and to establish the rules for obtaining power (Quandt, 1998).
Elections allow for the “peaceful” transfer of this power (Höglund, 2009).
Furthermore they provide legitimacy through direct popular participation, and, in
turn, legitimacy creates legitimate governments enjoying popular support for their
policies (Elkit & Svensson 1997, as cited in Sisk, 2008) and capacity for effective
governance (Brown 2003, as cited in Sisk, 2008).From this perspective, electoral
process is an alternative way to violence because of being a means for
governance (Fischer, 2004). For instance, the Nicaraguan election in 1990 was
the ‘first peaceful transfer of power from a revolutionary government to its
opposition (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a).Finn (2000) lists four important
functions in democracies: First, “legitimating” function by coupling political
obligation with consensual participation. Second, “integrating” function by binding
citizens and political parties to the state. Third, “socializing” function by teaching
and transmitting democratic values to the citizens. Finally, “transferring political
power” by providing a certain and conventionalized means (p.52-53). However,
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at the same time, they are also vulnerable to political violence, because elections
are means of achieving or retaining political power and governance (Sisk, 2008);
and violence can be used as a tactic in political competition (Fischer, 2004).
Understanding the Importance of Elections for the Insurgent
Briefly, since the elections can provide insurgent political power and access
resource, the insurgent has good reasons to engage in electoral politics. Namely,
when political parties won the power, they will be able to organize campaigns,
mobilize masses, and oversee policies (Rapoport and Weinberg 2000a, p.28). In
other words, the insurgent can intentionally use its political party to gain
sympathy from not only its native or government’s population but also from the
international community. By this way, it can also make their armed struggle with
the government legitimate. In addition, when the insurgent’s political party took
office, it would expand the pools of its supporters through providing benefits to
them thus strength their loyalty. Furthermore, it could also destabilize the political
system and even achieve self rule or independence from the government
(Weinberg 1991).
Neumann (2005) describes seven reasons or advantages of the insurgent’s
participation in elections: First, it can exploit the democratic process to
strengthen the insurgent’s military wing. Second, insurgent’s political wing may
facilitate

insurgent

recruitment

and

radicalization

by

providing

“vetting

mechanism”, or providing a possibility of “legalized fundraising” (p.946).Third is to
obtain official recognition and legitimacy. Forth is to mobilize the mass and
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broaden the movement— that is, to tap into resources and mobilize sections of
community that had not been available previously, which RMT theorists name
isolated adherents and constituents. Fifth, is to secure continuity both in terms
ideology and personnel. Sixth is to neutralize the government’s military
superiority. Finally, the insurgent can realistically assess consequences of the
terrorism campaign and demonstrate its popular support with the election results.
The reasons to engage in electoral politics can be group under three
categories: 1) increasing popular support for the insurgent; 2) gaining legitimacy
and respectability; 3) increasing the pool of its resources and role of the military
wing.
Increasing popular support
The most scholars focusing on this issue points out the importance of
participating elections in obtaining popular support for the insurgent thus
broadening the movement and increasing the organizational resources to
achieve insurgent’s goals. The insurgent may emphasize the ethnic and cultures
differences, and use political competition in calling for mobilization of large
sections of the population, because conflicts are commonly used to gain popular
support for its political party (Höglund, 2009, p.420).
Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) purported that elections are mechanisms
for generating popular support for the government and its policies as well. Taber
(2002) argued that “political mobilization” is the first task of the insurgent, and
Richardson (2001) pointed out the importance of electoral politics as a means for
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political mobilization. According to Richardson, the issue is two-fold: (a) First,
electoral politics is used by the insurgent as a means of building popular support
for the purpose of political mobilization, and (b) second, electoral results are
considered as an indication of the success or failure of that effort, because
obtaining a seat in the national or local government is viewed as a success and
reinforces the terrorist organization’s influence over the population. For instance,
till the Westminster election in April 1981, the IRA’s political wing the Sinn Fein
used to follow an “absenteeism policy”, which prevented their elected candidates
from taking their seats in the parliament. However, the president of Sinn Fein
Gerry Adams and others realized that by remaining isolated from the political
negotiations, they cannot mobilize the population towards their political goals,
therefore, they rescinded their absenteeism policy at 1986 Sin Fein conference
(McAllister, 2004,p.128).
Drake and Silva (1986) viewed votes as a “trade” to gain tangible benefits
from the government. In order to get elected the insurgent could pledge the
delivery of resources to its supporters and once elected, through providing
“domestic rewards” such as distributing resources and key positions of the
government to its supporters (Boyle, 2009, p.217), the insurgent would be able to
win population on its own side, and consolidate its control over the population.
Similarly, Höglund (2009) explains such mechanism through ‘patron-client
relationship” for political power, in which the ‘protection, services or rewards to
the clients are provided by the ‘patron’. Due to this mutual benefit oriented
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relationship, ‘clients’, who are usually individuals of low status, become the
patron’s political followers. As a consequence of such relationship, since the
political power is very important for the patron, and his/her followers, they can
strive to keep the patron in power, even with violence (p.420).
Legitimacy and respectability
The insurgent may gain democratic legitimacy through elections (Weinberg,
1991; Höglund, 2009). The election outcomes may encourage the insurgent to
demand secession and concessions (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a), thus would
gain domestic and international legitimacy. On the other hand, when it happens,
the supporters of the government may oppose the insurgent group’s demands
and resort to violence against the insurgent and its supporters. A desire to gain
respectability in domestic or international politics may lead the insurgent to end
its violent activities and engage in electoral politics (Weinberg, 1991).
Increasing the resource pool of the insurgent and role of the military wing
Weinberg (1991) found that terrorist groups with linkages to political parties
are more successful in persisting and waging their armed struggle than those
groups lacking these linkages. He suggests that terrorist groups with political
party links have an easier time in recruiting new members and obtaining logistical
aids from the population (p.434). Furthermore presence of military wing makes it
easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election
outcomes (Höglund, 2009, p.420), therefore it would be wiser strategy for the
insurgent not to demobilize all of its armed forces.
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Competition in elections may complement rather than replace the
insurgent’s military activities, and reduces the risk of major splits within the
organization over tactics (Höglund, 2009). For instance, with 1981 election, the
popular support encouraged the Sinn Fein, for the first time, to contest in 1982
Northern Ireland Assembly elections under the Sinn Fein. The Sinn Fein won
10.1% in 1982 election; this percentage increased to 13.4% in the Westminster
election, (McAllister, 2004, p.127). The insurgent interpreted this results that they
could fight an armed struggle and win the elections at the same time (O’Brien,
1999, p.126, as cited in McAllister, 2004). In 1986, the IRA adopted an electoral
strategy combined with a military campaign and sought to transform its military
success that generated popular support into electoral success, which could be
used to legitimize the continued use of threat of force (McAllister, 2004, p.128).
Similarly, as Neumann (2005) argues that when the IRA’s political party Sinn
Fein received a substantial vote share in 1981, Gerry Adams, the leader of the
party, expanded its political wing, however giving importance to the political
activities did not diminish the importance of military wing of the IRA and armed
struggle, instead, it legitimized the armed struggle, demonstrated popular support
for the IRA, advanced the movement. As Gerry Adams, the president of the Sinn
Fein, stated “Elections have helped to develop the party, and experienced bunch
of political workers” (Neumann, 2005, p.967).Furthermore, it argued that electoral
success also gave the political wing a kind of veto power which would make any
constitutional accommodation between the main moderate parties in Northern
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Ireland , because by taking seat in the Irish parliament, they reached a political
power to force a minority government to adopt a more intransigent manner vis-àvis Britain and to refrain from introducing harsh counterterrorism measures in the
IRA’s most important areas (Moloney, 2002, as cited in Neumann, 2005).
Election Violence
‘Election violence’ is considered as a special type of political violence in the
political science literature, therefore literature on election has been reviewed
understand the dynamics and the linkage between election and violence,
Dhanagare (1968) defines “election violence” as “use of force in the
struggle for scarce power positions and statuses between two or more individuals
or political parties and their supporters (p.151). Lewis (1964) focuses on the
political rivals and defines the aim of election violence as to "neutralize, injure or
eliminate rival or rivals" (as cited in Dhanagare, 1968, p.151). Unlike Levis,
Fischer (2004) focuses on the election process and the electorates rather than
perpetrators. Fischer defines election violence as a means to determine, delay or
otherwise influence the results of an election (p.6). Sisk (2002) stresses the
“election process” and “election outcomes” and argues that election violence
aims to vitiate the elections all together by undermining the integrity of the
results, or to influence voting behavior through threat or intimidation (p.1).
Although these definitions underline different components, they describe election
terrorism during the pre-election violence. So, in this study, we hypothesize that
“terrorist attacks increase during the pre-election period”.

73

Similarly, much of the past literature on election violence has focused on the
effects of terrorism on electoral process and election results (Guelke & Smyth,
1992; Neumann, 2005; Kydd & Walter, 2002; Bali, 2007; Gassebner et al., 2008;
Rose & Murphy, 2007). Although the past literature provides some insights about
under what conditions recourse terrorism and how it affects election results, it
offers little information how the election results affect terrorism in the postelection period. Furthermore, the scant existent literature on post-election
violence usually explains from a relative deprivation approach and lacks a
resource mobilization perspective. Thus, it is important to ask not only how the
terrorism influence elections, but also how the election results influence terrorism
over the time as well. This is one of the strength of this study. After surveying the
literature on election violence, this study focuses on post-election violence.
Dimensions of Election Violence
Scholars (Dhanagare, 1968; Fischer, 2002; Sisk, 2008) addressed and
described various dimensions of election violence. These dimension can be
categorized under five groups (see figure): 1) Perpetrators; 2) Victims or targets
of electoral violence; 3) Types of election Violence; 4) Time Periods, and 5)
Aims, or Motives of Election Violence (Figure 6).
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Figure 6: Dimensions of Elections Violence

Perpetrators
Election violence can be committed by various actors. Dhanagare (1968)
includes only individuals, political parties and their supporters into his definition of
election. Fischer (2004) expands them and divides the perpetrators into five
categories: First, Voter motivated conflict: This type election violence occurs
when voters challenge the state and claim ‘unfairness’ in the election process.
Massive cheating or fraud – such as conspiracies to bribe voters, tampering with
ballots, fallacious counting, or other measures (such as releasing large numbers
of prisoners to vote) – can be the stimulus for a voters (Sisk, 2008). For instance,
in Thailand elections on January the 6th of 2001, the voters believed that local
officials were biased in their counting procedures therefore organized protests
and burned police vehicles to disrupt vote counting. Second, State-motivated
conflict: It occurs when the State initiates conflicts with electorates who challenge
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the results of elections. Third, Rival-motivated Conflict: Political rivals may
conflict with each other for political gains. The Fischer (2002)’s study findings
suggest that rival-motivated conflict is the most common election type but also
most responsive to mediation among the others. Rival motivated election
violence may stem from history of intense rivalry among political clans, stark
competition for government posts that carry the potential for power and access to
resources and state largesse (Sisk, 2008). Sri Lanka elections of 2001 set up an
example of a pre-election violence performed by the governing political party. As
deSilva (2002) pointed out, in 2001 Sri Lanka elections, in Hambantota district of
the Southern Province, a senior cabinet minister and his close associates sought
to terrorize the electorate by attacks through armed groups on opposition
candidates and their supporters (deSilva, 2002). Fourth, Insurgent-motivated
conflict: The insurgent capitalizes on the visibility of an election to promote the
insurgency. Fischer (2002) found that insurgent-motivated conflicts are growing
and the most difficult to prevent because of being unresponsive to governance or
other electoral objectives, and seeking only to disrupt, delay and diminish the
democratic process. Fifth is a combination of those categories above.
Scholars include different actors into their definitions, but most of them
conclude that election violence is a collective, purposeful and instrumental action;
so, if it is collective, and instrumental, then it requires an extensive organization,
leadership, and resources (Sisk, 2008, p.13); because only with an effective
leadership and organization, the rank-and-file can be bridged, logistical needs to

76

carry out violent act can be created, and associational or population
representation dimension can be generated. Thus, organizational resources
allow the leaders and organizational structure to foment violence (Sisk, 2008,
p.13).
Although election violence can be performed by various actors, from the
perpetrators’ perspective, the insurgent-motivated conflict is the primary interest
of this study. This type of violence requires an organization, leadership and
resources. Thus, both resource mobilization approach and relative deprivation
approach can be useful to explain election violence.
Victims or Targets of Election Violence
Election violence includes various type of victims or targets. They can be
people such as electorates, candidates, political party workers, places such as
polling stations, offices, party buildings, campaign materials, vehicles, vehicles or
data such as ballot boxes; and victims can be resident in target ethnic, gender,
geographical, or political “hot spot” communities (Fischer, 2002).
Forms of Election Violence
Election violence can be committed through various ways. It can be random
or organized act, or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a
political stakeholder or stakeholders (Fischer, 2002). Types of violence may also
include riots, demonstrations, terrorist campaigns, military coups, civil wars
(Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a, and p.33), abductions, direct or targeted killings,
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terrorist attacks on rallies, destruction of property and vehicles, and the like (Sisk,
2008). Although there are various forms of election violence, this study includes
only terrorist incidents.
Aims and Motives of Election Violence
Like other dimensions, aims and motives vary and highly depend on the time
period of the election. In general, pre-election violence aims to influence electoral
process and election results whereas the post-election violence generally is
argued to stem from a relative deprivation caused by dissatisfaction with the
election results.
Some scholars stress (Finn, 2000; Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Sisk, 2008)
pointed out the influence of fair democratic process on election violence.
Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a) argue that when the “electoral process” is fair,
legitimate and works well, the ballots can silence the guns, as the Namibia
election of 1989 did end a 30-year war. Furthermore if the parties accepted that
winning possibility is too low and costs are too high, the elections can reduce the
violence (p.18). Likewise Finn (2000) argues that the “election structures” and
“rules” are among the possible sources of election violence. Similar to Finn’s
argument, Hewitt (2000) argues that if certain groups or individuals feel that the
political system is “unresponsive” to them, they become frustrated, thereby resort
to violence (p.326).
To explain reasons for or motives of election violence, usually scholars focus
on the benefits—political power, access to resources etc— that would be gained
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through the elections. In his analysis of election violence, Sisk (2008)
emphasizes the stakes of political competition, expectations about winning and
losing in election contests, and the incentives that the electoral process creates.
He argues that election violence is most likely to occur: when the stakes of
stakes of winning and losing valued political posts are very high and those
political posts are scarce; when winning the elections is the key to livelihood for
an entire clan, or ethnic group; depending upon the expectations, when the
winning the elections are highly uncertain about the ultimate outcome of the
electoral process, especially when margins of victory very close, they may resort
violence to affect uncertain outcomes; or when losing the elections are almost
certain, they may use violence to affect voter turnout through discouraging the
opponent’s supporter electorates; or when the losing elections are almost certain,
they may use violence to prevent the election’s success.
Time Periods
Höglund (2009) divides election periods into three periods; 1) Pre-election; 2)
during the election; and 3) Post-Election periods. Sisk (2008) includes even more
time periods into the pre-and post-election periods. He divides election violence
period into five time phases and defines most likely types and targets election
violence: Phase I: The Long Run-Up to Electoral Events; Phase II: The
Campaign’s Final Lap; Phase III: Polling Day(s); Phase IV: Between Voting and
Proclamation; and Phase V: Post-Election Outcomes and their Aftermath.
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Scholars have used different time scales in analyzing the election violence
ranging from two-week periods (Dhanagare, 1968) to four years (Klor & Berrebi,
2008). Dhanagare (1968) used biweekly periods and focused on only 60 daysperiod prior to release of the Fourth General Elections of 1967 in India. He
divided the election period into four phases of 15 days. The fourth phase covers
the election that started on February 15th and ends when most of the poll results
were announced. His study mainly covers pre-election period and election days
but excludes the post-election period. He found that election violence increases
as closing to the election day(s) and the violence varies across the
constituencies. Sisk (2008) considered election violence time period as cycle,
which often conceived of in terms of at least one year prior to an actual election
event (Wall, et.al. 2006, as cited in Sisk, 2008, and p.13). Like Sisk (2008), in this
study, we considered the election period as a one year period prior to an
election, and like Höglund (2009) we have thought election period also covers
the post-election period because of posing a risk generated by the perpetrators
due to their dissatisfactions with the election results. So, in this study, an election
period covers 24-months period (12 months before and 12 months after the
study).
Analyzing dimensions of Election Violence in the Pre-election Period
Sisk (2008) divides pre-election periods into two periods: Phase I (long run-up
to electoral events) and Phase II (the election campaign’s final lap). According to
Sisk, often objective of election violence in the Phase I of the pre-election
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period— is to affect the electoral process, and to establish a dominant position
within a particular district by eliminating or threatening potential adversaries
(p.14). Thus, it is highly selected rather than indiscriminate violence; the main
targets are not innocent, or neutral civilians, instead electoral process and the
political rivals are the most common targets. Therefore, common targets of
violence in this period are incumbent state officials or emerging candidates from
political parties (Sisk, 2008, p.14).
During the Phase II—the election campaign’s final lap—the pattern of
violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging candidates from
political parties to potentially adversary electorates and candidates. The main
common aim of the election violence during this period is to intimidate or
influence voters through creating insecurity against opponent’s potential
supporters (Sisk, 2008; Höglund, 2009). As the Election Day approaches, the
violence intensifies. Common types of violence in final weeks of the election
include clashes between rival groups of supporters; attacks on election rallies,
candidates, bomb scares; attacks or intimidation of election officials; and attacks
on domestic/international observers (Sisk, 2008).
Analyzing dimensions of Election Violence during the Election Days
During the polling day(s), usually perpetrators cease their acts of violence
when the voting begins (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009; Sisk,
2001). However when election violence occurs on the Election Day, it commonly
aims to disrupt the polling and to limit turnout and targets security forces, election
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administrators, observers; and materials such as destruction of ballot boxes
(Sisk, 2008). For instance on the Election Day, January 30th of 2005 in Iraq, the
insurgents carried out 260 attacks that resulted in at least 44 people, including 26
Iraqi civilians, eight Iraqi troops, ten British servicemen, and one American
soldier. 100 of the attacks were carried out at or near the polling stations.
Furthermore, although there was a traffic ban on the Election Day, the insurgents
sent at least eight suicide bombers on foot, wearing suicide vests, into voting
stations (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Similarly in Sri Lanka
presidential election of 1988, at least 46 people were killed on the poll day
(Sunday Times, January 1, 1989, as cited in Amerasinghe, 1989). In this study,
the Election Day has not been included into neither the pre-election nor postelection day.
Possible Consequences of Violence in the Pre-Election period and during the
Election Days
There are four possible common consequences of the violence prior to the
Election Day or during the election days: 1) Postponing or disrupting elections
from taking place; 2) Effecting voter turnouts; 3) Forcing the candidates to leave
from the electoral process; and 4) Influencing electorates’ political preferences.
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Postponing or disrupting elections from taking place
The insurgent may attempt to postpone or disrupt elections from taking place by
resorting violence prior to or during the election days. This aim may stem from
three main reasons: a fear of losing political power, opposing elections at all, and
electoral system.
In some cases, a fear of losing power could lead the insurgent to
undermine the integrity of elections (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a) and result in
forcing the governments to abandon elections (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a;
Höglund, 2009). Or in other cases, elections or political system could be source
of election violence. Or, the insurgent may oppose to any sort of elections and
view them as an “illegitimate” method to transfer political power, or oppose to the
ruling system under which the elections are held, therefore it may try to prevent
elections from taking place or postpone the elections (Höglund, 2009). For
instance, the Peruvian insurgent group Sendero Luminoso opposes the elections
and even targeted other left wing groups that compete in the elections (Höglund,
2009). Similarly, in order to disrupt the elections, insurgent groups in Iraq
increased their violence prior to the Election Day. Within the first week of the
New Year, which was just three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, at least
90 people were killed across the country including Bagdad’s governor, Ali AlHaidari and his six of his bodyguards (Ever bloodier.2005). Upon increase of the
violence prior to the election, Ghazi al-Yawer, the president, Iyad Allawi, the
interim prime minister, and some other high level political officials gave voice to
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possibility of postponement of the election by the United Nations (UN).
Chechen’s pre-election violence in Russia is another example. The Chechen
insurgents carried out bomb attacks just two days before the Election Day to
disrupt the 2003 Duma elections in Russia. They exploded a bomb attack on a
train resulted in more than 40 killings and over 150 wounded in Yessentuki
station in Russia’a southern fringe (Oates, 2006). Although the insurgents often
attempt to disrupt the electoral process, they rarely succeed in postponing or
preventing the elections from taking place, however, their violent acts can be
effective in influencing election outcomes through affecting voter turnouts, forcing
the candidates to leave from the electoral process, and changing electorates’
political preferences.
Affecting voter turnouts
In some cases the insurgent may intentionally employ violence against
rivals’ potential supporters to get them refrained from casting their votes due to
fear of violence (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008). The
aim of voter intimidation is to produce a self-imposed loss of freedom on the
victim. If intimidated, the victim will vote or behave in a certain fashion (Fisher,
2002). For instance, the insurgent LTTE and other extremist groups in Sri Lanka
group usually resorts violence prior to the elections. Although Sri Lanka used to
have high voter turnout rates in the last nationwide election in 1970 (85.2%),
1977 (86.7%) and 1982 (81.1%), due to high volume political violence that JVP
(Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or People's Liberation Front—the Sinhalese
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nationalist extremist organization) and the DJV (Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya
or Patriotic People's Front launched three months before the elections; as a
consequence, only 55.32% of the electorates casted their votes in the Sri Lanka
presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). According to Amerasinghe
(1989) the main aims of this pre-election violence was to create fear that would
lead to a compulsory boycott of the election by the electorate (p.349). For
instance, in Matara in Sri Lanka, on the morning of the poll people were
intimidated by a set posters warning voters that "the penalty for voting was
death". Only and even after the security forces created suitable condition very
small portion of electorates casted their votes (Matara 23.84%, Moneragala
17.1%

and

others

(Amerasinghe,1989).Similarly,

Maoist

insurgents,

the

Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) imposed violent nationwide protests
that resulted in only 20 percent voter turnout across Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). A
similar strategy was implemented prior to Iraqi Elections of 2005. In order to
intimidate the voters into not voting, the insurgent groups in Iraq launched a
terrorism campaign before the election of 2005 that resulted in low turnout rate
due to the fact that hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and did not cast
their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005). Chechen insurgent’s
terrorist attacks in a Russian constituency two days before the 2003 Duma
elections in Russia succeeded too in discouraging the Russian voters and
resulted in only 55.75% turnout rate. As seen in the literature, violence prior to
the election affects turnout rates, in most cases it lowers the turnout whereas in
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few cases, it increases the turnouts as Madrid terrorist attacks did in Spaniard
Elections of 2004.
Forcing the candidates to leave from the electoral process
In some cases, by use of violence, the insurgent can successfully force the
rival political contenders to leave the electoral process Rapoport & Weinberg,
2000a; Höglund, 2009), thus eliminate political rivals and win the elections. For
instance the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)
launched a violence campaign against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLS) that
resulted in the OLF to leave the elections of 1992 (Pausewang, Trondvall &
Aalen,2004, as cited in Höglund, 2009). Likewise, the LTTE, which is linked to
the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), attacked the political activists of other political
parties and local election monitors to force its political rivals to leave the
elections. As a consequence of these attacks, several candidates from other
political parties left elections (Höglund, 2009). Similarly, in the 2005 Iraq
elections, due to fear of terrorist attack, many political parties have not
announced their candidates, and some parties, including the country’s most
prominent Sunni group, the Iraqi Islamic Party, did not contest the election (Ever
bloodier.2005).
Influencing electorates’ political preferences
Winning votes through use of violence is neither a new technique nor only
peculiar to insurgents. As Charles and Frary (1918) points out violence and
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intimidation were regarded as the most effective way of winning votes by 1715
and political parties carried on them for more than 150 years (as cited in
Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a). Sisk (2008) acknowledges the existence of efforts
of coercive methods on gaining votes and considers them as “a form of election
fraud” (p.6).
As explained in previous sections, violence can be an effective means of
increasing popular support for the insurgent. We propose that it applies to the
election violence in terms of obtaining popular votes as well; therefore the
insurgent might resort to violence to win electoral support for its political party.
However effectiveness of election violence and its impact on election outcomes
is open to discussion. In some cases terrorist attacks against civilians may
suppress the mass mobilization whereas in other they may increases votes by
that population (Sisk, 2008, p.6).
Discussion on Consequences of Violence in the Pre-election and during the
Election Days
Pre-election violence may serve for various purposes and produce different
outcomes in pro-insurgent areas than pro-government areas. If the insurgent is
not strong in some constituencies, as Sisk (2008) argued, it may use
indiscriminate violence against government’s civilians in areas where the
insurgent is most likely to lose the election in order to discourage electorates for
voting; or target rival party candidates to force them to contest elections in proinsurgent areas, or use selective terrorism against carefully selected government
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targets/combatants to increase its support among the insurgent’s own population.
Although existent studies on election violence provide valuable insights in to
election violence, there is still scant literature on this field and still many
questions remain unanswered. Under which conditions pre-election violence
produce desired results is still not known clearly; in some cases it may backfire
and be counterproductive at the ballot box. For instance, unlike presidential
elections of 2005 in Sri Lanka, or 2005 Elections in Iraq, in East Timor militia
groups backed by the Indonesian army employed violence prior to the 1999
referendum in order to intimidate the electorates into not voting for the
independence, however, contrary to their expectation, it generated a massive
turnout (Rapoport & Weinberg, 2000a, and p.19). Similarly, the 2004 Madrid
Bombing just few days before the elections in Spain indicated that a successful
terrorist attack can provoke a sharp change of mood in the electorate (A winning
streak for zapatero.2007) and can increase the turnout rates against governing
party (Bali, 2007). Furthermore, in some cases, as a response to pre-election
violence, the electorates may punish the governing party and replace it whereas
in others the governing party even increases its vote share even more than
previous elections. For instance, Madrid bombings of 2004 in Spain just three
days prior to the Election Day replaced the governing PP party with a soft party,
the socialist PSOE party, whereas the terrorist attacks just two days before the
2003 Duma Elections brought a hard-line party, the United Russia. Furthermore,
similarly, Hamas terrorist campaign from April to February of 1996 before the
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Israeli elections of May 1996 damaged the incumbent government and replaced
the incumbent Labor Party government of Shimon Peres with the more hard-line
government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud. As seen in the literature, the
question of when or why the electorates would punish the governing party and
replace the government with the election is still not clear. Given the existent
literature, we point out five important factors that could be useful to anticipate
whether the governing party would be replaced or increase its vote share as a
response to pre-election period.
Position of the governing party on terrorism
Terrorism prior to the elections affects the electorates’ preferences and
usually brings a hard-line government. Terrorism can change public opinion and
in general this change is likely to favor the most right-wing and militaristic forces
in the electoral arena rather than the advocates of international law, peace and
negotiations (Fishman & Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2005,
p.13). Similarly, Hewitt (1990) suggests that usually majorities or pluralities in all
countries favor hard line policies. If the people believe that governing political
party does not have a harsh position on terrorism, they are more likely to vote for
a more hard-line party and replace the current governing party. However, if the
governing party is a hard-line party and has already harsh policies against
terrorism, then other people who had not vote for it also would vote the governing
party thus increase its vote share in the upcoming elections. Israeli elections of
May 1996, February 2001, Spain elections of May 1996, and 2003 Duma
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elections in Russia, and provincial elections of 1988, and 2008 in Sri Lanka set
good examples of it.
In Israel, Hamas launched a massive bloody pre-election terrorist campaign
from February to April 1996 against the Israel. On February the 25 th of 1996, a
suicide bomber carried out a suicide bomb attack on a travel bus that killed 26
and injured 48 people. Another suicide attack on a travel buss was carried out on
March the 3rd of 1996 and killed 19 and wounded 7 people. Other pre-election
terrorist attacks occurred in Ashkelon and Dizengoff Center which killed 59
people (Suicide bombings scar Peres' political ambitions CNN, May 28 1996). As
the polls taken in mid-May indicated Peres was ahead by 4-6%, however due to
these terrorist attacks, two days before the election Peres declined to 2% (CNN,
May 28, 1996). As a consequence, Labor Party government of Shimon Peres lost
the elections (49.5%) and was replaced with a hard line government of Benjamin
Netanyahu of Likud (50.5%). Kydd and Walter (2002) examined the impact of
Hamas’s terrorist campaign and reached the same conclusion that these terrorist
attacks damaged the incumbent government and replaced it with the more hardline government of Benjamin Netanyahu of Likud in Israeli elections of May 1996
(p.280). Likewise, Bloom (2004) concludes that these attacks were intended to
influence the election outcomes and as a consequence they brought a hard-line,
the right wing Netanyahu government into power. The Hamas’s next terrorism
campaign against Israel began in December 2000, two months before the Israeli
elections of February 2001. Again, the Hamas intestinally increased its terrorist
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attacks prior to the election. As a consequence, the terrorism campaign has
again reached its goals and Barak lost the elections (Kydd & Walter, 2002).
The Berrebi and Klor’s study (2008) findings are consistent with the Kydd &
Walter study (2002). They analyzed five national electoral data from 1988 to
2003 and examined two-way relationship between terrorism and electoral
preferences by employing differences-in differences (DID) methodology. They
found that terrorism has a strong impact on the electorate’s political preferences.
A terrorist attack regardless of where it was perpetrated increases the support of
the right bloc of political parties, which have strict policies against terrorism;
additionally, its electoral impact increases as it occurs closer to the elections.
Likewise, the governing party, the PSOE, lost the elections and was
replaced with a more hard-line political party, the Partido Popular (Popular Party,
here after the PP) in the Spanish general election of 1996. Barros, Passos, and
Gil-Alana (2006) attributed this electoral turnaround to ETA’s pre-election
terrorism campaign. They suggested that the ETA’s failed terrorist attacks
against the Prime Ministerial candidate Jose Maria Aznar, and King Juan Carlos
in August 1995 brought a more hard line government, Popular Party. The PP
presents itself as a party to control and eradicate the terrorism; according to Rigo
(2005) 9/11 attacks in the U.S had provided the PP an opportunity to present
itself a hard-line party through taking a strong position against the terrorism.
Chechen pre-election terrorism that killed more than 40 and injured more
than 150 people in Russia brought a hard-line party too, the United Russia, pro-
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Vladimir Putin party with largest number of votes and seats. Oates (2006) found
that indirectly, Putin’s position on terrorism was relevant in voting behavior
because many of the participants perceived Putin as a strong, decisive leader, a
man would ‘flush’ the Chechen terrorists down the toilet (p.288).
In Sri Lanka, the bomb attack by the LTTE just one day before the provincial
election of May 2008 election, which killed 11 and wounded 29 people, has
brought a landline victory to the hard line governing party, United People's
Freedom Alliance or the UPFA. According to the UPFA General Secretary Susil
Premjayanth the electorates viewed the elections as the referendum on war
against terrorism, and voted for their hard line governing party , which they
favored their counter terrorism policies (Ferdinando, 2008).
As seen in these examples, usually pre-election terrorism brings a hard-line
government. Thus it is important to ask why people vote for a more hard-line
government.
Most scholars (Höglund, 2009; Michavila, 2005; Indridason, 2008) explain
calling a hard-line government through an increase in personal security
concerns. Pratkanis and Aronson (1996) propose that recourse to fear as a
propaganda tool is most effective when: “1) there is a serious shock; 2) a specific
recommendation is offered to overcome the problem; 3) the proposed measures
are perceived as effective to deal with the threat; and 4) the person who receives
the message believes he or she can carry out the recommendation” (as cited in
Michavila, 2005,p.16). To put differently, a terrorist attack increases personal
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safety concerns, and people seek a political party that would effectively provide
them the most secure environment.
Likewise, Gassebner et al. (2008) pointed out the impact of terrorism on
increasing people’s personal safety concerns thus affecting their political
preferences. Their study examines the impact of terrorism on the replacement of
incumbent governments by analyzing 800 elections in 115 countries, and found
that terrorist attacks increase the probability of government replacement after an
election by revealing the government’s incompetence of protecting its people
from terrorism; furthermore, they suggested that this probability increases with
the severity of the attack.
Höglund (2009)’s study stresses a relationship among pre-election violence,
personal safety concerns and electorate’s political preferences. Höglund
suggests that electoral violence may polarize the electorate along conflict lines,
thus lead to new outburst of violence, and replace the incumbent with a hardliner
government, because when people feel they are insecure, they give more
importance to law and order than the peace and reconciliation, thereby call
alternative than call for reconciliation (p.412-413).
Michavila (2005) examines how and why people support government’s
harsh countermeasures. Michavila argues that people more concern their
personal security than collective security, whether national or international,
therefore to the extent that a citizen feels that the state guarantees his or her own
security, he or she supports the measures it adopts (p.17). Similarly, through
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analyzing the polls, Huddy, Khatib, and Capelos (2002) found that 9/11 terrorist
attacks increased concern about their personal security among the Americans
that they or a family member would become a general victim of terrorism.
Furthermore, the attacks also increased their support for the government and its
counter terrorism measures. Similarly, Indridason (2008) argues that terrorism
may influence electorate’s concerns about their safety, and such concerns
influence the electorate’s preferences. In other words, the electorates tend to
cast their votes for the party that would provide more security, especially the
ones who have been affected by the violence. Amerasinghe (1989) found preelection violence carried out by extremist groups in Sri Lanka lowered turnout
rates and those affected from violence voted against the opposition candidate,
Bandaranaike, rather than governing party’s candidate.
When the leftist insurgents increased their violence, General Gustavo Rojas
Pinilla took power in 1953 trough a military coup in Colombia and number of
killings under his tenure declined in the short run. And not surprisingly, the next
year, in 1954, due to his initial success, the national assembly elected him as the
president (Brauer, Gómez-Sorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004). By the same token,
since providing security of its population is one of the primary responsibilities of
government, the electorate may hold the government accountable for its failure in
securing and protecting its population against the terrorism. Thus, to Indridason
(2008), depending upon their performance, it is reasonable expect that the
electorate reward or punish the political parties at the ballot box. By the same
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token, on the other hand, it is also possible that fear of terrorism may work both
in favor of the insurgent. If the local population feels that the government is not
capable of protecting the population and preventing terrorism, it may vote for the
insurgent’s political party, just to avoid from being a target of the insurgent
terrorism, especially in the post election period.
Although pre-election violence is more likely to bring a hard-line
government, sometimes it may not always work that way. In few cases, it may
defeat a hard-line governing party, or lead the government to implement warm
policies that the insurgent may favor. For instance, Madrid bombings, which
occurred just three days before the Spanish General Election of 2004, replaced a
hard-line government (PP) with a soft one, (PSOE).Or in others, pre-election
violence may the lead the new government to accommodate the insurgent’s
demands in return for a relative decline in political violence. For instance, in
Colombia, when Liberal party candidate Cesar Augusto Gaviria Trujillo (19901994) won the elections and became president, he pushed the legislatures to
replace the constitution of 1886, appointed a former guerrilla leader to his
cabinet, pushed large scale budget increases in social expenditures and moves
that could be viewed as accommodating insurgent demands (Brauer, GómezSorzano, & Sethuraman, 2004).
As seen in the literature, only one dimension—position of the governing
party on terrorism— does not explain the election outcome, therefore, there

95

should be some additional dimensions in anticipating the consequences of preelection violence and election outcomes.
Fault factor
If people reach a conclusion that government’s policies or programs
attracted the terrorists to launch their terrorist campaign or carry out a terrorist
attack, then they are more likely to hold responsible the government for the
terrorist attack(s), and as a consequence, will punish the government at the ballot
box by replacing it with another one, even with a soft one. Spanish general
election of 2004 is a good example of this.
On March, 11st of 2004, just three days before the general elections ten
bombs were exploded in three different trains in Madrid and killed 191 deaths
and injured over 1500. Although polls indicated that the incumbent party,
People’s Party was supported by a majority of population in February 2004, the
incumbent lost the 14 March election with 37.6% of the vote while the Socialist
Party (PSOE) received 42.6% of the vote and won the election (Indridason,
2008). The winning party PSOE gained three million new votes compared to the
previous elections and as a consequence, won a total of 164 of the 350 seats,
while the incumbent a hard line PP party lost almost 7% of its votes from the
previous election and 35 of the 183 seats gained in 2000 (Chari, 2004). Whether
the Madrid bombings affected the unexpected election outcomes received a
great attention from scholars (Chari, 2004; Van Biezen, 2005; Montalvo, 2007;
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Bali, 2007; Rose & Murphy, 2007; Tures, 2009). Almost all scholars agreed that
the Madrid bombings affected electoral outcomes in various ways
Many international analysts and news media argued that if the ETA had
been responsible for the Madrid bombings the election outcomes would have
been very different than the current results; because an ETA attack would benefit
the incumbent party because of its clear accomplishment in combating terrorism.
However, an attack by Al-Qaida would put the responsibility for the deaths on the
governing party because of its support of the U.S in the war in Iraq, which most
of the Spaniards clearly opposed (Michavila, 2005, p.4).
Bali (2007) examined the influence of Madrid bombings through individual
level survey data and found that the Madrid train bombings of 2004 influenced
the electorate’s voting behavior not because of the population’s weakness
against terrorism, but because the terrorist attack increased the turnout rate in
favor of other parties and issues regarding the incumbent government’s policy on
the Iraq war and mismanagement of the bombing investigation.
Chari (2004) views the Madrid bombings as a catalyst for change and as a
reaction to governing party’s foreign policy. He concluded that the terrorist attack
coupled with the misinformation by the government and served as a catalyst to
encourage the abstainers to vote against the governing party.
In addition to the government’s support the war in Iraq, Rigo (2005)
concluded that poor management of the terrorist investigation was perceived by
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the population as an attempt to manipulate the tragedy influenced the election
(p.613).
Michavila (2005) analyzed published pre-and post-election polls and microdata from the post-election poll by the CIS, based on 5,377 door to door
interviews. He categorized the most proposed reasons for the election outcomes
under the following four hypotheses and tested their influence: 1) a latent desire
for a change of government; 2) the shock caused by the attacks; 3) a desire to
punish the government for its position on the war in Iraq; and 4) a dual
manipulation of information – by the government and against the government.
His study findings suggest that the Madrid bombings had a decisive impact on
the election results that is relatively small but a determining factor that changed
the final result. Finally, he concludes that those four hypotheses are not
exclusive,

but

rather

complementary.

The

first

three

were

necessary

preconditions for the electoral turnaround and the last one reinforced the
process. In other words, he argues that, without a latent desire for change,
without the Spanish government’s support for war in Iraq, and without the shock
by the terrorist attack, the change would not have occurred (p.32).
Proximity
Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its
impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the
election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Berrebi &
Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and
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electoral accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that
occurred two years before the elections and found that they do not influence the
election outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short
sighted with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008)
found that the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the
terrorist act occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance
of the electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had
occurred three months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have
been different today. In other words, due to the political competition and media
coverage, if a terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government’s
performance

becomes

questionable

and

vulnerable

thereby

changing

government at the elections by the electorate.
The other two factors that can affect the election outcomes are the 4)
severity and 5) targets of the terrorist campaign. The more severe and bloodier
terrorist attacks may generate the greater electoral impact on the elections; and
indiscriminate terrorism usually generates greater concerns about the personal
safety among the population.
To sum up, from the electorate’s perspective, pre-election violence raises the
concerns about the personal safety and these concerns dominates the voting
behavior. In case of pre-election violence that is close to the election, if the
governing party is a soft one, it is most likely that it will be punished at the ballot
box because of being incapable of protecting its citizens against the terrorists,
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thus will be replaced with a hard-line political party in the upcoming elections.
However, if the incumbent government is already a hard-line political party, then
people would decide whether the government’s policies or programs might have
attracted the terrorists to carry out the attack. If the terrorist attack was carried
out by a domestic terrorist group, then it is most likely that the incumbent
government would benefit from the attack because of its already known position
against the terrorist group and harsh policies. However, if the attack(s) were
conducted by an international terrorist organization, then the population would
look at its policies or programs that might lead the terrorist organization to
choose that country to attack. If the governing population is held responsible for
the terrorist attacks due to its poor or faulty policies, then it would be replaced
with another one, probably with a hard line party. This mostly depends on the
perception of the population. The media, political rivals and other actors may be
able to undermine incumbent government’s credibility and increase its concerns
about the incumbent government thus replace the government with the upcoming
elections; or depending upon the conditions; capabilities and skills of the
government, its allied media and other factors, if the blame can be attributed to
other factors and public can be convinced, the government may even benefit the
terrorist attacks and increase its vote shares.
Conclusion
In conclusion, pre-election has at least five dimensions. Therefore we argue
that if the insurgent is really rational, as many scholars acknowledge, then it
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should consider these dimensions, and carefully plan its terrorism campaign prior
to the election. Otherwise, since the election is a zero-sum game, the insurgent
would not only lose its popular support and fail at the ballot box thus deprive it
from political and population’s resources but also bring a hard-line government
that would make everything harder. Thus it is important to ask if pre-election
violence is likely to bring a hard-line government, why would the insurgent use
violence prior to elections; who actually benefits from pre-election violence, the
government or insurgent? What are the rationales behind of it? In order to get
desired outcomes, under what conditions would the insurgent resort to preelection violence?
Under the light of existent literature, if the primary goal of the insurgent is to
increase support and votes for its political party, it would not attack against its
native population, especially in its constituencies. Rather, the terrorism campaign
would focus on combatants and governmental targets in its constituencies.
However, if insurgent’s primary aim is to damage the government and electoral
process rather than winning elections, then terrorism campaign would focus on
government’s civilian population in non-insurgent constituencies. By this way, the
insurgent might increase the government’s population’s concerns about their
personal safety and to lead the government’s population to hold responsible the
government for the attacks. Thus, as a consequence, in order to decrease
personal security concerns among its citizens and secure a victory in the
upcoming elections, incumbent government would sit at the negotiating table and
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give concessions in favor of the insurgent. Because, in some cases, as Rose and
Murphy (2007) points out, terrorist attacks on civilians may potentially lead to
policy concessions if the government and citizens believe that the insurgent’ is
motivated by limited policy objectives; so the government may prefer to make
some policy changes in favor of the insurgent. Or, even if the elections usually
brings a hard-line government, due to its possible harsh indiscriminate counter
terrorism policies against the insurgent’s native population, the insurgent’s
population may alienate itself from the government; thus, the insurgent still would
be able to increase its popular support in the long run and secure the next
elections. As an example of such strategy, in November 2001 the Maoist
insurgents, the CPN-M, intentionally escalated the conflict to force the
government to drop their “democratic mask” and reveal their “true fascist role” in
front of the Nepalese people and international people (Gobyn, 2009).
Violence in the Post-Election Period
Various factors can influence violence in the post-election violence. They
include fraud in elections (Sisk, 2008; Fischer, 2004), which often occurs when
disputes over election results or the inability of judicial mechanisms to resolve
disputes in a fair, timely and transparent manner; electoral system–occurs
especially when elections are seen as “zero-sum” events and “losers” are left out
of participation in governance (Fischer, 2004) or in winner-take-all systems may
cause violence in fragile states because of not letting ethnic minorities to
represent in the government due to a threshold that must be met across the
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country (Sisk,2008); and election outcomes (Amerasinghe, 1989; Rapoport &
Weinberg, 2000a; Boyle, 2009; Finn, 2009; Höglund, 2009; Sisk, 2008).
Most of the studies focusing on the post-election violence (Amerasinghe,
1989; Rapoport and Weinberg 2001, Boyle, 2009; Finn, 2009; Höglund, 2009;
Sisk, 2008) focus on election outcomes and explain it through a relative
deprivation approach that is generated by dissatisfied election outcomes.
Electoral Outcomes
Most scholars have considered election outcomes as the main source of
the post-election violence therefore conceived post election violent events as
quick and short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are
announced and ends in a short period of time, such as a couple of weeks.
According to Rapoport and Weinberg (2000a) usually, post election violence
occurs after the results are announced, as it did in Sri Lanka Elections of 1988
(Amerasinghe , 1989). The election violence started as soon as results of 1988
Sri Lanka presidential elections of 1988 announced (Amerasinghe (1989). As the
Sunday Times (January 1, 1989) reported, 94 bodies were found just on the day.
Furthermore, at least 260 people were killed within the five days and 417 were
killed within 13 days in the post-election violence (as cited in Amerasinghe, 1989,
p.346).
Poor election outcomes have various negative meanings for the insurgent
such as failure at mobilizing the mass (Weinberg & Eubank, 1992), deprive of
political power and its benefits (Sisk, 2008; Finn, 2009), loss of legitimacy.
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Without a correct interpretation of election outcomes, post-election violence
cannot be anticipated or analyzed accurately.
Weinberg and Eubank (1992) suggest that terrorist violence is the
outcome of a small elite group of individuals who are frustrated by their inability
to mobilize the masses; therefore terrorism should be related to a frustrating
decline in power, not an increasing parliamentary presence, because they may
think their electoral appeals go “unheeded” (p.136). In other words, when the
insurgent confronts the indifference of the population that it hopes to get its
support and mobilize against the government, and its appeals for support are
rejected by the electorate, it resorts to violence (Weinberg, 1991). Likewise, the
Hewitt (2000) study on violence perpetrated by the White racists during the South
during the civil rights period and by the Black militants in the late 1960s and early
1970s, found that timing of each outbreak of terrorism coincided with the decline
of popular mobilization, rather than its high points. To Hewitt, unexpectedly poor
electoral support at the ballot box may lead the insurgent to conclude that the
entire electoral politics is a fraud and the population has been blinded to the
insurgent’s real interests (p.433). Furthermore he concludes that groups lose in
the elections, particularly if they lose “consistently”, are likely view violence as
tempting option (p.343).
Similarly Sisk (2008) and Finn (2009) views undesired election results as
the main source of the election violence because of the insurgent’s aims to retain
political power or unwillingness to cede power. When the insurgent’s political
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party lost the elections, it may frustrate its supporters thus lead to political
violence (Finn, 2009, p.53). As Boyle (2009) pointed out dissatisfied groups have
powerful incentives to use violence against target population (Boyle, 2009); thus,
when the insurgent does not satisfy with the defeat at the ballot box, the
insurgent may use violence against target population (Boyle, 2009), or try to
overthrow or alter the election outcomes (Höglund, 2009, p.416). Depending
upon the insurgent’s interpretation of election results, the perpetrator can punish
the electorates for not voting for its political party, or target government and its
citizens. For instance when the results of 1999 referendum indicated that an
overwhelming 78.5% of people voted for the independence of East Timor from
the Indonesia, military- backed militias launched a violence campaign against the
East Timorese population, foreign journalists, the UN staff and Catholic clergy
(Schulze, 2001,p.77-78); as a consequence of this campaign 70-80% of the
business district in Dili was destroyed, almost 50% of houses in the capital city
were burnt, and over 271,545 East Timorese were forced to leave to the West
Timor (Crouch,p.155 as cited in Boyle, 2009, p.225).
Scholars (Guelke & Smyth, 1992; Neumann, 2005; Berrebi & Klor, 2008)
have reached different conclusions in their research on the influence on election
outcomes on post-election violence. For instance Berrebi and Klor (2008)
examined the influence of Israeli popular support for Israel’s right block parties on
Palestinian terrorism during the post election period and found no evidence
indicating a relationship. Perhaps it would have generated greater insight for the
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proposed study if Berrebi and Klor had examined the Palestinian population’s
votes.
Guelke and Smyth (1992) examined this relationship between violence and
relative decline in popular support for the IRA by using electoral data and
concluded that relative decline in popular votes led the IRA to commit terrorist
acts to increase its popular votes. They suggested that when its political party,
the Sinn Fein, suffered a set back in the second direct election to the European
Parliament and polled 10,000 fewer votes than the party had received in the
Westminster election a year earlier, this failure led to dissatisfaction within the
IRA regarding the priority given to the electoral contest. Consequently, violence
increased and most important was the attempt to assassinate the British prime
minister at the Conservative Party Conference held in 1984 (Guelke & Smyth,
1992). They suggested that the IRA carried out this attack in order to increase its
popularity among the Irish population. However, effectiveness of resorting
violence to increase popular votes is open to discussion. Neumann (2005) found
that the IRA violence did not manage to increase its popular support in the long
run. He found that in the long run, as its popular support declined the IRA
violence declined too in the following ten years and never has reached its death
tolls.
Weinberg (1991), McAllister (2004) and Neumann (2005) suggested that
depending upon the conditions the insurgent may shift its strategy from violence
to electoral politics, or use both simultaneously. Neumann’s (2005) study
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indicates that relative declines in vote share of the Sinn Fein started at 1984
European elections and lasted till 1989 local elections of Northern Ireland. In the
following years after the 1989 elections, the number of IRA killings gradually
declined. When the IRA declared a ceasefire in 1993, its political party Sin Fein
received its highest vote share at 1993 local elections in Northern Ireland and
European elections. Neumann attributes this electoral success to the IRA’s ability
to correctly read the changing dynamics of the movement and understand its
electorates’ opposition to violence. Likewise McAllister (2004) suggested that
Sinn Fein benefited from the ceasefire of 1994 and built itself a stronger personal
base of support. In other words, Sin Fein’s political constituents delegitimized the
violence and this opposition put a pressure on the IRA and limited its violence.
Therefore, in order to keep popular support with its own side, the insurgent did
not increase its violence to meet its electorate’s demands thus succeeded in
regaining popular support. Similarly, Weinberg (1991) points out the mutability of
political conditions and suggests that given the appropriate circumstances the
insurgent can replace the electoral campaign with terrorism campaign, the
opposite, or both simultaneously. If the insurgent desires to acquire respectability
in domestic and international politics and its violent activities have been to be
ineffective, then it may pursue its political goals through participating in
democratic electoral politics (Weinberg, 1991).
The degree of attached importance to efficiency of violence to reach
insurgent’s political objectives varies with the time and may affect the insurgent’s
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violence as well. Similarly, Funes’s study findings indicate that in 1989, 80% of
the Basque country people agreed that violence is unnecessary to obtain political
goal. This percentage reached to 88% in 1991 and in 1997. The terrorist attacks
of September 11 2001 in the U.S and March 11 2004 in Madrid have further
reinforced strong opposition to any terrorist activity in Spain (Pallarés, Muñoz, &
Retortillo, 2006), as consequence in order to not to alienate the population from
itself and keep its popular support, the ETA decreased the number of its killings.
Discussion on Post-Election Violence
Much of the past literature on election violence primarily has focused on the
pre-election violence and its effects on electoral process and/or election
outcomes. However, post-election violence has different dynamics and stems
from different reasons than the pre-election or election day(s) violence. As
Amerasinghe (1989) points out pre-election violence aims to “obstruct”
electorates whereas post-election violence aims to “punish” them (p.347).
Much of the past studied has explained violence in the post-election period
with dissatisfaction with the election outcomes, in other words, through a relative
deprivation approach. Basically, these studies suggest that when a political party
lost elections, they deprive from political power and resources, thereby these
political parties or their supporters resort to violence because they do not want to
loss political power and resources. Although this approach provides some
insights about post-election period in cases where the insurgent’s political party
has lost elections or gained a poor success at the ballot box, it provides little
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information on post-election violence when the insurgent’s political party has won
the elections or increased its vote shares compared to previous election.

CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY

This study uses a quantitative research methodology and secondary data
analysis approach, and constructs a longitudinal design. This chapter first
provides information about the research design, research approach; then it
discusses validity and limitations of the study. It introduces the variables and how
they are coded in the study. Finally, it presents proposed hypotheses.
Research Design
Longitudinal designs are quasi-experimental designs, in which the same
subjects are examined two or more time intervals to allow researchers to
examine the changes in the dependent variable, and to determine the direction of
the causation (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). Furthermore, due to the
fact being extended over time, longitudinal designs are considered as superior to
cross-sectional designs (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000).
In this study we examine terrorism trends over the elections and relationship
between insurgent’s electoral support and its terrorist attacks. Timing of data
collection should be consistent with the nature of change processes under
investigation (Mitchell & James, 2001, as cited in Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002).
Scholars have argued that as terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its
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impact on the election results increases, whereas the farther away from the
election, terrorist attacks lose impact (Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008;
Gassebner et al., 2008). For example, in their study on terrorism and electoral
accountability, Gassebner et al. (2008) examined terror events that occurred two
years before the elections and found that they do not influence the election
outcome; therefore, the authors concluded that the electorate is short sighted
with respect to its voting behavior. Similarly, Berrebi and Klor (2008) found that
the electoral impact of terrorist acts decreases the farther away the terrorist act
occurs from the elections. Bali (2007) acknowledged the importance of the
electoral proximity and suggested that if the Madrid bombings had occurred three
months before the elections, the electoral outcomes may have been different
today. In other words, due to the political competition and media coverage, if a
terrorist act occurs near to election times, the government’s performance
becomes questionable and vulnerable thereby changing government at the
elections by the electorate. Consistent with previous research, we assumed that
a monthly time period is appropriate for data collection over a year period both
before and one year after the elections.
Research Approach
The study uses a secondary data analysis approach to examine the
relationship between electoral support for the political party affiliated with the
PKK and terrorist incidents over the election periods. Nachmias-Frankfurt and
Nachmias (2000) list four main advantages of using a secondary data analysis
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approach: 1) provides opportunity for replication; 2) enables researcher to
employ longitudinal research design; 3) may improve the validity of measurement
by expanding time the scope of the independent variables used when
operationalizing major concepts; and 4) enables the researcher to increase
sample size, its representatives, and number of observations; 5) it can be used
for triangulation; and finally reduces the costs.
Secondary data analysis has three main limitations: 1) differences in data
collection methods, variables, sample sizes and others; 2) difficulties in
accessing the data; and 3) problems may arise if insufficient information is
provided on how the data were collected and other procedures (NachmiasFrankfurt & Nachmias, 2000).
Data of the Study
In this study, unit of analysis is the provinces of Turkey. Currently, there are
81 provinces in Turkey. Although the PKK does not carry out any terrorist attacks
in some provinces, due to presence of a 10% threshold and not to harm
generalization of the study across Turkey, we included all provinces in to the
study. The secondary data of the study were collected on two main areas: 1)
Elections and 2) terrorist attacks
Terrorism data for the dependent variable was acquired from a database
generated by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) of Sam
Houston State University in Huntsville, TX. This database includes terrorist
incidents that occurred in Turkey between 1980 and 2008. The researcher
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assigned terrorist attacks only carried out by the PKK listed in the database to
the province wherein the attack was carried out.
Electoral data for both the parliamentary and municipalities were obtained
from Turkey’s High Election Board (YSK). For the parliamentary elections, data
includes the total number of eligible voters, voter turnout, and popular votes for
each political party. These observations correspond to the results of the
parliamentary elections of 1995, 1999, 2002, and 2007, and municipal elections
of 1999, and 2004, in provinces of Turkey.
Measurement of Variables
In this study terrorism is measured through the “number of terrorist
incidents” carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey. Vote share of the
political party affiliated with the PKK is assumed to represent the degree of
popular support from the province; therefore popular support was measured
through “vote share of the political party affiliated with the PKK”. Its vote share is
assumed to represent the degree of popular support from the province.
Dependent variable
Number of terrorist incidents: This variable represents the number of
terrorist attacks that have occurred within individual provinces of Turkey. The
study measures terrorism through number of terrorist incidents rather than
casualties, because from a RMT approach, it is assumed that each terrorist
attacks requires some level intelligence, logistics, materials and human
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resources to have; therefore, from this perspective, number of terrorist attacks
also indicates the terrorism capacity and intention of the insurgent. While a
terrorist attack could kill tens of people several terrorist attacks might not result in
any casualties. Therefore, by counting only casualties, not only might we miss
some terrorist incidents but also might overestimate the capacity or think that the
insurgent avoided carrying out terrorist attacks. For instance in reality, the
insurgent might attempt carry out a number of terrorist attacks, but due to
effective counter-terrorism efforts, they could have been prevented or failed to kill
or wound anyone. Or resorting indiscriminate terrorism in a crowded place could
kill tens of people. For these reasons, the researcher counted terrorist attacks
within corresponding time period for each province.
Independent variables
Singer and Willet (2003) describes how to construct a model to analyze
changes upon an expected event. They name it as “discontinuous individual
change model” and illustrate how to code the variables into the dataset to
examine changes pre- and post-event period. Their analogy and discontinuous
individual change model were use in few studies such as Lang and Bliese
(2009). Similar to others, this study uses the Singer and Willet (2003) study’s
design for the sake of this study.
Due to both statistical and theoretical reasons, an election was divided into
three election periods: 1) pre-election period; 2) transition stage, (or short term
post-period; and 3) post-election period, (or long term post-period). If the
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elections have any impact on terrorist attacks, then they will affect terrorism
trajectories of provinces by the following ways:
An immediate shift in elevation, but no shift in slope: In this case provinces’
terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election, but their subsequent rate
of change will be unaffected. This means that the elevations of their trajectory
jump, but their slope in the pre-election and post-election epochs remain the
same. The following figure illustrates such an immediate shift at the election but
no shift in the post-election slope.
An immediate shift in slope, but no shift in elevation: In this case provinces’
terrorist attacks will remain stable upon election, but their subsequent rate of
change will be affected—increase or decline in the post-election period. This
means that elevation of terrorism trend is no higher at the election, but its slope
in the pre-and post-election epochs differ.
An immediate shifts in both the election and slope: In this case provinces’
terrorist attacks change in two ways as a result of election: They abruptly change
(increase or decline) and their subsequent rate of change increases/decreases.
This means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ
pre-election and post-election
The model of the study was structured to represent these possible changes
upon election by including the following independent variables.
Time: The time period for the time variable begins 12 months (coded as 0)
before the election and ends twelve months after the election (coded as
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23.month) for each individual province; because of following two time variables,
the time variable in this study represents the pre-election slope for terrorism
attacks over the pre-election period.
Election: A dummy coded election variable has been added in the dataset,
and 0 has been coded for terrorist incidents that occurred before the election and
1 for after the election. This dummy variable examines the possible elevation
upon election. Furthermore, the inclusion of the dummy-coded time variable
allows for discontinuity in the change model (Lang & Bliese, 2009).In the Bliese’s
study this represents the transition stage to the post-election period. Thus, in
words of Singer and Willet (2003)’s study this dummy variable indicates whether
there is an immediate shift in elevation
Post-election: The post-election variable is used to determine if the postelection slope differ from the pre-election slope. Stated differently, this variable
examines whether the slopes of terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and postelection.
Vote share of the political party associated with the PKK: This variable
represents the electoral support (or popular support) of the PKK. For each
province, it is calculated by dividing valid votes for its party into total valid votes.
Before the new election (election=0, or time=0…11), previous vote share of the
PKK’s party has been used and its latter vote share has been used for after the
new election. Thus, parameter of this variable indicates whether vote share of the
PKK’s party is significantly associated with the PKK’s terrorist attacks. A positive
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parameter indicates a positive relationship with the attacks, thus representing the
RMT approach, whereas a negative parameter indicates a negative relationship,
thus representing the RD approach. The Table 1 lists all of the variables in the
study.

Table 1: List of the Variables in this study
Dependent Variable
Independent Variables
Number of terrorist incidents
time (continuous)
(continuous)
election (dummy)
post-election (continuous)
Vote share of the party affiliated with the PKK
(continuous)

This design was employed for each election separately. Although data
were collected from 1995 and 2002 election results to calculate electoral support,
the study does not include a separate analysis for 1999 local elections and 2002
general elections. With regards to local elections of 1999, the PKK’s political
party did not participate in 1995 local elections, so no electoral data available for
its political party that is needed for the analysis of 1999 local elections. As
explained previously, consecutive election results are needed to analyze one
election. Therefore the researcher did not include local elections of 1999.
Regarding the general election of 2002, after the capture of PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan in 1999, the PKK declared a unilateral ceasefire that covers 2002 general
elections –the ceasefire ended in 2004. During the period of 2002 general

117

elections, only few terrorist attacks occurred, so, inclusion 2002 general elections
into the study would not yield reliable results. Therefore for the sake of this study,
the researcher has not included 1999 local and 2002 general elections in to this
study. As a result, three separate dataset (1999 general, 2004 local and 2007
general elections), were constructed by using above mentioned independent and
dependent variables. The Table 2 below indicates the data structure for Istanbul
province in 1999 general elections.
Table 2: Data Structure of the study
provincename
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL
ISTANBUL

voteshare
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
3.64
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03
4.03

time
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

election
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

postelection
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

ntotalincidents
0
2
1
2
0
1
0
0
0
0
6
1
0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
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Hypotheses of the Study
The main research question of the study is “are the elections and popular
support affect insurgent’s terrorist attacks?” Two main hypotheses are proposed
to answer it: The first one;
H01: “Terrorist attacks are not associated with its popular support”.
H1: “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.
With regards to impact of electoral support, the RMT and RD theoretical
approaches have different expectation, so we have two sub hypotheses: First,
deriving the RMT approach, we hypothesize that:
H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.
From a RMT approach we expect that an increase in its vote share
increases its terrorist attacks. If vote share of the insurgent is positively
associated with terrorist attacks, then provinces with higher electoral support are
expected to experience higher terrorist attacks, because more electoral support
is assumed to indicate more popular support from the local population. Thus, the
PKK would be able move freely with little concern about being informed to the
security forces and get more logistic, intelligence and other resources to conduct
terrorist activities.
In contrast to the RMT approach, taking a RD approach, we hypothesize
that:
H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.
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If vote share of insurgent is negatively associated with terrorist attacks, the
researcher expects that a relative decline in the PKK’s electoral support lead to
an increase its terrorist attacks because of the relative deprivation caused by
undesired election results.
The second main hypothesis of the study is that:
H02: “Terrorist attacks are not associated with elections”.
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.
The main reason of proposing two related but separate hypotheses is that vote
share of the insurgent might be related to terrorist attacks but terrorist attacks
may not change as a function of time over the election periods. Or it is also
possible that terrorist attacks may change as a function of time over the election
periods, but vote share may not associate with them.
As explained previously, the study divides an election into three election
periods: 1) pre-election period; 2) transition stage, (or short term post-period; and
3) post-election period, (or long term post-period). We propose hypotheses for
each of these periods.
H02a (Null): “Terrorist attacks will not change during the pre-election period”.
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.
The PKK could intentionally increase its terrorist attacks over the pre-election
period to discredit the government, to discourage electorates to cast their votes,
and increase its popular support among the Kurdish population. Thus, as a
possible consequence of its pre-election terrorism the incumbent might be
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replaced with a rival, probably a conservative party—who is known for, or
promised to take though counterterrorism measures against the PKK.
As some scholars pointed out post election violent events as quick and
short-lived events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and
ends in a short period of time (Amerasinghe , 1989). Consistent with previous
research finding we expect an increase soon after the election and a decline in a
short period of time; so we propose the following hypotheses:
H02b (Null): “Terrorist attacks will not change abruptly upon the election”.
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.
H02c (Null): Subsequent terrorism attacks will not differ in the post-election
period.
H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period.
Analytical Techniques used in the Study
Longitudinal Data as Hierarchical: Time Nested Within Individuals
In this study, we examine the changes in terrorist incidents over election
periods and how relative changes in vote share of the PKK’s political party are
related to terrorist attacks. Rogosa, Brandt, and Zimowski (1982) provided the
following useful guidelines for analyzing changes: First, assessments of change
must be based on a model for change. Second, a model for individual change is
useful for the measurement of change. Third, the regression function represents
the key initial summary of the data. Fourth, measures of individual change can be

121

“improved” by incorporating information from all n persons into the measure of
change. Finally, answers to questions regarding change are most often obtained
from longitudinal panel data. This study meets Rogosa et al.’s suggestions
because of its longitudinal design and application of multilevel modeling to model
terrorism trajectory of provinces over time.
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) can be applied to multiple
observations nested within a single individual. Due to this feature, HLM can be
applied to longitudinal data where the primary interest is to model the structure
and predictors of change over time (Luke, 2004). These models, in which the
HLM applied to longitudinal data, are also known as “growth models” or “growth
curve models”.
Within a longitudinal design, HLM is an intuitive and efficient way to
estimate individual growth or change curves (Tate & Hokanson, 2006). Multilevel
models are also known as Random coefficient models (RCM), Multi Level
Modeling (MLM) or Linear Mixed Models (LMM). Furthermore, multilevel
modeling is capable of separating changes over time within individuals and
differences in between individuals at the initial status. It allows random effects
into the model, and each individual is treated as a random effect. In multilevel
model, data should be in long format in order that individual slopes and intercepts
can be calculated. Having estimated individual slopes and intercepts, the model
predicts individual variability with more precision by using other variables to
predict the individual variability. Thus, the researcher can examine how an
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individual changes over time, what the rate of change is, and how the rate of
change varies by predictors across the individuals.
One of the essential features of multilevel modeling is that it substantially
reduces the number of parameters to be estimated while still allowing the
coefficient to differ from unit to unit or from time to time (Hsiao & Pesaran, 2004).
This is done by estimating two models: The Level 1 model specifies the intraindividual model (also referred to as micro model, within-subject, or intraindividual model), and then the Level 2 model produces parameters for the interindividual model (also known as macro, between-subject, inter-individuals model)
using the parameters of the level 1 model. In other words, level 2 models the
macro model based on the parameters of level 1 and attempts to explain the
change and variability by adding predictors of interest in the level 2 model.
In addition, unlike other repeated measures analysis methods, HLM allows
the fit of data with unequal numbers of repeated observations for each subject,
variable timing of observations, and missing data features (Tate & Hokanson,
2006). Many traditional longitudinal approaches, such as repeated-measures
MANOVA, are unable to easily handle unbalanced longitudinal data (Luke,
2004). The HLM can also provide significance tests for individual parameters
(Ployhart, Holtz, & Bliese, 2002).
Growth and Discontinuous Growth Models with Hierarchical Linear Modeling
“Growth modeling” is widely applied to the analyses of longitudinal data and
tests for individual differences in the outcome and variability in the rate of change
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over time. The growth model can explain differences in overall outcomes and
differences in slopes as a function of level 2 characteristics. Growth curve
modeling requires that the outcome data collected at each time point be
measured on a common metric in order that changes across time reflect growth
and not changes in the measurement scale (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1987). Typical
growth models work in cases when there is an underlying trend to the data, or
there is no explicit transition point between measurement intervals where change
takes on a distinct non-linear pattern. However, in many situations, events
representing distinct transition points occur during longitudinal data collection.
When this occurs, the growth model masks sub-trends in the overall change
pattern. Even longitudinal data without any apparent change may reveal
important information when transition points are examined. If the topic of interest
is a certain point(s), a “discontinuous growth model” is a good way to reveal such
information (Bliese, 2006; Lang & Bliese, 2009). In this study, election is the
‘transition point’ that we will examine.
Discontinuous growth models are a specific form of multilevel mixed-effects
models with multiple time variables to model transition processes over time and
individual differences in transition processes (Lang & Bliese, 2009). Furthermore
a discontinuous growth model can capture possible changes and variability
among provinces. Therefore, in order to thoroughly analyze the differences in the
terrorism outcome and variability in the rate of change over time, a discontinuous
growth change was established to analyze whether the terrorism pattern has
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really changed after an election within-individual, inter-individual levels.
Furthermore, individual provinces may differ in each term of the discontinuous
growth model, because it is possible that individual differences can exist for the
pre-election, election, and post-transition slopes among provinces. For instance,
some provinces may experience different terrorism patterns in the post-election
period while others might stay the same. Such individual differences can be
predicted using level-2 variables.
The standard HLM does not appropriately analyze the data if the data is
count.

In these cases, the possible values of Y are non-negative integers,

typically indicating a positively skewness. If data has few zeros, a transformation
may solve the problem and allow us to use a linear model; however, if there are
many zeros, the normality assumption cannot be approximated by a
transformation (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.292). In such cases, predicted
values based on a linear model might be negative, indicating coefficients are not
interpretable. Generalized Hierarchical linear models (Luke, 2004) also known as
generalized linear models with random effects (Schall, 1991), or Hierarchical
Generalized Linear Models (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002), offer a coherent
modeling framework for multilevel data with nonlinear structural models and nonnormally distributed errors (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002, p.292). GHLMs can
handle a wide variety of different types of non-continuous or non-normal
dependent variables including binary, proportion, count, and ordinal variables
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through a necessary transformation and appropriate error distribution for the
dependent variable (Luke, 2004).
Initial analysis of the data of this study revealed the need for a Poisson
distribution in the study because of the presence of nonlinearity of the
association between predictors and outcome, production of negative predicted
values, and highly skewness of terrorist attacks is highly skewed. These
problems can be addressed more productively in employing a nonlinear model.
Therefore, a generalized hierarchical linear model (GHLM) is more appropriate
for the sake of this study.
Generalized Hierarchical Linear Models (GHLM)
Hierarchical linear models are considered as a special case of GHLM with
a normal sampling model and identity link function at level 1 (Raudenbush and
Bryk, 2002). The level-1 model in HGLM has three parts: a sampling model, a
link function, and a structural model. A standard generalized linear model for the
count data uses “Poisson” sampling model and a log link function. These extend
directly to hierarchical models. In other words, the transformational link connects
the untransformed dependent variable to a new transformed variable (Luke,
2004).
The standard link function when the level-1 sampling is Poisson is log link,
that is,
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In words,

, is the log of event rate. Thus, if the event rate,λti, is 1, the

log is 0. When the event rate is less than 1, the log is negative; when the event
rate is greater than 1, the log is positive. Thus, while
nonnegative,

is constrained to be

can take on any real value.

The transformed predicted value of

is now related to the predictors of

the model through the linear structural model.

=β0j+ β1j * 1ij + β2j * 2j+…………………+ βpj * pij

Then such, transformed predicted log event rate can be converted to an
event rate, λti by computing λti=exp(

). Whatever the value of predicted nti, λti,

will be nonnegative. As seen , combining the level-1 sampling model, the level-1
link function and the level-1 structural model reproduces the usual level-1 model
of HLM.

Yti | λti ~ P (mti, λti)

According to the Poisson distribution, the expected value and variance of
Yti, given the event rate,λti, are then

E(Tti| λti)=mti λti, Var(Tti| λti)= mti λti
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In words, the expected number of terrorist attacks in time t for province i is
its event rate, λti, times its exposure mti.
Specification of the Model of the Study
Level-1

Y t i = β 0 i +β 1 i (voteshare t i)+ β2 i (time t i)+ β3 i (election t i)+ β4 i (postelection i )+еti

Where Y is the ‘log’-number of terrorism incidents in province i at the time
t; t denotes the measurement occasion (t=1 to T
observations for province i ), and time

ti

i

where T

i

is the number of

is the month that begins for all provinces

from 12 months (time starts from 0) before election and ends 12 months after the
election.
For the current scaling of time, the intercept β 0 i represents the log-number of
terrorist incidents in the province i 12 months before the election (time=0); The β 1
i

coefficient reflects the log-rate of terrorism change when vote share of insurgent

increase one 1%.for the province I; the β 2 i coefficient reflects the log-linear rate of
change of terrorism indicator for the province i over pre-election period; the β 3 i
coefficient reflects log-linear rate of change of terrorism indicator for the province i
in the transition stage; the β 4 i coefficient reflects the log-linear rate of change of
terrorism indicator for the province i over post-election period. The е t i term is the
log-within-subject residual at the tth month (i.e., the deviation of Y regarding the
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true systematic change curve for province i for the tth measure).In count terrorist
attacks are converted by calculating its exponential value.
If this level 1 analysis suggests that people differ on within-individual change,
then the level 2 (between-provinces) can examine the association between
explanatory variables of interest and patterns of change. Stated differently, like
HLMs, in GHLM models, variables are added to level 2 models to analyze level-1
coefficients, either intercepts or slopes (Nezlek, 2001). Due to the fact that
primary interest of this study is level-1 model (within-province change), no level-2
predictor other than the mean score of the corresponding coefficient has been
included in to the level-2 model.

Level-2 Model
Intercept:

β 0 i = π 00+r0 i

VoteShare Slope (change rate by 1% increase in vote share): β 1 i = π 10 +r1 i
time (change rate in pre-election period) : β 2i = π 20+ r2i
election Slope (change rate in transition stage) : β 3 i = π 30+ r3 i
postelection Slope (change rate in post-election period): β 4 i = π 40 +r4 i

Analysis Steps for each election
The HLM.6.08 software package, which was developed by Raudenbush,
Bryk and Congdon (2004) was used in analyses and only the population-average
estimates were reported. The population-average estimates give the expected
difference in the in outcome associated with a unit increase in the predictors,
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holding constant the other predictors, but averaging over the distribution of level2 random effects (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). Furthermore Raudenbush, Bryk
and Congdon suggest using population-average estimates if the researcher is
interested in how a change in a predictor can be expected to affect the overall
population mean.
Researchers of the HLM usually points out the importance of three main
steps in conducting level-1 model analysis (Bliese et al, 2007), Singer and Willet,
2003, Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002): 1) Estimating null model (also referred as
unconditional means model) and calculate intra class correlation coefficient
(ICC). 2) Estimate unconditional growth model without random slopes and 3)
estimate growth model with random slopes.
Step 1: Estimating Null model and calculating the ICC score
Step 1 of the procedure involves estimating the intra class correlation
coefficient (ICC) for the criterion measure. In our context, the ICC indicates how
much variability in terrorism scores among observations can be attributed to
between-province differences across time periods.
Null model
Level-1 Model
E(Ntotalincidents | β t i ) = λ t i
Log [λ t i ]=η t i
η t i= β 0i +℮ t i
Level-2 Model
β 0i = π 00+ r0
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The null model does not describe change in the outcome overtime; it stipulates
that the true individual change trajectory for individual i is completely flat, sitting
at elevation π00 at level-1. Instead, the null model simply describes and partitions
the outcome at every level. The level-2 stipulates that while these flat trajectories
may differ in elevation, their average elevation is π00, and any interindividual
variation in elevation is not linked to predictors. Thus testing the null model
allows researcher to establish whether there is systematic variation in our
outcome that is worth exploring (Singer & Willet, 2003, p.92). The null model
needs to be fitted first, because its partitions the total variation in the outcome
meaningfully. The primary reason for fitting the null model is to estimate variance
components, which assess the amount of outcome variation that exists at each
level (Singer & Willet, 2003; p93). Where β0i is true log-mean of Y for province i;
π00 is true log-mean of Y across provinces in population; and the level-1 residual
is a “within-individual” deviation that asses the “distance” between Yij and β0i.
Variation in the log-outcome is just the sum of the within and between-individual
variance components, so the population intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) is
calculated as the following:
ICC= Intercept variance (between-province variance, also referred as level-2 variance)
Intercept variance +Residual (also referred as level-1 variance)

Step-2: Unconditional Growth Curve Model
Step 2 involves estimating the nature and shape of the time-terrorism
score relationship. The null model and unconditional growth model assess
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whether there is potentially predictable outcome variation, and if so where it
resides (Singer & Willet, 2003; p.102). In order to examine the fixed relationship
between level-1 variables and number of terrorist incidents, number of terrorist
incidents were regressed on four time-variant predictors which represent the preelection, transition stage, post-election slope and vote share slopes. Vote share
of party affiliated with the PKK has been included as a covariate into to model as
a level-1 variable rather than level-2 predictor, because of being a time-varying
covariate, which means it is not constant for a given province, rather it covariates
with the time, because it changes after the Election Day (time=11). Time-varying
covariates are included into the level-1 model as level-1 predictors, not into the
level-2 model (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002, p.179) so that the variation in the vote
share can be captured by the model.
Adding additional time-varying predictors to the level-1 can reduce the
level-1 variance and can affect variance components in both levels, because they
vary both within-and between provinces; but time-invariant (level-2) predictors
cannot explain much within-person variation (level-1). The reason is that since
time-invariant predictors are constant across all individuals they have no withinprovince variation to allow for a level-2 residual. However, adding time-invariant
predictors will reduce the level-2 components if they “explain” some of

the

between-province variation in initial status or rates of change, respectively.
(Singer & Willet, 2003; p.103, p.170). Adding a time- varying predictor changes
the meaning of the individual growth parameters because of the two reasons: (1)
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the intercept parameter β0i, now refers to the value of the outcome when all
predictors, not only time variables, but also the time-varying predictor, are zero.
(2) The slope parameters are now a conditional rate of change, controlling for the
effects of the time-varying predictor.
The level-1 and level-2 models for the unconditional growth curve model
are presented in Equation 2.
The level-1 and level-2 models for unconditional growth curve model.
Level-1 Model
E(Ntotalincidents | π t i ) = λ t i
Log [λ t i ]=η t i
η t i=β 0 i +β1i(voteshareti)+β2i(timeti)+β3i(electionti)+β4i(postelectionti)+ ℮ t i
Level-2 Model
β 0 = π 00+ r0
β 1 = π 10
β 2 = π 20
β 3 = π 30
β 4 = π 40
Step-3: Unconditional Growth Curve Model with Random Coefficients
Step 3 involves testing for significant variability across provinces in the
slopes of time-terrorism relationships. One of the drawbacks of unconditional
growth models in step 2, which allow only intercepts (r0) to vary among
provinces, is that it assumes these parameters are constant for each province.
However, some provinces may have different terrorism patterns over the time
than other provinces. In order to determine whether provinces have different
terrorism patterns, alternative models with random slopes that allow slopes vary
are tested in the Step 3. P values of the parameters have been used to examine
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parameter variability. A p-value that is smaller than 0.05 indicates a statistically
significant variability in the corresponding parameter among provinces.
Limitations of the Study
External validity of the study is a limitation of the study. Whether the study
findings can be generalized to larger populations and applied to different settings
is referred as “external validity” (Nachmias-Frankfurt & Nachmias, 2000). Since
the study focuses only one specific insurgent terrorist organization in Turkey over
time, it could have a low external validity. Although findings could provide some
insights into election related terrorism in other countries—especially for those
who struggle with ethnic insurgent terrorist organizations with political party,
since terrorist organizations have different background, characteristics and
operates countries with different characteristics, its findings cannot generalized to
other countries. Namely, terrorist attacks might follow a totally different trend over
the election periods or there might be no trend at all.
The other limitation of the study is related to the data of the study. The
data were collected by the Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG) of
Sam Houston State University in Huntsville through open sources, so the data
might cover important terrorist attacks that attracted media attention. There might
be some small scale terrorist attacks that did not attract media attention thus not
present in our data.

CHAPTER IV: FINDINGS OF THE STUDY

The results of the study are presented in three sections. The first section
provides descriptive statistics on the overall number of and type of attacks, then
charts the attacks longitudinally. The second section test hypotheses and
presents results of the study.
Briefly, our study found that electoral support for the PKK was positively
related to its terrorist attacks. Furthermore, terrorist attacks changed in two ways
as a result of election: They first abruptly increased upon election and their
subsequent rate of change declined over the post-election period, meaning that
both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and
post-election.
Descriptive Statistics of the study
Number of provinces affected by PKK terrorism and number of terrorist
attacks differ from election to election. Terrorist attacks increased and expanded
to more provinces in the 2007 elections. In 1999 general election a total of 27
provinces (34%) out of 80 experienced terrorist attacks, however this number
declined to 20 provinces (25%) out of 81 in the 2004 local elections, indicating
the PKK focused on certain provinces, especially those are located in the
dominantly Kurdish populated region (DKPR)—which the PKK claims to fight for
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its independence— rather than conducting a large-scale terrorism campaign. On
the other hand, for the 2007 elections, terrorist attacks occurred in 30 (37%) out
of 81 provinces. 18 (60%) of those 30 provinces are located in the DKPR;
furthermore while provinces located in the non-DKPR region experienced 44
terrorist incidents other provinces experienced 380 terrorist attacks over 24month period in 2007 general elections. The tables 5-6-7 provide detailed
information about number of and types of terrorist attacks as well as casualties
for elections.
Terrorist Attacks in 1999 Elections
In 24-month period of 1999 elections, a total of 147 terrorist attacks were
carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey (See Table 3, Figure 7 and Figure
8). In terms of attack type, 58% of attacks were armed attacks and 29% of the
attacks were bombing attack. 47% of the attacks targeted individuals/ vehicles or
facilities with combatant status, which include soldiers, gendarmerie forces,
police and village guards. However, 63% of the targets were affiliated with the
government. Stated differently, although the PKK targeted mostly non-combatant
targets (53%), most of the targets (63%) were either government’s officials or
facilities used by the government. We argue that by targeting officials, vehicles or
facilities of the government, the PKK tried to avoid losing support of the local
population, because it is normally easier to justify carrying out terrorist attacks
against governmental targets than merely civilians without any tie to the
government.
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Among combatant targets, the PKK much more preferred to target military
targets (36%) rather than the police (11%). Since the PKK mostly targeted
combatants, almost half of the deaths (55%) and wounded (51%) were
combatants. Attacking mostly military targets is not surprising, because of three
main reasons: First, the PKK considers itself as a kind of army of the Kurdish
people and to have a responsibility to expel occupying (Turkish) forces from the
DKPR region. Second, the police work only in urban areas, whereas the PKK
militants mainly operate in the rural areas. In order to target the police, the PKK
has to gather intelligence against police, acquire some logistics and other
materials; however, operating in the urban areas decreases their chances to
succeed in their attacks because of relatively less resources and supporters in
the urban areas.

Table 3: Terrorist Attacks in 1999 Elections
Terrorist attacks

Target
Military
Police
Government
Civilian

Total
147

Total
Attack
53
16
24
54

Arm.Att.
85

Bomb.
43

Kidn.
8

Target
Terrorists
Security Forces
Civilians
Total

Arson
11

Deaths
61
193
99
353

Comb vs.
non-Comb.
69 - 78

Injured
8
232
211
451

Gov vs.
non-Gov
93- 54

Total
69
425
310
804
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Figure 7:Targets of Terrorist Attacks Figure 8: Casualties in 1999 GE
in 1999 GE

The Figure 9 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 1999
general elections. These terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-election
periods below and their characteristics are explored.

Figure 9: Terrorist Attacks over the Time in 1999 Elections
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Pre-election period of 1999 GE
The Table 4 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the
governmental vs. non- governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants
over the pre-election period of 1999. During the overall pre-election period of
1999 elections, the PKK mostly hit the non-combatant targets (50, or 63%),
especially in the final lap of the election. Despite a higher number of attacks
against non-combatants, they were not merely civilians. Rather, 55% of the
targets were affiliated with the government. However, when looked the time
period of the attacks, it is seen that especially in the final lap of the election the
PKK dramatically increased its violence against both the governmental and nongovernmental targets, however, most of them were non-combatant targets (see
Figure 10 and Figure 11 ).
Table 4: Target Types over Pre-election period of 1999 Elections
Month
Governmental
non-governmental
Total

0
3
0
3

1
1
6
7

2
7
2
9

3
6
10
16

4
1
2
3

5
1
0
1

6
2
3
5

7
4
1
5

8
2
0
2

9
0
0
0

10
8
8
16

11
9
4
13

total
44
36
80

Month
Combatant
non-combatant
Total

0
3
0
3

1
1
6
7

2
5
4
9

3
4
12
16

4
1
2
3

5
1
0
1

6
2
3
5

7
4
1
5

8
1
1
2

9
0
0
0

10
4
12
16

11
4
9
13

total
30
50
80
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Figure 10: Attacks against
combatants and Non-combatants
over the pre-election period of 1999
elections

Figure 11: Attacks against governmental
and non- governmental over the preelection period of 1999 elections

The Table 5 below provides number of terrorist attacks over the preelection period of 1999 elections by dividing them into their regions and
combatant status. As seen in the table 5, almost 90% percent (or 26 out of 30) of
the combatants were attacked in the DKPR region, indicating that during the preelection period, the army, police and village guards experienced much more
terrorist attacks compared to their counterparts deployed out of the DKPR region.
Interestingly, the PKK carried out more terrorist attacks against the noncombatant (50) than the combatant targets (30) over the pre-election period.
However, as closing the Election Day, while terrorist attacks against the
combatant targets were declined in the DKPR region, they increased in the nonDKPR regions (see Figure 12 and 13). Furthermore, in the final lap of the
elections, attacks against the non-combatant targets sharply increased in both
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the DKPR and non-DKPR regions.42% of the attacks against non-combatants
within two months prior to the Election Day.

Table 5: Terrorist Attacks over the Pre-Election Period of 1999 Elections
1999 GE
DKPR
non-DKPR
Total

month
Combatants
Combatants
Combatants

0
3
0
3

1
1
0
1

2
5
0
5

3
4
0
4

4
1
0
1

5
0
1
1

6
2
0
2

7
4
0
4

8
1
0
1

9
0
0
0

10
3
1
4

11
2
2
4

Total
26
4
30

1999 GE
DKPR
non-DKPR
Total

month
Non-Combatants
Non-Combatants
Non-Combatants

0
0
0
0

1
4
2
6

2
1
3
4

3
8
4
12

4
0
2
2

5
0
0
0

6
2
1
3

7
1
0
1

8
1
0
1

9
0
0
0

10
3
9
12

11
6
3
9

total
26
24
50

Figure 12: Attacks against
combatants over the pre-election
period of 1999 elections according
to their region.

Figure 13: Attacks against noncombatants over the pre-election period of
1999 elections according to their region.

Post-election period of 1999 GE
Table 6 provides number of terrorist attacks against non-combatants over
the post-election period of 1999 elections according to their regions. Like the pre-
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election period, most of the combatants (31, or 79%) were hit in the DKPR
region. However, unlike pre-election period, the PKK avoided from targeting noncombatants (5) out of the DKPR region but continued in DKPR region. 82% of
non-combatants (23 out of 28) were hit in the non-DKPR region over the postelection period. Terrorist attacks against combatant and non-combatant targets
abruptly increased upon the election in both the DKPR and non-DKPR regions
(see Figure 14 and Figure 15). 82% of the attacks (or 23 attacks) against those
non-combatant targets and 74% of attacks (or 29 attacks) against combatant
targets were carried out within three months after the Election Day.

Table 6: Terrorist Attacks over the Post-Election Period of 1999 Elections
1999 GE

month

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Total

DKPR

Combatants

5

8

9

7

0

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

31

non-DKPR

Combatants

3

1

3

0

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

8

Total

Combatants

8

9

12

7

1

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

39

1999 GE

month

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

Total

DKPR

Non-Combatants

4

2

12

4

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

23

non-DKPR

Non-Combatants

1

1

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5

Total

Non-Combatants

5

3

15

4

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

28
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Figure 14: Terrorist Attacks against
Combatants in the DKPR And NonDKPR Regions Over The PostElection Period Of 1999 Elections.

Figure 15: Terrorist Attacks against NonCombatants in the DKPR and Non- DKPR
Regions Over the Post-Election Period of
1999 Elections.

To sum up, in 1999 general elections, most of the PKK terrorist attacks were
armed assaults and attacks focused on governmental targets without combatant
status. In the final lap of the election, PKK increased its violence in the DKPR
region. However, starting from the election, the PKK concentrated it attacks on
the DKPR region and targeted both combatants and noncombatant targets (see
Figure 16).
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Figure 16: Attacks against combatants and non-combatants over 24-month
period of 1999 elections.

Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections
In 24-month period of 2004 local elections, a total of 84 terrorist attacks
were carried out by the PKK in provinces of Turkey .While armed assault (58%)
was the primary attack type and non-combatant targets (53%) were the primary
targets in the 1999 elections, the attack type shifted from armed assault (46%) to
bomb involving attacks (48%) and target type shifted from non-combatants (39%)
to combatants (61%) in 2004 local elections (See Table 7). 75% of the targets
were affiliated with the government. As a consequence of its attacks, half (51%)
of the overall deaths and wounded were combatants (see Figure 17 and Figure
18). This indicates that PKK strategically chose certain targets which are
affiliated with the government but was not good enough to control the
consequences of its attacks, especially number of wounded. Finally, like the
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1999 elections, in terms of combatant targets, the PKK directed its violence
against military targets (40%) rather than the police (19%).

Table 7: Terrorist Attacks in 2004 Local Elections
Terrorist attacks

Target
Military
Police
Government
Civilian

Total
84
Total
Attack
34
17
12
21

Arm.Att.
39

Bomb.
41

Kidn.
2

Target
Terrorists
Security Forces
Civilians
Total

Figure 17: Terrorist Attacks in 2004
Local Elections

Arson
2

Comb vs.
non-Comb.
51-33

Deaths

Gov vs.
non-Gov
63-21

Injured
25
45
19
89

0
74
70
144

Total
25
119
89
233

Figure 18: Casualties in 2004 Local
Elections

The Figure 19 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 2004 Local
elections. These terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and post-election periods
below and their characteristics are explored.
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Figure 19: Terrorism trend in the 2004 Local Elections

Pre-election period of 2004 LE
The Table 8 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the
governmental vs. non-governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants
over the pre-election period of 2004 elections. In contrast to the pre-period of
1999 elections, the PKK concentrated its attacks against the combatant targets
(10, or 59%). 70% (or 12) of targets were affiliated with the government. Unlike
the previous elections, the PKK minimized its violence especially within the last
months of the local elections (see Figure 20 and Figure 21). Specifically, only
one attack was carried out against a civilian target.
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Table 8: Target Types over Pre-election period of 2004 Local Elections
Month
Governmental targets
Non-governmental targets
Total

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

2
0
1
1

3
1
1
2

4
1
0
1

5
0
1
1

6
6
0
6

7
3
1
4

8
1
0
1

9
0
0
0

10
0
0
0

11
0
1
1

Total
12
5
17

Month
combatant
non-combatant
total

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

2
0
1
1

3
0
2
2

4
1
0
1

5
0
1
1

6
6
0
6

7
2
2
4

8
1
0
1

9
0
0
0

10
0
0
0

11
0
1
1

total
10
7
17

Figure 20: Attacks against
combatants and Non-combatants
over the pre-election period of 2004
Local Elections

Figure 21: Attacks against governmental
and non-governmental over the preelection period of 2004 Local Elections

The Table 9 below provides number of terrorist attacks over the preelection period of 2004 elections according to their regions and combatant status.
70% (or 12 out of 17) of overall terrorist activities during the pre-election occurred
in the DKPR region. 75% of the targets were combatant targets, which occurred
in the DKPR region (See Figure 22). Of those combatants, 90% percent (or 9 out
of 10) were attacked in the DKPR. Terrorist attacks against combatant targets
stopped within the last months of the election regardless of the region, although
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few individual attacks were carried out non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR
region, only one non-combatant target was attacked in the DKPR region within
the last six months of the election (See Figure 23). Unlike the previous elections,
it seems that this time PKK wanted a peaceful electoral process before the local
elections, therefore minimized its terrorist attacks.

Table 9: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period of 2004 Local elections
according to their regions and combatant status.
2004 LE
DKPR
non-DKPR

Month
Combatant
Combatant
Total

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

2
0
0
0

3
0
0
0

4
1
0
1

5
0
0
0

6
6
0
6

7
1
1
2

8
1
0
1

9
0
0
0

10
0
0
0

11
0
0
0

total
9
1
10

2004 LE
DKPR
non-DKPR
Total

Month
Non-Combatants
Non-Combatants
Non-Combatants

0
0
0
0

1
0
0
0

2
0
1
1

3
2
0
2

4
0
0
0

5
0
1
1

6
0
0
0

7
1
1
2

8
0
0
0

9
0
0
0

10
0
0
0

11
0
1
1

total
3
4
7

Figure 22: Terrorist attacks against
combatants in the DKPR and nonDKPR regions over the pre-election
period of 2004 Local Elections.

Figure 23: Terrorist attacks against noncombatants in the DKPR and non-DKPR
Regions over the pre-election period of
2004 Local Elections.
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Post-election period of 2004 LE
Table 10 provides number of terrorist attacks according to combatant
status over the post-election period of 2004 local elections. 80% (67 out of 84) of
overall terrorist attacks were carried out during the post-election period. 25% of
the post-election attacks occurred within three months and 74% of them occurred
within the six months after the election. Almost 90% of the attacks within the first
three months after the local election were carried out against combatant targets.

Table 10: Terrorist attacks according to combatant status over the post-election
period of 2004 local elections.
Month
Combatant
non-combatant
Total

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

total

0
0
0

7
0
7

8
2
10

3
3
6

10
7
17

5
5
10

5
5
10

0
2
2

0
0
0

0
0
0

2
0
2

1
2
3

41
26
67

Post-election terrorist attacks focused on the DKPR region (see Table 11,
Figure 24 and Figure 25 below). 75% of overall post-election attacks occurred in
the DKPR region. First choice of target was combatant targets in the DKP region.
Over 70% of the targets in the DKPR region were combatant targets; and 90%
(37 out of 41) of the combatant targets of the post-election period were attacked
in the DKPR region. This indicates that during the post-election period, the PKK
carefully chose its targets especially in the DKPR region and used a discriminate
terrorism strategy to increase its popular support and avoid from losing it.
However, in contrast to the DKPR region, the PKK directs its violence against
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non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region provinces. In post-election
period, 75% of overall targets were non-combatant targets.
Within the first three months following the election, the PKK exclusively
targeted combatants in the DKPR region. Only 1 attack out of 15 was carried out
against a noncombatant target.

Table 11: Terrorist Attacks over the post-election period of 2004 Elections
2004 LE

Time

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

total

DKPR
non-DKPR

Combatant
Combatant

0
0

7
0

7
1

3
0

10
0

3
2

4
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

2
0

1
0

37
4

Total

Combatant

0

7

8

3

10

5

5

0

0

0

2

1

41

2004 LE

Time

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

total

DKPR
non-DKPR

Non-Combatants
Non-Combatants

0
0

0
0

1
1

3
0

2
5

2
3

3
2

1
1

0
0

0
0

0
0

2
0

14
12

Total

Non-Combatants

0

0

2

3

7

5

5

2

0

0

0

2

26

Figure 24: Terrorist attacks against
combatants in the DKPR and nonDKPR regions over the post-election
period of 2004 Local Elections.

Figure 25: Terrorist attacks against
non-combatants in the DKPR and nonDKPR Regions over the post-election
period of 2004 Local Elections.
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When considered the overall terrorism trajectory, it is seen that in the long
run up to the 2004 local elections, the PKK increased its attacks against the
combatant targets in the DKPR region, where it’s most constituencies live in, but
during the election’s final lap it stopped its terrorist activities in this DKPR region
(See Figure 26). In the post-election period, it concentrated on the DKPR region
and launched a massive terrorism campaign against combatant targets in this
region. Furthermore, starting from four months after the election, the PKK also
directed its violence against non-combatant targets in out of the DKPR region.

Figure 26: Attacks against combatants and non-combatants in 2004 Local
Elections

In conclusion, the 2004 local elections have the lowest rate of terrorist
attacks among others. The PKK made some changes in its terrorism strategy. In
general, the attack type shifted from armed assault to bomb involving attacks and
target type shifted from non-combatants to combatants in 2004 local elections.
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While the attacks focused on combatant targets in the DKPR region, they
focused on non-combatant targets in out of the DKPR region. In contrast to the
other elections, provinces experienced more terrorist attacks during the postelection than the pre-election period; finally, there is no increasing trend in the
final lap of the election, instead, terrorist attacks declined to minimum points as
closing to the Election Day.
Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections
Compared to other elections, the 2007 general elections have the greatest
number of terrorist attacks. In 24-month period of 2007 general elections, a total
of 424 terrorist attacks were carried out provinces of Turkey (See Table 12,
Figure 27 and 28). Armed attacks (63%) became a prevalent attack type again in
the 2007 general elections. Like the previous elections in 2004, terrorist attacks
were concentrated on officials and property of the government (88%), especially
on combatant targets (84%). Not surprisingly, the military was the first choice of
the PKK; 77% (or 328 out of 424) of attacks were directed against the military.
Civilian targets were the second choice, which came even before the police
targets. Although a greater proportion (67%) of the deaths was combatant
targets, proportion of the wounded civilians (51%) exceeded the combatant
targets (48%). As a consequence of the terrorist attacks, 485 civilians and 460
combatants were injured. This indicates that either the PKK was not good
enough to control civilian victims or intentionally did not avoid from using
indiscriminative terrorism, which increases number of civilian casualties.
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Table 12: Terrorist Attacks in 2007 General Elections

Terrorist attacks

Target
Military
Police
Government
Civilian

Total
424

Total
Attacks
328
27
20
49

Arm.Att.
268

Bomb.
135

Kidn.
12

Target
Terrorists
Security Forces
Civilians
Total

Figure 27: Terrorist Attacks in 2007
General Elections

Arson
9

Comb vs.
non-Comb.
355-69

Deaths
179
503
70
752

Injured
5
460
485
950

Gov vs.
non-Gov
375-49

Total
184
963
555
1702

Figure 28: Casualties in 2007 General
Elections

The figure 29 illustrates the terrorist attacks over 24 months in 2007
general elections. Then these terrorist attacks are divided into pre-and postelection periods below and their characteristics are explored.
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Figure 29: Terrorist Attacks over the Time in 2007 General Elections

Pre-election period of 2007GE
The Table 13 below presents number of terrorist attacks against the
governmental vs. non- governmental targets and combatants vs. non-combatants
over the pre-election period of 1999. During the overall pre-election period of
2007 elections, 88% of the targets were governmental targets; specifically 84%
of the targets were combatant targets. As closing the Election Day, the PKK
increased its violence against governmental targets, especially against
combatant targets (see Figures 30 and Figure 31 below). Choosing combatant
targets indicates the PKK’s intention to use discriminate or selective terrorism
strategy, thus avoiding from being criticized by its own population. As mentioned
previously, use of violence against combatant targets is a means of acquiring
popular support for the insurgent. Increasing terrorism especially within the final
lap of the election indicates the intention of the PKK to effect elections. The
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reason could be discouraging adversary parties’ voters and increasing its own
electoral support especially.

Table 13: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period of 2007 General
Elections
pre-election 2007
Governmental targets
Non-governmental targets
Total

0
24
4
28

1
25
7
32

2
12
2
14

3
3
0
3

4
4
0
4

5
2
0
2

6
1
1
2

7
1
1
2

8
2
0
2

9
13
4
17

10
57
3
60

11
38
2
40

total
182
24
206

pre-election period 2007
Combatants
Non-combatants
Total

0
19
9
28

1
23
9
32

2
12
2
14

3
3
0
3

4
4
0
4

5
2
0
2

6
1
1
2

7
1
1
2

8
2
0
2

9
13
4
17

10
57
3
60

11
36
4
40

total
173
33
206

Figure 30: Attacks against Combatants
and non-combatants over the Preelection Period of 2007 General
Elections.

Figure 31: Attacks against
Governmental and Non- governmental
over the Pre-election period of 2007
General Elections.

The DKPR region and combatant status of the targets are important
factors for the PKK. Almost 90% (183 out of 206) of the terrorist attacks during
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the pre-election period were carried out within the DKPR region; and 90% (161
out of 183) of those attacks within the DKPR region targeted combatants (Table
14 and Figure 32 and Figure 33 below). Furthermore, especially in the final lap of
the election the PKK dramatically increased its violence against combatants in
the final lap of the election. 60% (106 out of 173) of the attacks targeting
combatants were carried out within the last three months of the election, and only
one of them was carried out of the DKPR region.

Table 14: Terrorist Attacks over the pre-election period against
combatants/noncombatants according to the region in 2007 General Elections.
2007 GE-pre
DKPR
non-DKPR

Time
combatant
combatant
total

2007 GE-pre
DKPR
non-DKPR

Time
non-combatant
non-combatant
total

0
13
6
19

1
21
2
23

2
12
0
12

3
3
0
3

4
4
0
4

5
2
0
2

6
0
1
1

7
0
1
1

8
1
1
2

9
13
0
13

10
56
1
57

11
36
0
36

total
161
12
173

0
8
1
9

1
4
5
9

2
2
0
2

3
0
0
0

4
0
0
0

5
0
0
0

6
1
0
1

7
0
1
1

8
0
0
0

9
2
2
4

10
1
2
3

11
4
0
4

total
22
11
33

Figure 32: Attacks against combatants
in the DKPR and non-DKPR regions
over the Pre-election period of 2007
General Elections

Figure 33: Attacks against noncombatants in the DKPR and nonDKPR regions over the Pre-election
period of 2007 General Elections.
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Post-election of 2007 GE
Post-election violence started after the election and quickly declined three
months after the election. 84% (183 out of 218) of the post-election period
attacks were carried out within the first months after the election (See Table 15,
Figure 34 and Figure 35 below). Like the pre-election period, main targets of the
PKK during the post-election period were governmental (89%) and combatant
targets (83%). 88% of the combatants that were targeted during the overall postelection period were attacked within the first three months after the election.
Attacks followed a similar trend for both the combatant and noncombatant, or
governmental and nongovernmental targets.

Table 15: Terrorist Attacks According to Governmental and Combatant Status
over the Post-election Period of 2007 General Elections
Post-election 2007
Governmental targets
Non-governmental targets
Total

12
45
3
48

13
81
5
86

14
41
8
49

15
7
1
8

16
3
1
4

17
2
2
4

18
0
0
0

19
2
2
4

20
5
0
5

21
3
2
5

22
4
1
5

23
0
0
0

Total
193
25
218

Post-election 2007
Combatants
Non-combatants
Total

12
43
5
48

13
78
8
86

14
38
11
49

15
7
1
8

16
3
1
4

17
2
2
4

18
0
0
0

19
2
2
4

20
4
1
5

21
3
2
5

22
2
3
5

23
0
0
0

Total
182
36
218
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Figure 34: Attacks against Combatants
and non-combatants over the Postelection Period of 2007 General
Elections

Figure 35: Attacks against
Governmental and Non- governmental
over the Post-election Period of 2007
General Elections.

When considered the DKPR region, it is clearly seen that the attacks
focused on the DKPR region. Specifically, 90% of (197 out of 218) the postelection attacks occurred within the DKPR region (See Table 16, Figure 36 and
Figure 37). 86% of those attacks were carried out against the combatant targets;
which 75% (149 out of 197) of them occurred within the first three months after
the election.

Table 16: Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status and Region over the
Post-election Period of 2007 General Elections
2007 GE

Time

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

total

DKPR

combatant

38

74

37

7

3

1

0

2

4

3

1

0

170

non-DKPR

combatant

5

4

1

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

1

0

12

total

43

78

38

7

3

2

0

2

4

3

2

0

182

2007 GE

Time

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

DKPR

non-combatant

3

7

8

0

1

1

0

1

1

2

3

0

27

non-DKPR

non-combatant

2

1

3

1

0

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

9

total

5

8

11

1

1

2

0

2

1

2

3

0

36
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Figure 36: Terrorist Attacks against
combatants in the DKPR and nonDKPR regions over the Post-election
period of 2007 General Elections.

Figure 37: Terrorist Attacks against
non-combatants in the DKPR and nonDKPR regions over the Post-election
period of 2007 General Elections

The PKK focused on the DKPR region and launched a massive terrorism
campaign against specifically combatant targets over the final lap of the 2007
general elections. In the post-election period, campaign against the combatants
abruptly increased in the short run after the election but then declined
approximately over the post-election. Furthermore it seems that the PKK
considers the DKPR region factor and combatant status when directing its
violence (See Figure 38).
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Figure 38: Terrorist Attacks against combatants and non-combatants in 2007
General Elections

Comparison of the Elections
In terms of geographical location, Kurdish region factor seems to be an
important for the PKK. The PKK’s main area of terrorism is the DKPR, which it
has a considerable amount of popular support and each passing election the
PKK has more concentrated its terrorist attacks on Kurdish region. While 72% of
terrorist attacks occurred within the Kurdish region in 1999 general elections, this
percentage increased to 75% in 2004 local elections, and peaked at about 90%
in 2007 general elections (see Table 17). In addition to DKPR region, the PKK
specifically targets combatants, which include soldiers, police and village guards
that were deployed in the DKPR region. For instance, the percentage of terrorist
attacks against the combatant targets in the DKPR region increased from 54% to
73% in 2004 local elections and peaked at 87% in 2007 general elections (See
Table 18). On the other hand, in contrast to such a selective terrorism strategy in
the Kurdish region, the PKK tends to target mostly noncombatant targets (70-
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75%) in non-Kurdish region provinces. Although such an indiscriminate terrorism
strategy was a prevalent strategy in non-Kurdish provinces till 2004 local
elections, this strategy seems to shift from non-combatants (45%) to combatants
(55%) in 2007 elections. In 2007 elections, only 13% of targets were
noncombatant targets in the Kurdish region and 45% were noncombatants in the
non-Kurdish region. Stated differently, the PKK systematically decreased its
attacks against noncombatant targets region but increased them against
combatants in the DKPR region.
Despite this shift, a considerable amount of threat against non-combatant
targets still exist in the non-Kurdish region provinces.

Table 17: Terrorist Attacks according to Combatant Status of Terror Targets
across Elections

1999 GE
2004 LE
2007 GE

Comb.
57
46
331

DKPR
Noncomb.
49
17
49

total
106
63
380

% of
total
72.11%
75.00%
89.62%

Non-DKPR
NonComb.
comb.
12
29
5
16
24
20

total
41
21
44

Table 18: Percentages of Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status of
Terror Targets across Elections

1999 GE
2004 LE
2007 GE

Comb.
53.77%
73.02%
87.11%

DKPR
Non-comb.
46.23%
26.98%
12.89%

Comb.
29.27%
23.81%
54.55%

Non-DKPR
Non-comb.
70.73%
76.19%
45.45%

% of
total
27.89%
25.00%
10.38%
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Figure 39: Terrorist Attacks According to Combatant Status of Terror Targets
and Regional Status across Elections

Visual inspection of terrorist attacks over time indicates that terrorist attacks
show an increasing trend and reaches their peaks two months before the general
elections. However; in contrast to general elections, terrorist attacks started to
decline as closing to the local elections and reached its minimum levels in the
final lap of local elections (See Table 19 and Figure 40 below). In general
elections, terrorist attacks first reach their peak points within three month after
the election day, then dramatically declines in the post-election periods.However,
local elections has a different terrorism trajectory during the pre-election period
only. Terrorist attacks were kept at the minimum level during the pre-election
period of the local election of 2004, then, like the general elections terrorist
attacks increased in the post-election period, declined in the long run.
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Table 19: Total Terrorist incidents in Turkey during pre-and post-election periods
for each election
Total

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

7

9

16

3

1

5

5

2

0

16

13

12

27

11

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

0

0

1

2

1

1

6

4

1

0

0

1

0

7

10

6

17

10

10

2

0

0

2

3

206

28

32

14

3

4

2

2

2

2

17

60

40

218

48

86

49

8

4

4

0

4

5

5

5

0

pre-election period 1999

80

3

post-election period 1999

67

13

pre-election period 2004

17

0

post-election period 2004

67

pre-election period 2007
post-election period 2007

2

Figure 40: Overall terrorism trajectories per election

Conclusions from descriptive statistics
To sum up, the data indicates that terrorism starts to increase three
months before the general elections and drops three months after the election.
Local election has a different terrorism trajectory in pre-election period. Although
terrorism shows a declining in the long-run over the post-election period of the
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local election, it did not drop below the level in the pre-election terrorism.
Furthermore, in terms of geographic locations, most of terrorist attacks occur
within the Kurdish populated region. In terms of target type, the PKK specifically
chooses combatants within the Kurdish region. Although the PKK concentrated
its violence on non-combatants in the non-Kurdish region provinces in the past
two elections, it has shifted this strategy to combatant targets in the last
elections.
Analysis Results of the Study
This section presents the results of our analysis. Each election is analyzed
and interpreted separately first, then compared to each other. In each election,
variables (vote share, pre-election, election and post-election) in the model
represent our hypotheses; therefore their corresponding parameters have been
used to test to our hypotheses. Having analyzed each election separately and
compared to each other, we present our hypothesis tests.
Overview of the Results
Briefly, our analysis indicates a significant immediate shift in both the
elevation and slope for each election. Namely, terrorist attacks changed in two
ways as a result of election: They first abruptly increased and their subsequent
rate of change declined. Statistically, this means that both the elevation and
slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election and post-election. With
regards to the relationship between popular support and terrorism, our study
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found a positive relationship between them, indicating that electoral support for
the PKK is positively related to its terrorist attacks.
To start with the terrorism trajectories, with the exception pre-election
terrorism in 2004 local elections, our analysis indicated that all independent
variables are statistically significant. In terms of terrorism trajectory our findings
indicate that that terrorism increases upon the election in the short-term after the
election but subsequent terrorism declined in the long-term over the post-election
periods. Specifically, our analysis indicates a statistically significant increasing
terrorism trend over the pre-election periods in the1999 and 2007 general
elections (t=2.01, p=0.045; t=3.69, p=0.000, respectively), but not in the 2004
local elections (t=0.330, p=0.74). Furthermore, terrorism dramatically and
significantly increases upon the election (t=6.2, p=0.000; t=5.5, p=0.000; t=6.2,
p=0.000, respectively), then subsequent terrorism declines over the post-election
period (t=-12.6, p=0.000; t= -2.9, p=0.005; t=-11.133, p=0.000, respectively). The
Figure 41 illustrates the expected terrorism trajectories over the 24-month period
for each election based on our findings.
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Figure 41: Expected terrorism trajectories over 24-month period for each
election based on our findings estimates

Our analysis indicates that PKK’s electoral support is significantly and
positively associated with terrorism in all three elections (t=3.213, p=0.002;
t=6.279, p=0.000, respectively). These findings provide evidence for resource
mobilization theory, suggesting that popular support increases terrorist attacks
and lack of electoral support decreases them.
Finally, our analysis indicates that there are variances among provinces in
terms of their terrorist attacks, indicating that terrorism declined in some
provinces whereas increased in others.
Variances among provinces in Elections
The Table 20 below presents the estimates of the null models for 1999
general, 2004 local and 2007 general elections. Results for the step 1(estimating
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the null model) presents that provincial characteristics had a statistically
significant effect on terrorist attacks across all the three elections (t=-10.7 for the
1999 GE, t=-12.4 for the 2004 LE, and t=-6.3 for the 2007 GE). This finding
indicates that there are statistically significant differences among provinces in
terms of their terrorism scores. Provinces could experience terrorist attacks
differently either because of their provincial characteristics (time in variant factors
such as being located in the dominantly Kurdish populated region) or because of
some time-variant factors that they experienced over the time (such as elections,
changes in electoral support for the political party associated with the PKK).
Since the primary interest was not on the differences of the provinces (Level-2
model) we did not attempt to explain these differences by including provincial
characters.

Table 20: Unconditional Model estimates
Fixed Effect
For intercept, β0 (when time=0)
1999 GE:INTRCPT2, B00
2004 LE: INTRCPT2, B00
2007 GE:INTRCPT2, B00

coeffient
-2.480
-3.021
-1.493

s.e
0.232
0.243
0.237

t-ratio
-10.71
-12.45
-6.298

d.f
79
80
80

pvalue
0.000
0.000
0.000

exp{coeff}
0.084
0.049
0.225

At step 2, we looked at the variance components and calculated the ICC
scores in order to see where these differences reside. Our analyses indicate that
provinces varied in terms of their terrorist attacks, and provincial characteristics
of provinces are the main source of such variance among provinces.
Furthermore in all elections there was much more between-province differences
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than within-individual differences in terms of their log-terrorist attacks (results are
not shown here). For instance, 90% of the variance in log-terrorist attacks over
24-month time period can be attributed to provincial characteristics in 1999
elections; 92.5% in the 2004 local elections and 84% in the 2007 general
elections.
At Step-3 whether there were any differences in terrorism during any of
the periods among provinces were examined. A series of analyses suggested
that there are differences among provinces in their transitions stage (short term
after the election) in each election. For instance while provinces followed a
similar terrorism trajectory in their pre-election periods in 1999 and 2004
elections, there were sufficiently large differences in 2007 elections to conclude
that certain provinces experienced different terrorism trajectories in their preelection, transition stage and post-election periods (results are not shown here).
Since the primary focus of this study was on the intra-province, or within-province
changes over the time, we have not included any level-2—provincial
characters—predictors to explain such differences in terrorism trends over the
periods among provinces.
Terrorism in 1999 General Elections

Briefly, our analysis suggest that vote share of the PKK’s party is positively
associated with its terrorist attacks in 1999 elections accounting for other
variables. Furthermore, terrorist attacks gradually increased over the pre-election
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period, then first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then
declined over the post-election period. The table 21 presents the results of our
analysis for 1999 general elections, and Figure 42 and 43 illustrates the logs and
counts of expected terrorism trajectory of provinces in 1999 elections,
respectively.
Table 21: Analysis Results in 1999 Elections
Fixed effects
Intercept
Vote share
Pre-election
Election
Post-election

Coeff.
-3.256077
0.041697
0.035774
0.955136
-0.443562

S.E
0.254955
0.012979
0.017832
0.153641
0.035141

Figure 42: Log-Terrorist incidents over
time in 1999 Elections

t-ratio
-12.771
3.213
2.006
6.217
-12.622

D.F
79
1903
1903
1903
1903

pvalue
0.000*
0.002*
0.045*
0.000*
0.000*

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio
0.039
1.043
1.036
2.599
0.642

Figure 43: Count Terrorist Incidents
over time in 1999 Elections

Our analysis suggests that vote share of the political party affiliated with the
PKK is significantly and positively related to terrorist attacks (t=3.2, p=0.002). A
1% increase in the vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.042; or
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stated differently, a 1% electoral support is the expected to make a 0.042
difference in the log-terrorist attacks of provinces. Holding others constant, a
positive relationship between electoral support and terrorist attacks implies the
followings: First, provinces with higher popular support experiences higher level
of terrorism; or provinces with less popular support experience lower level
terrorism. Second, an increase in electoral support for the PKK leads it to
increase its terrorist attacks in the post-election period. From the same token, a
decline in its electoral support decreases its terrorist attacks in the post-election
The Figure 44 and Figure 45 below illustrate this relationship on three provinces
with different electoral support for the PKK. As seen in the Figure 28, a province
with a higher level electoral support for the PKK’s party is expected to experience
higher level of terrorism over the time. In other words, more ballots breed more
bullets.

Figure 44: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 1999
Elections
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Figure 45: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 1999
Elections

Parameters for pre-election slope suggest that terrorist attacks systematically
increased over the pre-election period, thus indicates presence of a significant
increasing terrorism trend (t=2.0; p=0.045). Specifically, the log-terrorist attacks
significantly increase by 0.036 per month. This increase is a very small change
relative to the dummy election and post-election variables. It is 26 times smaller
than the dummy election and 12 times smaller than the post-election variable. In
other words, there is slower rate of terrorism change during the pre-election
period compared to the dummy election and post-election period.
The Figures 46 and Figure 47 below plot the log terrorist attacks and count
terrorist attacks over the pre-election period, respectively.
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Figure 46: Log-Terrorist incidents over
the pre-election period in 1999
Elections

Figure 47: Count Terrorist incidents
over pre-election period in 1999
Elections.

As explained previously, we have included a dummy election variable in the
election month, because we anticipated that elections would affect the PKK’s
terrorist attacks, thus the PKK will employ a different terrorism strategy after the
election. The parameter for dummy Election indicates that log-terrorist attacks
significantly and abruptly increased by 0.96 upon the election (t=6.2, p=0.000).
Election caused an immediate shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had
the greatest impact on the terrorist attacks among others. If the parameters for
the dummy election variable had not been significant, it would have indicated that
terrorism trend remained stable upon the election. The Figures 48 and Figure 49
plot the expected terrorism change upon the 1999 elections in the log and count
terrorist attacks, respectively.
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Figure 48: Change in Log-Terrorist
Incidents upon the 1999 Elections

Figure 49: Change in Count Terrorist
Incidents upon the 1999 Elections

Finally, election had a significant influence on the subsequent rate of
terrorism change over the post-election period. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks
declined by -0.44 per month over the post-election period. A significant p value
for the post-election slope indicates that election also shifted in the slope. When
compared to pre-election period, log-terrorist attacks over the post-election
period changed 12 times faster than the pre-election. The Figures 50 and Figure
51 plot post-election terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of
terrorism change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the postelection period of 1999 elections
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Figure 50: Log-Terrorist incidents over
the post-election period in 1999
Elections

Figure 51: Count Terrorist incidents
post-election period in 1999 Elections

Since the parameters for dummy election has a significant p value, our
analysis indicates that rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon
the election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the postelection period. This means that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism
trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.
Terrorism in 2004 Local Elections
Like the general elections of 1999, vote share of the PKK’s party is positively
associated with its terrorist attacks in 2004 local elections accounting for other
variables. However, in contrast to the previous election, there is no reliable
terrorism increasing trend over the pre-election trend. Like the previous elections,
terrorist attacks first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then
declined over the post-election period.
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Table 22 presents the results of our analysis for 2004 local elections and
Figure 52 and Figure 53 plots the expected logs and count terrorist attacks over
the pre-election period in 2004 elections, respectively. As seen in the Table 22,
vote share of the PKK’s political party is significantly and positively related to
terrorist attacks (t=5.9, p=0.000). A 1% increase in the vote share increases the
log-terrorist attacks by 0.077, indicating that a 1% electoral support is the
expected to make a 0.077 difference in the log-terrorist attacks of provinces.

Table 22: Analysis Results in 2004 Local Elections
Fixed effects
Intercept
Vote share
Pre-election
Election
Post-election

Coeff.

S.E

t-ratio

D.F

pvalue

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio

-4.920254
0.077152
0.011992
1.571605
-0.113615

0.339737
0.013004
0.036289
0.284813
0.039612

-14.483
5.933
0.33
5.518
-2.868

61
1219
1219
1219
1219

0.000*
0.000*
0.741
0.000*
0.005*

0.007
1.080
1.012
4.814
0.893

Figure 52: Log-Terrorist incidents over
time in 2004 Local Elections

Figure 53: Count Terrorist incidents
over time in 2004 Local Elections
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The Figure 54 and Figure 55 below illustrate this relationship on three
provinces with different electoral support for the PKK. Although two provinces
with the same degree electoral support for the PKK are expected to experience
same terrorism trajectory over the pre-election period, the province where the
PKK gained an additional 10% vote share is expected to experience a higher
level terrorism trend than the other one whose electoral support remained same
in the latter election (See Figure 54 and Figure 55).This finding implies that
provinces with higher level electoral support are expected to experience a higher
level of terrorist attacks over the time. Similarly, provinces where the PKK’s
political party gained more electoral support in the new election are expected to
have higher rate of terrorism over the post-election period (see Figure 53 and 54
below).

Figure 54: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 2004 Local
Elections
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Figure 55: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 2004 Local
Elections

Parameters for pre-election slope indicate that there is no statistically
significant terrorism trend over the pre-election period (t=0.33; p=0.741). As seen
in the figures 53 and 54, count terrorist attacks remained stable over the preelection period.
Similar to the previous elections in 1999, the parameter for dummy Election
indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by 1.57
upon the election (t=5.5, p=0.000), indicating election caused an immediate shift
in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the terrorist
attacks among others. It coefficient is 131 times greater than the coefficient of
pre-election and 14 times greater than the post-election’s. The Figures 56 and
Figure 57 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 2004 local elections in the
log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.
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Figure 56: Change in Log-Terrorist
Figure 57: Change in Count Terrorist
Incidents upon the 2004 Local Elections Incidents upon the 2004 Local
Elections.

Finally, subsequent rate of terrorism change over the post-election period
was also significantly affected by the local election (t=-2.87; p=0.005), indicating
that local elections also shifted in the slope. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks
declined by -0.11 per month over the post-election period (See Table 22).
Despite this decreasing trend over the post-election period, due to high rate of
terrorism change in the short run and relatively small rate of change over the
post-election slope, terrorist attacks did not decline below the pre-election
period’s level (see Figure 58 and Figure 59).
The Figures 58 and Figure 59 plot post-election terrorism trend based on
our expected subsequent rate of terrorism change in the log and count terrorist
attacks respectively over the post-election period of 2004 local elections
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Figure 58: Log-Terrorist incidents over
the post-election period in 2004 Local
Elections.

Figure 59: Count Terrorist incidents
over the post-election period in 2004
Local Elections.

In conclusion, because of the fact that dummy election and post-election
parameters have significant p values, we conclude that rate of change in terrorist
attacks abruptly increased upon the election and their subsequent rate of change
decreased over the post-election period. Like the previous election, this means
that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism trajectories differ pre-election
and post-election.
Terrorism in 2007 General Elections

Like the other two elections, vote share of the PKK’s party is positively
associated with its terrorist attacks in 2007 general elections accounting for other
variables. The terrorism trajectory over the 2007 general elections resembles the
1999 elections. Namely, terrorist attacks increased over the pre-election period,
then first abruptly increased upon the election in the short term then declined
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over the post-election period. Table 23 presents the results of our analysis for
2007 general elections; and Figure 60 and Figure 61 plot the logs and counts of
expected terrorism trajectory of provinces in 2007 general elections, respectively.

Table 23: Analysis Results in 2007 General Elections
Fixed effects
Intercept
Vote share
Pre-election
Election
Post-election

Coeff.
-3.443496
0.060502
0.08153
1.173584
-0.486888

S.E
0.251876
0.009636
0.022098
0.188138
0.043735

Figure 60: Log-Terrorist incidents over
time in 2007 General Elections.

t-ratio
-13.671
6.279
3.689
6.238
-11.133

D.F
80
1399
1399
1399
1399

pvalue
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*
0.000*

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio
0.032
1.062
1.085
3.234
0.615

Figure 61: Count Terrorist incidents
over time in 2007 General Elections

Like the previous elections, our analysis of 2007 general elections found a
significant positive relationship between the vote share of the PKK’s political
party and its terrorist attacks (t=6.3; p=0.0000. Specifically, a 1% increase in the
vote share increases the log-terrorist attacks by 0.06. In other words, a 1%
electoral support is the expected to make a 0.06 difference in the log-terrorist
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attacks of provinces. This finding implies that provinces with higher level electoral
support for the PKK’s party are expected to experience higher level of terrorism
over the time. The Figure 62 and Figure 63 below illustrate this relationship on
three provinces with different level of and changes in electoral support for the
PKK (see Figure 62 and Figure 63).

Figure 62: Impact of Electoral Support on Log-Terrorist Incidents in 2007
General Elections

Figure 63: Impact of Electoral Support on Count Terrorist Incidents in 2007
General Elections
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Our findings indicates presence of a significant increasing terrorism trend
over the pre-election period of 2007 general elections (t=3.7; p=0.000).
Specifically, the log-terrorist attacks significantly increase by 0.08 per month (See
Table 23 above). This increase is a relatively small change compared to the
dummy election and post-election variables. It is 14 times smaller than the rate
of change upon the election and 6 times smaller than the rate of change over the
post-election period. In other words, terrorist attacks shows a slowly increasing
trend over the pre-election period, but a faster increasing trend in the short run
upon the election and a faster declining trend in the long run over the postelection period. The Figure 64 and Figure 65 below plot the log terrorist attacks
and count terrorist attacks over the pre-election period, respectively.

Figure 64: Log-Terrorist incidents over
the pre-election period in 2007 General
Elections.

Figure 65: Count Terrorist incidents
over the pre-election period in 2007
General Elections
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Similar to the previous elections in 1999 and 2004, the parameter for dummy
Election indicates that log-terrorist attacks significantly and abruptly increased by
1.17 upon the election (t=6.2, p=0.000), indicating election caused an immediate
shift in terrorist attacks after the election and had the greatest impact on the logterrorist attacks among others (See Table 23, Figure 66 and Figure 67). The
Figures 66 and Figure 67 plot the expected terrorism change upon the 2007
general elections in the log and count terrorist attacks, respectively.

Figure 66: Change in Log-Terrorist
Incidents upon the 2007 General
Elections

Figure 67: Change in Count Terrorist
Incidents upon the 2007 General
Elections

With regards to post-election terrorism, our analysis suggests that similar
to 1999 and 2004 elections subsequent rate of terrorism change over the postelection period was significantly affected by the 2007 general elections (t=-11.13;
p=0.000), indicating that elections also shifted in the slope. Specifically, logterrorist attacks declined by -0.49 per month over the post-election period (See
Table 23). The rate of change per month in the post-election period is 6 times
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than the rate of change per month over the pre-election and only 2.4 slower than
the rate of change in the short run after the election, therefore in few months after
the election terrorist attacks dropped below the terrorism level during pre-election
period (see Figures 68 and 69 below). The Figures 68 and Figure 99 plot postelection terrorism trend based on our expected subsequent rate of terrorism
change in the log and count terrorist attacks respectively over the post-election
period of 2007 general elections.

Figure 68: Log-Terrorist incidents over
the post-election period in 2007
General Elections

Figure 69: Count Terrorist incidents
over the post-election period in 2007
General Elections

In conclusion, rate of change in terrorist attacks abruptly increased upon the
election and their subsequent rate of change decreased over the post-election
period. Therefore we conclude that both the elevation and slope of the terrorism
trajectories differ pre-election and post-election.
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Tests of Hypotheses
In this section we focus on the same independent variables across
elections, compare their rate of change in terrorist attacks and test our
hypotheses.
Hypothesis Test for Electoral support for the Insurgent’s Political Party
The primary focus of the study is on the popular support and its relationship
with the terrorist attacks.
H1: “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.
Due to the RMT and RD approaches’ different assumption, we had developed
two different sub-hypotheses:
H1a: “Popular support is positively associated with terrorist attacks”.
H1b: “Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.
To remind, we have measured popular support for the PKK through vote
share of the PKK’s political party in this study and have tested its relationship
with the PKK’s terrorist attacks. The Table 24 provides our results across
elections.
Table 24: Electoral Support for the PKK’s Party across Elections
Fixed effects

Coeff.

S.E

tratio

D.F

pvalue

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio

Vote share (1999 GE)

0.041697

0.012979

3.213

1903

0.002

1.043

Vote share (2004 LE)

0.077152

0.013004

5.933

1219

0.000

1.080

Vote share (2007 GE)

0.060502

0.009636

6.279

1399

0.000

1.062
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To summarize, our analysis found a statistically significant relationship
between popular support and number of terrorist attacks in provinces
(β1=0.041697, p=0.002 in 1999 GE, β1=0.077152, p=0.000 in 2004 LE, β1
=0.060502, p=0.000). Since this relationship was statistically significant in 1999,
2004 and 2007 elections, we accepted our first main hypothesis (H1) which
states “Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support”.
A statistically significant ‘positive’ relationship between PKK’s electoral
support and terrorism supports the RMT and provides no evidence for the
relative deprivation approach. If the findings had found a ‘negative’ relationship
between electoral support and terrorist attacks, this would have supported a
relative deprivation approach, meaning poor electoral support would lead to more
terrorist attacks; or relative decline would lead to terrorist attacks. Therefore we
accepted our sub-hypothesis H1a which states “Popular support is positively
associated with terrorist attacks” and rejected the rival one, the H1b which states
“Popular support is ‘negatively’ associated with terrorist attacks”.
When compared the effect of vote share on terrorist attacks across elections,
vote share had the greatest impact on local elections. While a 1% increase in
electoral support for the PKK increased the log-terrorist attacks by 0.042 in 1999
and 0.06 in the 2007 general elections, it increased the log-terrorist attacks by
0.077 in 2004 local elections. It had a quadratic impact on terrorist attacks over
the 2004 local elections. The Figure 70 and Figure 71 below illustrate how
electoral support is expected effect terrorist attacks in each election. As seen in
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the those figures, as electoral support increases, terrorist attacks are expected to
increase; and similarly as electoral support decreases, terrorist attacks are
expected to decrease. However, magnitude of this impact varies in elections
(See Figure 70 and Figure 71).

Figure 70: Impact of an Increase in
Electoral Support on CountTerrorist
Incidents per Election

Figure 71: Impact of a Decrease in
Electoral Support on Count Terrorist
Incidents per Election

Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in the Pre-election Periods

The second interest of this study is on the relationship between elections
and terrorist attacks. To remind, our main hypothesis was;
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.
With regards to terrorism over the pre-election period, our sub-hypothesis
was;
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.
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We have tested our hypothesis in our models through our independent time
variable that represents the pre-election period. With the exception of local
elections, we have found evidence for our hypothesis. The table 25 presents our
findings for terrorism over pre-election period across elections, which were
explained under each election separately.

Table 25:Pre-election Terrorism across Elections
Fixed effects

Coeff.

t-ratio

p-value

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio

Pre-election (1999 GE)

0.035774

2.006

0.045*

1.036

Pre-election (2004 LE)

0.011992

0.33

0.741

1.012

Pre-election (2007 GE)

0.08153

3.689

0.000*

1.085

To remind, terrorism significantly increased towards the general elections
(β2=0.035774, p=0.045 in 1999 GE; and β2=0.08153, p=0.000 in 2007 GE).
Therefore for the 1999GE and 2007GE, we rejected the null hypothesis H 02 and
accepted the H2, which states that “Terrorist attacks are associated with
elections”; however we failed to reject the null hypothesis H02 for the 2004 local
elections. In terms of direction, all parameters are positive, indicating a positive
relationship between popular support and terrorist attacks.
Furthermore, the rate of change differed from election to election.
Specifically, log-terrorist attacks increased by 0.036 in the 1999 general election
and by 0.08 in the 2007 general election per month over the pre-election period.
In other words, during the pre-election period, log-terrorist attacks in 2007
general elections increased over twice times faster per month than the 1999
general elections. In contrast to the general elections, log-terrorist attacks did not
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significantly increase during the pre-election period of 2004 local elections.
Terrorism trends in the pre-election periods for each election are illustrated in the
figure 72 and 73.

Figure 72: Log-terrorist attacks in preelection periods across Elections

Figure 73: Count terrorist attacks in
pre-election periods across Elections

In conclusion, we conclude that there is statistically significant increasing
terrorism trend over the pre-election period in general elections but not in local
elections of 2004.
Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in short-term period after the election
Deriving from existing literature, which was pointed out post election violent
events are quick and short-lived events (Amerasinghe, 1989), for the first part the
argument we proposed that;
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.
The dummy variable “Election” in our model represents the H2b subhypotheses and rate of change in terrorist attacks in the short term after the
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election. Parameters for the dummy election variable across elections are
presented in the table below and have been used to test our hypotheses.

Table 26: Terrorism upon the Election in the Short-Term Periods
Fixed effects

Coeff.

t-ratio

p-value

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio

Election (1999 GE)

0.955136

6.217

0.000

2.599

Election (2004 LE)

1.571605

5.518

0.000

4.814

Election (2007 GE)

1.173584

6.238

0.000

3.234

The findings of study revealed terrorism significantly increases abruptly
upon the election (β3=0.955136, p=0.000 in 1999 GE; β3=1.571605; p=0.000 in
2004 LE; and β3=1.173584, p=0.000 in 2007 GE). So, we rejected the null
hypothesis H02b and accepted our hypothesis H2b, which states “Terrorist
attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.
Log-terrorist attacks significantly increased by 0.96 upon election in the
1999 general elections, by 1.57 in the 2004 local elections, and

by 1.17 in the

2007 general elections (See Table 26). When compared the elections, holding
others constant it is the 2004 local elections which had the greatest effect in
terrorism elevation (See Figure 74 and Figure 75).
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Figure 74: Log-terrorist attacks upon
election in the Short-term across
elections

Figure 75: Count terrorist attacks upon
election in the Short-term across
elections

In conclusion, we conclude that terrorist attacks increases upon the
election in the short run after the elections, but their rate of change differ from the
election.
Hypothesis Test for Terrorism in post-election periods

Deriving from the same argument arguing post election violent events are
quick and short-lived events (Amerasinghe, 1989), for the second part the
argument we proposed that;
H2c: “Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period”.
The post-election variable in our model represents the H2c sub-hypotheses
and rate of change in terrorist attacks in the long term after the election.
Parameters for the post-election slope across elections are presented in the
Table 27 below and have been used to test our hypotheses.
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Table 27:Post-election Terrorism across Elections
Fixed effects

Coeff.

t-ratio

p-value

Exp{Coeff}
Rate Ratio

Post-election (1999 GE)

-0.44356

-12.62

0.000

0.642

Post-election (2004 LE)

-0.11362

-2.868

0.005

0.893

Post-election (2007 GE)

-0.48689

-11.13

0.000

0.615

Our findings revealed that subsequent terrorist attacks significantly declines
over the post-election periods (β4=-0.44356, p=0.000 in 1999 GE; β4=-0.11362;
p=0.005 in 2004 LE; and β4=-0.48689, p=0.000 in 2007 GE). So, we rejected the
null hypothesis H02c and accepted our hypothesis H2c, which states
“Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period”.

Figure 76: Log-terrorist attacks in the
Post-election period across elections

Figure 77: Count terrorist attacks in the
Post-election period across

Rate of subsequent change in log-terrorist attacks differ from election to
election. Specifically, log-terrorist attacks significantly declined by -0.44 per
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month over the pre-election period of 1999 elections, by -0.11 in 2004 local
election and by -.049 in 2007 general elections. Among three, the 2007 general
elections have the fastest rate of decline in log-terrorist attacks over the postelection period. However, holding constant other factors, 1999 general election’s
declining trend is very close to trend in 2007elections (see Figure 76 and 77).
Terrorism declined to its lowest points in several months after the general
elections but despite its declining trend, it did not end or drop below its level
during the pre-election period.

CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION

Introduction
In this study we have sought answers to two main questions: First,
whether popular for the PKK was associated with the terrorist attacks; second,
whether elections had any impact on the PKK’s terrorist attacks. Terrorism trends
were explored both prior and after the elections. In this section, we discuss our
findings, compare them to the existing literature, and discuss possible policy
implications.
Discussion of Findings
Popular Support for the Insurgent and Terrorism
Hypotheses:
1: Terrorist attacks are associated with its popular support.
Hypothesis 1 tested whether popular support for the insurgent was related to
its terrorist attacks and the direction of this relationship. Our analysis found a
statistically significant positive relationship between them. This finding indicates
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that popular support for the insurgent increases its terrorist attacks and lack of
popular support decreases its terrorist attacks.
The primary interest of this study was on the insurgent’s electoral support.
In the social movement and insurgency literature there are two leading approach
to this issue. Taking a relative deprivation approach some scholars argue that an
expected result and achieved result would create a relative deprivation and this
relative deprivation lead to political violence. On the other hand, RMT scholars
suggest that resources of the social movement (or insurgent) are crucial for the
social movement organizations; thus without sufficient resources, organizations
fail to achieve their objectives. In this study, electoral support for the PKK is
assumed to indicate popular support level for the PKK. As explained previously
popular support is identified as a key factor in the insurgency literature because
of the fact that popular support from the local population is closely associated
with logistics, intelligence, and recruitment for the insurgent. Thus, without
sufficient popular support the insurgent would not survive. The study findings
shed some lights on this dispute between resource mobilization and relative
deprivation scholars. The analysis results found a significant positive relationship
between popular support and terrorist attacks, providing support for the RMT
approach; however this study found no evidence supporting the RD approach. If
the findings had found a negative relationship between electoral support and
terrorist attacks, this would have supported a relative deprivation approach,
meaning poor electoral support would lead to more terrorist attacks; or relative
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decline would lead to terrorist attacks. On the other hand, we acknowledge the
possibility of that poor election results in some provinces might still frustrate the
insurgent and could lead it to carry out few terrorist attacks in some of those
areas.
Our findings on the positive relationship between popular support and
terrorist attacks are consistent with arguments of leading counterinsurgency
practitioners and a few scholars. As the flow of resources increases, the
insurgent will be able to recruit more members, and increase its intelligence,
logistics, financial support other necessary material (McCarthy & Zald, 1977), in
return, increasing the level of resources invested in terror would increase the
success of the insurgent (Mesquita , 2005). From the same analogy as the
insurgent group loses support, its capabilities and resources to generate violence
will diminish, because the insurgent are subject to resource constraints that limit
the insurgent’s expenditures on activities not to exceed its income or resources
(Enders & Sandler, 1993). Even if the insurgent loses a relative amount of its
support, the insurgent will be confined to its popular base areas, therefore, it will
fight for its popular bases for the sake of intelligence and logistical reasons
(Thompson, 1966; Galula, 2006). Concentrating the terrorist activities in popular
activities is logical and beneficial for the PKK, because the PKK has limited
number of militants and limited ammunition and other material that are used to
carry out terrorist attacks. By carrying out terrorist attacks in less or nonsupportive areas it would not only waste their resources but also decrease its
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chance to succeed in carrying out those attacks. Each terrorist attacks requires
some materials, safe houses, intelligence and individuals to participate in.
Carrying out terrorist attacks in hostile or less supportive areas is easy as it might
seem to be. Residents of less supportive areas have no sympathy for the PKK,
thus are more likely to cooperate with the government and inform any suspicious
activity. In addition to low chance, high risk and waste of resources, in terms of
popular support, the effect of the terrorist attack would be less compared to more
supportive areas.
In conclusion, we conclude that the PKK is more likely to increase its
terrorist attacks when there is more popular support and to decrease them when
lacked popular support.
Election and Terrorism
H2: “Terrorist attacks are associated with elections”.
This study reveals that elections affect the insurgent’s terrorist attacks, so
terrorism trend differs pre-election and post-election periods, indicating that PKK
is not oblivious to elections.
Terrorism before the Elections
H2a: “Terrorist attacks will increase during the pre-election period”.
With regards to pre-election terrorism, our study found a significant increasing
trend in terrorist attacks over the pre-election period of general elections only.
There may be various reasons or a combination of these reasons for increasing
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terrorism towards general elections. These reasons could include discouraging
potential voters of adversary political party; increasing popular support among
the Kurdish population, thus increasing its vote share in the upcoming election;
generating fear among the population, discrediting the incumbent government
and replacing it with another party. We do not think the PKK is increasing its
terrorism to disrupt the electoral process; rather it tries to increase its vote share,
thus win the elections, because winning general elections provide the PKK extra
power and status. Once the PKK won the general elections and gained seats in
the parliament, it will be able to gain also respect and legitimacy both in the
domestic and international arena. Its parliamentary members will be able to
oversee policies and government official’s actions. An analysis on the proposals
submitted by parliamentary members indicate that the parliamentary members of
the political party affiliated with the PKK were very active; they have submitted
approximately 30 proposals either to change or make new laws. These proposals
include changes in anti-terrorism law, and certain laws related to the police and
army. For instance, on December 13th and May the 15th of 2008, its
parliamentary members proposed bills to abolish mandatory military service and
to change tasks of the Turkish army. On December 2nd of 2008, they submitted a
bill to limit discretion of police in using force. On February 12th of 2009 and June
24th of 2009, they have submitted bills to make changes in the Anti-Terrorism
law. In these two bills, they aimed abolish some of the articles regulating trial of
young people between 15 and 18, propaganda of a terrorist organization and
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punishment of directors of media organizations. With their proposals, the
parliamentary members of the PKK’s political party attempted change laws on
the benefit of the PKK. In addition to these efforts, these parliamentary members
submitted numbers of proposal regarding the activities of the government’s
officials. For instance, between 2007 and 2009, they have submitted 602
proposals requesting either oral or written explanation by the minister of related
governmental institution regarding an official’s operation. One third (172 out of
202) of these proposals were related to the law enforcement issues. 5% of them
were related to prisons or jails. By submitting proposals, these parliamentary
members were not only putting pressure on government’s officials who fight with
the PKK terrorism but also proposing as if they were defending the Kurd’s rights
in the parliament. In addition, as a parliamentary member, they often pointed
Abdullah Ocalan as the only solution of the Kurdish issue and asked the
government to negotiate with him. Because of these and many other benefits, the
elections offer extra power to the PKK, thereby the PKK strive to win the
elections; as explained its rationales, political violence is a common means of
acquiring popular support and often used over the pre-election period. Like the
other insurgents, the PKK resorted violence to win the elections.
Our findings on pre-election terrorism are consistent with previous studies,
suggesting that terrorism increases before elections (Dhanagare, 1968;
Amerasinghe, 1989; “Ever bloodier.2005”; “Can the voters build on success?
2005”; Gobyn, 2009; Sisk, 2008; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008).
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Most of them focused on the pre-election terrorism were descriptive studies and
pointed out low turnout rates as a consequence of terrorist attacks prior to the
elections. For instance, as mentioned previously, the Sinhalese nationalist
extremist organization) and Patriotic People's Front launched a terrorism
campaign three months before the elections; as a consequence, due to fear of
terrorism, only 55.32% of the electorates went to the polling stations in the Sri
Lanka presidential elections of 1988 (Amerasinghe, 1989). Similarly, Maoist
insurgents, the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (CPN-M) carried out violent
nationwide protests and as consequence only 20 percent of the electorates voted
in Nepal (Gobyn, 2009). Likewise, the Chechen insurgents killed 40 and
wounded 150 people just two days before the Election Day and as a
consequence only 55.75% of the electorates voted in the 2003 Duma elections in
Russia. Similarly, insurgent groups in Iraq launched a terrorism campaign just
three weeks before the Iraqi elections of 2005, (Ever bloodier.2005); as a
consequence of these attacks, hundreds of thousands Sunni Arabs scared and
did not cast their votes (Can the voters build on success? 2005).
Specific reasons of the PKK are not statistically examined in this study;
however descriptive statistics on target types indicates that the PKK prefers to
specifically attack against combatant targets, which include soldiers, police and
village guards in the dominantly Kurdish populated region (DKPR). We argue that
by targeting specifically combatant targets in its constituencies—which are the
DKPR provinces— the PKK aimed to increase its popular support and turn it to
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electoral support for its political party. As explained in the descriptive statistic
section of this study, the PKK focused combatants in the DKPR region, over the
pre-election period, especially in the final lap of the elections, whereas targeting
more non-combatant targets in the non-DKPR region provinces compared to the
DKPR region provinces. This findings are partially consistent with the Sisk(2008)
and the Höglund (2009) studies, which argued during the election campaign’s
final lap main common aim of the election violence is to intimidate or influence
voters through creating insecurity against opponent’s potential supporters, thus
the pattern of violence shifts from incumbent state official and emerging
candidates from political parties to potentially adversary electorates and
candidates. Their study did not make any difference in provinces or regions. In
our study, although the violence intensified as the Election Day approached,
violence shifted to noncombatants (in which covers potentially adversary
electorates and candidates in those studies) only in non-DKPR region provinces,
however violence was directed against the combatant targets in the DKPR region
provinces. For instance, in the DKPR region the percentage of terrorist attacks
against the combatant targets increased from 54% to 73% in 2004 local elections
and reached to 87% in 2007 general elections. On the other hand, in contrast to
such a selective or discriminate terrorism strategy in the DKPR region, the PKK
still targets noncombatant targets in the non-Kurdish region, where it has poor
popular support.
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Another factor related to pre-election terrorism is proximity, which was
mentioned previously. Literature suggested that terrorist attacks starts within a
short time period prior to the elections. Some studies explicitly pointed out the
“proximity” of the terrorist attacks. (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Sisk,2008;
Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al., 2008).Briefly they have argued that as
terrorist attacks occur near to election time, its impact on the election results
increases, whereas the farther away from the election, terrorist attacks lose
impact (Dhanagare, 1968; Bali, 2007; Berrebi & Klor, 2008; Gassebner et al.,
2008). Our finding is also consistent with these studies argument. Similar to
these studies, our descriptive statistics reveal that the PKK increases its terrorist
attacks especially within the last three months of the general elections. This
study shows that the PKK intentionally carries out its terrorist attacks as closing
to the general elections.
To sum up, this study indicates that the PKK systematically increased its
violence over the pre-election period of general elections because of the four
main reasons:
First; electorates are short-sighted, terrorist attacks closer to the elections
have more impact on the electorate’s preferences. It mobilizes the sympathizer
Kurdish constituents and increase electoral support for the PKK’s political party in
the upcoming elections; it discredits the incumbent government in the eyes of
citizens for not being able to protect them from the PKK’s atrocities; thus
decreases its chances to win in the elections.
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Second, if the terrorist attacks are successful enough the replace the
incumbent with another one, most probably a tougher one. If the new
government would implement harsh counter terrorism measures, especially
indiscriminate policies against neutral Kurdish population, it could radicalize the
Kurdish population, alienate the Kurdish population from the government. As a
consequence of these harsh counter-terrorism policies, the local population
would sympathize the PKK, thus the government would be doomed to failure.
Third, by increasing terrorist attacks, the insurgent intends to persuade the
government that it has capacity to impose serious costs to the government and
the citizens if the government continues a particular policy (Kydd & Walter,
2006). So, by resorting violence prior to the general elections, PKK wanted show
the government it has strong enough to create costs to the government.
Fourth, targeting especially combatant targets in its own region, not only
would the PKK increase its popularity among the Kurdish population but also
propose a considerable threat against non-supportive sections of the Kurdish
population. By using terrorism tool, as Kydd and Walter (2006) pointed out, the
insurgent intends to convince the local population it has still power to punish the
disobedience and the government is not capable of protecting them from the
insurgent; similarly Galula (2006) argues that support from the population is
conditional; so as long as the local population is convinced that the government
has will and power to win, people will not be able to openly support the
government (Galula, 2006). So, by carrying out terrorist attacks prior to the
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general elections, the PKK has reminded the constituents that it is strong enough
to impose cost to the population, so wanted to secure votes for its political party.
As Weinberg (Höglund, 2009) argues that presence of military wing makes it
easier for the insurgent to return violence if it does not satisfy the election
outcomes.
Terrorism after the Elections
H2b: “Terrorist attacks will increase abruptly upon the election”.
H2c: Subsequent terrorist attacks will decline over the post-election period.

Although existing literature does a relatively better job in explaining preelection terrorism, it does not provide sufficient insights into the post-election
terrorism other than arguing poor electoral results. Most scholars have
considered election outcomes as the main source of the post-election violence;
some scholars conceived post election violent events as quick and short-lived
events that starts right or soon after the results are announced and ends in a
short period of time, such as a couple of weeks (Kydd &Walter, 2002; Mesquita,
2005) . Our study results suggest that terrorist attacks first abruptly increase
upon the elections, and then decline in the long run over the post-election period.
Although our study indicates that argument that post-election terrorism is quick
short-lived events, we don’t attribute it to poor election results. If we had found a
negative relationship between terrorism and vote share of the PKK, then our
findings would have attributed their arguments regarding poor electoral supports.
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Since there is no evidence for the RD approach in our study, why would the PKK
increase its violence in the short-run after the election, and then decline in the
long run over the post-election period?
There might be many factors relevant to the post-election terrorism, some of
them could be publicized, whereas some others not. In general terrorism trends
after elections may stem from the followings: First, indication of political
willingness to combat terrorism by the incumbent government; second,
discrediting the government for its election pledges; second showing its power to
impose cost to the government and discrediting the government in the eyes of its
constituents.
Indication of government’s political willingness:
Since the terrorism increased prior to the general elections, political parties
that contesting the elections might have touched upon the terrorism issue in
Turkey and given election pledges stopping terrorism if they get elected. Due to
their election pledges to stop terrorism and to meet the expectation of the
constituents, the incumbent governments might have increased the counter
terrorism efforts and operations in the short run after the elections. In return, the
PKK might have responded to these efforts by dramatically increasing its
terrorism thus imposing more costs to the government to stop government’s
those efforts. This might be a reason for such a dramatically increase right after
the election.
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Increasing the Bargaining Capacity and Sitting at the Negotiating Table: As
some scholars note that if the insurgent wish to affect the government and
population, they must use costly signs (Kydd, 2005; Riley, 2001). Besides, the
insurgent has to persuade its adversary (government and target population) that
it is strong enough to impose serious costs, so the adversary accepts the
insurgent’s demands (Overgaard, 1994). From this perspective, the greater costs
the insurgent is able to impose, the more credible its threat to impose future
costs and more likely to obtain concession from the adversary; and furthermore,
the insurgent may use resort terrorism directly against the population when the
government has consistently refused to implement a policy at the insurgent’s
favor or when its efforts to change the government’s policy appear useless (Kydd
& Walter, 2006). Similarly, after the election, by increasing terrorism level, the
PKK may have wanted to indicate how it was able to and still has power to
instantly increase the costs for the incumbent, thus tried to force the incumbent to
sit at the negotiating table and make some policy changes favoring the PKK. For
instance, the PKK may have attempted to force the government to stop military
operations, or to make some changes in certain laws or some concessions. In
other words, the PKK may have attempting to push its demands into the political
agenda by resorting terrorism after the election.
Discrediting the government in the eyes of the constituents and showing its
weakness in protecting them from the PKK: By increasing costs to the local
population through terrorist attacks the PKK would be able to kill two birds with
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one stone. By this way, the PKK not only would be able to gain obedience and
support of the local Kurdish population but also discredit the government in the
eyes of the local population through showing the incumbent government’s
weaknesses in protecting them from the PKK. In other words, the PKK might
have been attempting to give a signal to the population that it is the de facto and
only power in the DKPR region. Having launched a massive terrorism campaign
right after the election, the population would come to conclusion that the
incumbent government was a bluffer and does not have capability to stop
atrocities of the PKK, so they would prefer to hide their true feelings and avoid
from cooperating with the PKK rather the government.
With regards to a decline in terrorist attacks in the long run over the postelection, we think that since the PKK has given its messages to the government
and population during the pre-election period as well as the short term period
after the election, so the PKK did not see any additional benefit to keep carrying
out terrorist attacks in the long-run over the post-election period, thus wasting its
resources.
Finally, seasonal factors may have influenced the terrorism trends. Two of the
elections (April 18th of 1999, and March 28th of 2004) were held in the spring and
one of them (July 22nd of 2007) was held in the summer seasons. In order to rule
out impact of the elections, we have included 12 months periods for both the preand post-election periods, so we were able to see a whole year period before
and after an election. If we had considered only three or six months periods for

207

pre- and post-election periods, then it would have been impossible to rule out this
alternative explanation. However, it is still possible that the PKK may have
increasing its terrorist activities in spring and summer seasons. This constitutes
one of the limitations of this study; however, even if seasons have any impact on
terrorism trends, it would not affect our conclusions for impact of popular support.
When considered the time period of the elections in explaining the terrorism
trends, the PKK might have increased its terrorist attacks after the elections
because the elections were held in the seasons when the PKK was most active,
and declined over the time because of the upcoming fall and winter semester
when the PKK’s militants operating in the rural areas station in shelters or
sanctuaries and do not move frequently. On the other hand, this argument is built
on an assumption that terrorist attacks are carried out by only guerrillas who
operate in rural areas. However, this does not represent the actual situation,
because the PKK has also cells operating in the urban areas and capable of
carrying out detonating bombs and conducting armed assaults, kidnapping and
arsons, which our data include all of them.
Policy Implications
The findings of the study have some policy implications. Briefly, the most
significant policy implication would be derived from this study is implementation
of winning hearts and mind policies that target the local population and help the
government acquire popular support of the local population and win the
population to government’s side. Since the popular support was positively related
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to the PKK’s terrorist activities, the best policy to diminish PKK terrorism is to
isolate it from the local population through well designed good counter terrorism
policies. These policies are non-military and politician oriented policies; the
military and law enforcement oriented policies must be subjugated to politician
oriented policies and play a complementary role. The military should not lead the
politicians; instead, the politicians must play a central role and coordinate overall
counter terrorism policies. On the other hand, it should be acknowledged that
terrorism problem neither can be solved without effective military and law
enforcement approach. Without neutralizing the armed wing of the population
and political organization operating at the grassroots of the local population
winning hearts and mind policies cannot achieve its goals. Without securing the
population, the government cannot win the population to its own side.
Secondary important policy implications are related to terrorism trends
over the pre-and post-election periods. Unlike long-term, politician oriented
winning hearts & minds policies, these policies are relatively more tactical
measures and designed to harden the government affiliated targets, to protect
civilian population from the terrorist attacks, to predict and prevent terrorist
attacks before they occur.
Policy implications for popular Support

Since the popular support is the key factor in counterinsurgency warfare,
the population is the key component, which the government and insurgent must
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strive win it to its own side. As explained in previous sections, depending upon
the sympathy level, the population is usually divided in to several sections by the
counterinsurgency practitioners and scholars. The findings of the study have
some policy implications for each section of the population as well as the other
insurgent and government. Deriving from findings of this study, we recommend
long-term winning hearts and minds policies for the general Kurdish population,
especially for those living the DKPR region. For the sympathizers of the PKK, the
government should develop a combination of nonmilitary repressive and law
enforcement based policies. Finally, for the PKK’s armed militants the
government should implement effective military based policies and conduct
effective intelligence operations on the active supporters who actively help the
armed militants (see Figure 78 below)

Figure 78: 3-Tiered Counter-Terrorism Policies
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1. Tier: Winning hearts and mind policies on neutral population
When the insurgent becomes unable to recruit new members and some
segments of the population express its hostility against the insurgent, the
insurgent may end its struggle and violent activities (Weinberg, 1991).
Therefore, primary aim of the overall counter-terrorism policies is to isolate the
PKK from the local population.
According to our study findings insurgent violence varies depending on the
degree of popular votes for its political party, thereby the government should
resort on “winning hearts and minds” policies in an effort to win the population
over to its side and erode popular support for the PKK, because eroding popular
support for the PKK through good policies will bring an end of backing for the
PKK, thereby leading the organization to suffer from the absence of resources,
thus leading to a decline in terrorist incidents.
As our study pointed out the PKK concentrated its terrorist activities in more
supportive areas because of the availability of resources. Therefore, while
implementing good countermeasures especially on insurgent friendly areas, at
the same time, the government should also position its counterinsurgent forces in
the provinces where PKK’s political party has retained or increased its popular
votes due to its potential capabilities of carrying out terrorist attacks. Adopting
this strategy has three main advantages: first, the government will be able to; 1)
use its forces more effectively; 2) predict where the most vulnerable provinces to
terrorist attacks; and 3) discourage current and potential supporters.

211

Winning the local Kurds in the DKPR region is core of counter-terrorism
policies. As Horowitz and Sharma (2008) pointed out ethnic insurgents fight for
their core national territories, which they claim; therefore they are likely to be
pursued with high levels of political will. Causes of insurgency lie in the political
conflict (Martin, 2010), thereby military conflict is subordinated to political conflict
(Shaw, 2001). Since the PKK is as an ethnic insurgent and terrorist organization,
Turkey’s counterterrorism policies must destroy the PKK’s political will and
causes of this political conflict. Political will cannot be destroyed without eroding
local population’s popular support for the PKK. As Parker (2007) pointed out
good counterinsurgency policies erode popular support for the insurgent where
poor ones contribute to popular support. Thus, by implementing good
counterterrorism policies not only the government will be able to erode popular
support for the insurgent but also solve the problems, or grievances that the PKK
has exploited for years. As our study results have indicated, the insurgent PKK’s
terrorist attacks are dependent on strength of its popular support from the local
population; therefore eroding popular support through good counterterrorism
policies is the main policy implication derived from this study. However, achieving
this objective is not an easy task and requires long term, politician oriented
policies that aim to gain the Kurds to the government’s side.
Such long term policies include social reforms, education, health and other
civilian policies to win the local population to government’s side. Social reform is
an attempt to address the grievances of the terrorists and their championed
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group. Its primary purpose is to resolve and undercut the underlying problems
that the terrorist organization exploits to acquire popular support and causes of
the conflict (Martin, 2010). Social reforms can include the improvement of
economic conditions and public recognition of the validity of grievances (Gus,
2010).

For instance, when Peru’s insurgency group Shining Path’s leader,

Abimail Guzman, was captured in 1992, the Peruvian government launched a
social reform campaign that includes land reforms, political rights, and rural
improvements. As a consequence, these policies have successfully eroded
popular support from the peasants for the insurgent Shining Path. Similarly, the
Turkish government should channel its resources to decrease the gap between
the DKPR region and other regions. Currently, the DKP region provinces are less
developed and have worse conditions in almost all areas compared to especially
the western and south western region provinces. The PKK has exploited these
grievances over 30 years. Although the Kurds are citizens and posses all political
rights, still the living conditions in the DKPR region provinces need improvement.
The government should increase job opportunities by promoting economic
investments and agriculture, so that employed individuals would find little reason
to join the PKK.
Similarly, education should be promoted in the DKPR region. The government
should increase the number of public schools and promote entrepreneurs to
invest on private schools through various monetary and tax incentives.
Thousands of students live in villages and hamlets, which makes it harder for
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them to get good quality education. In order to promote the education, the
government should offer them free boarding schools and provide vouchers for
private schools if they meet the conditions. By this way, the government will not
only be able to increase the level of education in the region but also protect them
from exposure of the PKK. The more young people attend schools, the fewer
individuals the PKK could find to recruit. In addition to increasing the level of
education on the DKPR region, schools and especially universities will also
contribute and vitalize social and economic life of the provinces.
University education is very competitive In Turkey, so majority of the students
will not be able to get a university education. Therefore, the government should
open new public universities and promote private universities as well. Especially
medical and law schools are very popular; prospective students of these schools
are usually willing to go anywhere to graduate from these schools. Launching
medical and law school programs in the DKPR region provinces would be a good
start in order to vitalize the social and economic life in the DKPR region.
Despite an anticipated increase in the undergraduate level education, still
thousands of students will not be able attend universities. Therefore, the
government should also make long term plans to meet middle-person needs in
the industrial and other areas. In order to meet these needs, the government
should promote vocational schools and design courses (electric & electronic
technician, nurse aids, child care, auto mechanics etc) for those who will have
little chance get a university level education, so having graduated from these
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schools or courses, individuals would be able to find jobs or start a business. By
this way, the government will be able decrease their possible deprivation and
diminish the risk for joining the PKK.
Health care is another important issue in the DKPR region. Compared to
western region provinces, there are fewer hospitals, health care personnel and
medical equipment in the DKPR region provinces. One reason for the shortage of
heath care personnel is that there is no mandatory service and rotation in health
care officials. Therefore, not many people are willing to serve in the health care
facilities of the DKPR region. As a consequence, people of the DKPR region wait
longer in the lines to see a doctor and less time are allocated due to lack of
human resources. Besides, due to less sufficient medical equipment in the
hospitals, people receive a lower quality treatment compared to the Western
region provinces.
The areas needs development can be expanded; the DKPR region also
needs better inter-province and inter village roads. There are still non-motorway
inter-province roads in this region. This may be affecting the trade in the region
as well. Some villages and hamlets even do not have roads connecting each
other.
In conclusion, by promoting the economic, social, education and other
conditions in the DKPR region, the government will be able to win the hearts and
minds of the population and erode the support for the PKK. Eroding popular
support will diminish resources of the PKK; thereby force it to decrease its
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terrorism. The PKK has exploited these less favorable conditions in the DKPR
region over 30 years and claimed that the Kurds are being discriminated in this
country. Actually, the DKPR region was not the only region with less favorable
conditions. For instance, the northern region (Black sea region) has less
favorable conditions compared to the Western regions but the people living in
this region have never challenged with the government or claimed that they have
been discriminated. In short, the government should make this DKPR region is a
better place to live.
However, as Martin (2010) noted long term, politician oriented policies should
be used in conjunction with other counterterrorism policies.
2. Tier: Repressive policies against supporters or friendly population
Martin

(2010)

argues

that

the

successful

use

of

nonmilitary and

nonparamilitary assets to suppress terrorism requires the effective deployment of
technological and organizational resources. The primary objective is to disrupt
and

deter

terrorist

organizations

and

their

support

apparatuses.

Counterinsurgency practitioners Galula (2006) and Trinquier (2006) point out the
active supporters of the insurgent living with the population. They argue that
when the population is watched by the active supporters of the insurgent, they
face with a threat of denunciation to the insurgent and prompt punishment by its
armed militants; thereby without neutralizing these active supporters, the local
population will not be able support to the government and have to act with the
insurgent to avoid from such punishment.
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Martin (2010) divides nonmilitary options four categories: 1) covert operations
(nonviolent)—which are secretive operations that include a number of possible
measures such as infiltration, disinformation and others; 2) intelligence—which
refers to data collection to create an informational database about terrorist
movements and to predict their behavior; 3) enhanced security— which refers to
the hardening of targets to deter or prevent terrorist attacks such as security
barriers, checkpoints, surveillance and others; 4) economic sanctions— which
are used to punish or disrupt state sponsors of terrorism.
Deriving from their arguments, we argue that the government’s intelligence
and law enforcement organizations must have closely work together for the
purpose of revealing these active supporters of the insurgent. Intelligence should
be collected on possible active supporters and their activities in the area. Having
collected and analyzed the information they have collected to reveal the network
of active PKK supporters, the intelligence organization work together with the law
enforcement to prosecute them. Through these repressive policies against the
active supporters at the grassroots of the population, the government will be able
to defeat the threat imposed to the neutral population, in return, the local
population will hot have to support or act with the insurgent. As a consequence,
the PKK will have less resources, intelligence and logistics to invest terrorist
activities.
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3. Tier: Offensive policies against militants:
These policies include military operations, covert operations and aim to
disrupt armed band of the PKK. As a military solution, Robert Thompson (1966)
suggests employing full-time paramilitary forces to protect hamlets and villages
from the insurgent and tasking the army with conducting clear-hold operations
and controlling the local population in insurgent’s popular base areas. In order to
achieve this goal, the military and intelligence organizations must work in a great
harmony to succeed in neutralizing the armed militants. Without doing so, fear of
terrorism among the local population will not disappear and government’s longterm policies will be doomed to failure.
Policy implications for Terrorism Trends in Elections
In addition to policies targeting certain sections of the population and
insurgents, the government should also implement some defensive policies to
protect its forces, officials, facilities and the population. Defensive policies
include: increase of terrorism and security awareness in the security forces,
officials and population; target hardening; strengthening possible security
weaknesses. Our study findings have some implications to diminish casualties,
predict possible terrorist attacks depending upon the election period.
Revealing an increasing terrorism trend over the pre-election period of
general elections has significant policy implications for the incumbent
government and population: The government should increase terrorism
awareness among its security forces and population towards the election and
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short term after the election, especially the last three months of the election and
three months after the election are very important. Within these approximately six
months period, provinces experience more terrorist attacks. During this period,
the intelligence agencies should increase their technical and surveillance
operations against the suspected individuals who could provide places, logistics,
intelligence and other necessary materials for the members of the insurgent’s
armed wing. In addition, the police, army, and private security companies should
be briefed about possible terrorist attacks against possible targets such as
security forces, political party buildings/workers and candidates and others
toward the election; protective countermeasures should be revised and their
efforts to protect possible targets should be increased.
Furthermore, our data indicates that the PKK strategically direct its violence
against the combatant targets deployed in the DKPR region. This finding leads
us to conclude that the PKK focuses and targets combatants in the DKPR region,
thus we recommend developing countermeasures that designed to diminish
attacks against government’s forces deployed in the DKPR region and protect
them from terrorist attacks. Such countermeasure include using jammer devices
to disrupt radio or cellular phones signals, thus disable possible remote
controlled bomb devices on the roads during transportation of military personnel
and materials; preferring air transportation as much as possible; developing
intelligence networks to reveal possible terrorist plots planning to attack
combatant targets and their collaborators.
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Finally, according to our study findings, the PKK decreases its terrorist
attacks in the long-run. Knowing this information would help the government to
re-allocate its resources and give rise to non-military initiatives.
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